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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE PROPOSED AFRICAN BOYCOTT
OF THE XI COMMONWEALTH GAMES

BY

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A THESIS
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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance a thesis entitled: "The Proposed African Boycott of the XI Commonwealth Games", submitted by David C. Hoy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Physical Education.

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ABSTRACT

This study was undertaken with one major objective. The study endeavored to describe the events leading up to the 1978 Commonwealth Games which occurred as a result of a threat by black African Nations to boycott the Edmonton Games.

In order to meet this objective three areas were explored. To provide essential supplementary information to the main problem under study an historical overview of apartheid as practiced in South Africa is examined. Chapter Two describes the historical roots of apartheid, apartheid in sport in South Africa and the isolation of South Africa in international sport. To secure this information an extensive review of available literature was undertaken.

Additional supplementary information is provided in Chapter Three, which describes international opposition to apartheid as it has manifest itself in the Commonwealth Games. Historical evidence provided in this chapter illustrates that at recent Commonwealth Games, Commonwealth nations which maintained sporting links with South Africa were threatened with boycotts by African Commonwealth members. Specifically these nations were the host countries, Great Britain in 1970, and New Zealand in 1974. Information gathered in this chapter was obtained through an extensive review of the literature, and through newspaper analysis.

The research findings of Chapter Four chronologically describe the events related to the African boycott threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Essentially the African Commonwealth nations threatened

to boycott the Games if New Zealand maintained its sports contacts with South Africa. Agencies concerned with the organization and success of the 1978 Commonwealth Games, the Commonwealth Games Foundation and the Canadian Government, were not aware that a boycott threat existed until after the 1976 Olympics. There, 29 of 31 black African nations boycotted New Zealand's attendence at the Olympics. Subsequently, during the Fall of 1976 and Spring of 1977, considerable diplomatic efforts were made by the Canadian government in conjunction with the Commonwealth Games Foundation and the Commonwealth Secretariat, towards resolving the differences between New Zealand and the black African nations. These efforts were directed towards achieving a reconciliation at the Commonwealth heads of government conference held in London, England in June of 1977. At that conference, during a weekend retreat at Gleneagles, Scotland, an agreement between New Zealand and the Africans declaring opposition to sports apartheid was reached. This agreement officially called the "Commonwealth Statement On Apartheid In Sport" and popularly called the "Gleneagles Agreement" was approved by the 33 Commonwealth nations present at the conference.

Following this conference, Commonwealth Games Foundation President Dr. Maury Van Vliet travelled to Africa on a promotional and goodwill tour. While there Dr. Van Vliet was able to promise African Commonwealth nations transportation to Edmonton prior to the opening of the Games. Those efforts, combined with the signing of the Gleneagles Agreement, contributed to the resolution of November 1977 by the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa urging all African Commonwealth nations to attend the Games in Edmonton.

During the first six months of 1978, 11 of 13 African Commonwealth nations accepted their invitations to the Games. Only Botswana, who had insufficient funds to send athletes and Uganda, who withdrew because of Canadian hostility towards Uganda did not accept invitations. One week before the Games opening, Nigeria withdrew from the Games because they believed New Zealand had not lived up to the Gleneagles Agreement.

Attendence at Edmonton by 10 of the 13 African Commonwealth nations can be attributed to efforts made by the Commonwealth Games Foundation, the Canadian government and the Commonwealth Secretariat.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the members of my supervisory committee, Dr. M. Smith, Dr. G. Redmond for their assistance in the completion of this study. In particular I would like to thank Professor R. O. Anderson, the chairperson of the committee for her valued assistance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION 1
- Statement of the Problem 3
- Definition of Terms 3
- Justification of the Study 5
- Scope of Study 5
- Limitations of Study 6
- Objectives of Study 6
- Methods and Procedures 7
- Organization of Study 8

II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 10
- The Roots of Apartheid 10
- South Africa Since 1948: Apartheid in Practice 17
- Apartheid in Sport in South Africa 26
- The Isolation of South Africa in International Sport and South Africa's Reaction to Isolation . . 36

III. INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AND THE COMMONWEALTH GAMES 65

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS BOYCOTT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES 74
- Winning the Bid to Host the XI Commonwealth Games: 1972 74
- Canadian Government Policy on Apartheid in Sport: 1972-1976 76
- Lead Up to the Boycott of the 1976 Olympic Games: November 1975 - July 1976 77

CHAPTER PAGE

Canadian Response to the Olympic Boycott: August-September 1976 83

Diplomatic Efforts Towards Reconciliation Between New Zealand and Africa: Fall 1976 86

Games Invitations Go Out With Optimism: January 1977 92

Lead Up to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting: February-June 1977 94

Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference (June 8 - 15, 1977) 101

Reaction to the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport: June 1977 103

Post-Gleneagles Events: Summer 1977 106

Dr. Van Vliet's Trip to Africa: September-October 1977 108

Africans Accept Games Invitations: Winter 1977-78 113

Orida and Ganga Visit Edmonton: April 1978 118

Dr. Ivor Dent's Trip to Africa: June-July 1978 121

Late Efforts to Ensure African Participation at Edmonton: July 1978 122

Nigeria Withdraws from the 1978 Commonwealth Games: July 26, 1978 124

The XI Commonwealth Games: August 3 - 12, 1978 . . 128

V. DISCUSSION 130

New Zealand: The Subject of the Boycott 130

The African Boycott Threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games 133

The Boycott By Nigeria 135

Efforts Directed Towards Alleviating the Boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games 137

CHAPTER PAGE

International Efforts 137

The Commonwealth 138

Other Commonwealth Governments 140

The Federal Government of Canada 140

Efforts Inside Canada 143

The Federal Government of Canada 143

The Province of Alberta 144

The City of Edmonton 145

The XI Commonwealth Games Foundation 145

Individual Efforts 146

Implications of the Boycott Threat on Politics in International Sport 147

Sports Boycott of South Africa Vs. Political Realities in Africa 149

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 151

Summary 151

Conclusions 152

Recommendations 155

BIBLIOGRAPHY 156

APPENDIX 1. Government of Canada Policy on Apartheid in Sport 1975 - 1978 162

APPENDIX 2. Shridath Ramphal Letter to National Sport Organizations in Commonwealth Countries 174

APPENDIX 3. Uganda's Involvement in the 1978 Commonwealth Games 178

APPENDIX 4. E. S. Mpofu, First Secretary, Embassy of Botswana Letter to Author 185

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. International Organizations, Nations and Individuals Involved in Events Surrounding the Boycott Threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games 131

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> For it is the dawn that has come, as it has come for a thousand centuries, never failing. But when that dawn will come, of our emancipation, from the fear of bondage and the bondage of fear, why that is a secret.
>
> Alan Paton, Cry the Beloved Country, 1948.

> I, therefore, want to make it quite clear that from South Africa's point of view no mixed sport between whites and non-whites will be practiced locally, irrespective of the standard or proficiency of the participants ... We do not apply that as a criterion because our policy has nothing to do with proficiency or lack of proficiency.
>
> South African Prime Minister Vorster, 1967 (in Lapchick, 1975)

Sport is significant to people. One only need review the attention given to international sports competition to realize that sport has meaning. The 1976 Montreal Olympic Games were staged in a billion dollar complex and were viewed through global communication by nearly a billion people. Thus sport can be a common denominator among men. As such, it is thought to have the ability to transcend race, religion, ethnicity and ideological differences and create international brotherhood, goodwill and peace among all people. International sport is seen to be a common peaceful meeting ground for the people of the world. This belief is clearly only one side of the coin. Orwell (1950) is one of many authors who has described sport as international mimic warfare and is means of sowing discord among nations.

The extension of apartheid into international sport has witnessed an ever increasing isolation of South Africa from the rest of the sporting world. This act, supported by many nations vehemently opposed to apartheid, demonstrates inextricably the link of politics with international sport. Consequently, the value of sport as a peaceful meeting ground for all people has been ironically destroyed. A form of social protest intended to assure all individuals the right to compete freely with one another in sport has resulted in the denial of many nations' outstanding athletes the honour of competing at the premier sports festivals of the world.

The ever-increasing isolation of South Africa in international sport culminated in the 1970 expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic movement (Lapchick, 1975). Further attempts to isolate South Africa have taken on different forms, ranging from protests by individual social action groups within several nations, to major boycotts by black African nations. These forms of protest have had some success in disrupting South African sports participation abroad (Hain 1971, Shaw 1976, Thompson 1975). The most profound display of the boycott phenomenon occurred at the 1976 Olympic Games where twenty-nine African nations chose to boycott the Games rather than participate with New Zealand. Following the Olympic boycott it became clear to those concerned with the preparation and staging of the 1978 Commonwealth Games that there was a definite possibility that African Commonwealth members might boycott. Consequently, the two year period following the Montreal Olympics leading up to the 1978 Commonwealth

Games resulted in considerable effort directed towards alleviating the boycott threat.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem to be examined can be put in the form of a question which reads:

> What was the effect of the proposed African Commonwealth Nations boycott on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games?

Sub-problems originating from this question to be examined are as follows:

1. To describe the effect of the proposed boycott on the organization, development and staging of the 1978 Commonwealth Games between 1971 and 1978.
2. An interpretation and discussion of the effect of the proposed boycott on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

DEFINITION OF TERMS[1]

For the purpose of this study the following terms are defined:

Apartheid: The policy of strict racial segregation and discrimination against native Negroes and other native peoples as practiced in the Republic of South Africa.

Racialism: A feeling of differences, especially with reference to racial superiority, inferiority or purity, racial prejudice, hatred or discrimination.

---

[1] Many of the terms defined here are derived in part from Websters New World Dictionary, 1957, and Websters New International Dictionary, 1976, and adapted for the purposes of this study.

Racism: The assumption that psychological traits and capacities are determined by biological race and that races differ decisively from one another which is usually coupled with a belief in the inherent superiority of a particular race and its right to domination over others. 2. A doctrine or political program based on the assumption of racism and designed to execute its principles.

Politics: For the purposes of this study, politics can be defined as the extension or imposing of one group's idealogy (anti-apartheid) or will upon another group (South African, New Zealand, the entire world). Essentially, this is manifest in the form of protest and boycott.

Protest: To make objection to, to express disapproval, or to speak strongly against.

Boycott: To join together in refusing to deal with any nation which has sporting contacts with South Africa.

African Commonwealth Nations: The thirteen African nations within the Commonwealth, which are: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

Sports Festival: An event, a celebration in which athletes compete at sports and spectators come to observe their excellence.

XI Commonwealth Games Foundation (Edmonton 1978): An administrative organization which exists for the express purpose of successfully coordinating the planning and staging of the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The study can be justified for the following specific reasons:

1. While much research has been completed pertaining to the impact of apartheid on the phenomenon of international sports festivals, there is little description of its impact on the development and preparation for sports festivals.
2. The international sports festival has long been a focal point for the interplay between politics and sport. As such it has often had a detrimental effect on the spirit of peace, friendly competition and international brotherhood. An interpretation of the data described in this study may aid in both the planning of future sports festivals and in discerning the value of sports festivals in today's society.
3. The study will add to the body of knowledge relative to the historical development of sport in Canada.
4. Canada is moving into a new era in sport in terms of its importance in society. The outcome of the 1978 Commonwealth Games may have a profound impact on Canadians. Thus a study of this nature is both "timely" and necessary.

SCOPE OF STUDY

The study was delimited in the following aspects:

1. The primary emphasis of this study shall be to describe the impact of the proposed boycott on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

2. The historical description of the impact of the boycott shall be delimited to the time period from January 1971 (the era in which Edmonton first seriously considered bidding for the 1978 Commonwealth Games) to August 1978 (the Commonwealth Games occur).

LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

The study was limited by the procedures and instruments utilized. The limitations of these procedures and instruments are:

1. The interview technique (i.e. the accuracy of statements by the persons interviewed, personal biases expressed by the interviewer).
2. Analysis and interpretation of documents obtained during the course of research in terms of their accuracy and accessibility.
3. The use of personal correspondence with various individuals (i.e. obtaining response and accuracy of information, etc.).
4. The study was limited in that it was difficult to obtain all of the relevant documentation because of financial constraints.
5. The study was limited by the time period in which research took place. Research at a later date would have allowed for the dissemination of more detailed information on the topic, information not available at the time of writing.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

In an effort to describe the impact of the proposed boycott on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games it is hoped the following objectives can be met:

1. To describe who the instigators behind the boycott are, and why they chose to threaten a boycott.
2. To describe what form, if any, the boycott took.
3. To set down in clear terms an accurate description using valid historical data the impact of the proposed boycott on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games.
4. To describe what efforts and initiatives were made to reduce the possibility of a boycott at the 1978 Commonwealth Games.
5. To obtain data which for a practical purpose will be useful for the planning and organization of future sports festivals.
6. To provide supplementary information to the main problem under study pertaining to:
    - (a) The history of apartheid in international sport (i.e. the increasing isolation of South Africa and the impact of boycotts on international sports competition).
    - (b) The history of the influence of apartheid on the Commonwealth Games.
7. To further understand the role of the international sports festival in modern society.
8. To identify areas of future study.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This study used primarily the descriptive research method. Within this method a wide range of research techniques were used including basic library research, document analysis, newspaper analysis, personal correspondence through letters, personal observation and personal interviews.

Research covered an historical period beginning January, 1971, and concluded August, 1978. The data collected was placed chronologically on a time line, and described in terms of its effect on those agencies associated with the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. These agencies were: The Commonwealth Secretariat, the three levels of government in Canada, other Commonwealth governments, the XI Commonwealth Games Foundation, the Commonwealth Games Federation and concerned individuals.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

Chapter II is an historical overview of apartheid and apartheid in sport. This chapter reviews the roots of apartheid and apartheid in practice which are important to the conceptualization of apartheid in sport. The chapter also describes South Africa's isolation in international sport and their reaction to that isolation.

Chapter III describes the historical involvement of apartheid in the Commonwealth Games from 1934 to 1974. This chapter deals exclusively with this topic because of its relevancy to the study.

Chapter IV presents historically the effect of the proposed African Commonwealth boycott on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Described in the chapter are the reasons for the boycott threat, efforts made internationally and inside Canada to minimize the possibility of a boycott and historical events which are pertinent to the study.

Chapter V offers a discussion and interpretation of efforts made and events which occurred as a result of the boycott threat. The chapter also discusses these outcomes in light of their implications on politics in international sport.

Chapter VI presents a summary of the study, conclusions which could be drawn from this study, and recommendations for future study and research.

CHAPTER II

THE ROOTS OF APARTHEID

The Portugese, while establishing a passage around the Cape of Good Hope (1498) were the first whites to come in contact with blacks in southern Africa. It was the Dutch, however, who set up the first white settlement, a half-way supply station, at the Cape in 1652 (Roskam, 1966). Rhoodie and Venter (1959) describe the early association with the aboriginal tribes (Hottentots) by the Dutch as being made with "noticeable aloofness", one of the earliest forms of apartheid. While the new settlers were certainly aware of their differences from the natives, marriages between whites and slaves and Hottentots were both socially accepted and legally sanctioned. This situation emerged out of a shortage of marriageable white women for the male settlers (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959). These miscegenous unions produced many half-breed or coloured offspring. By the end of the seventeenth century, marriage between whites and full coloureds was prohibited, but white and half-breed marriages were still accepted. Du Toit (1966) believes that a caste structure emerged in society in which racial background was not of primary importance. The class structure which did emerge was one of slaves and slave owners.

Another factor which gave rise to an awareness of racial differences during the seventeenth century concerned Dutch attempts to employ aboriginals as laborers. This proved to be unsuccessful and resulted in the importation of slaves from central Africa. By 1750 there were more non-whites than whites at the Cape and consequently a substantial labour force. According to Paton (1959) these people later became known as the Cape Coloureds.

Territorial segregation had its roots in early disputes over grazing land between Cape settlers and the aboriginal groups. Whites, in efforts to secure grazing for their own livestock, attempted several times to mark out boundaries between their land and that which belonged to the natives. While the rationale behind this physical separation was economic, it has become over the centuries a tradition which is now associated with the apartheid idea (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959).

During the latter part of the seventeenth century a group of settlers emerged at the Cape who were determined to make southern Africa their permanent home. This group of pioneer farmers distinguished themselves from the rest of the colonists through their concern over race relation problems of self preservation, and border disputes with natives. Rhoodie and Venter (1959) described this group of people as those who:

> ... collectively identified themselves with the new father-land and felt themselves drawn together on a common density ...[their]... moral characteristics were based on their determination to preserve their racial identity and an inherent realization of the differences between themselves and non-whites. (p. 49)

This group of people later trekked inland in search of farm land and became known as Boers, Voortekkers, and Afrikaners. Their beliefs concerning self preservation in a new land and "an aversion to personal or social intercourse with 'different', less developed cultural and racial groups created a general pattern on which later generations were able to build" (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959, p. 50). Macrone (1957) attributes the attitude of social exclusion that was directed towards non-whites in part to the religious beliefs of these Dutch settlers. There was an inherent belief that christians (the white European settlers) were morally and socially superior to non-christians (non-white slaves and aboriginals). Further, to place non-whites on an equal footing with christians was "contrary to laws of God and natural distinction of race and religion" (Bird, 1888, p. 459).

The British established themselves and took permanent control of the Cape in 1806. With the British came a new philanthropic attitude towards non-whites which eventually saw the emancipation of the Hottentots in 1828 and the abolition of slavery in 1837 at the Cape (Du Toit, 1966). Walker (1940) reported that there was also a move to make non-whites and whites equal before the law. Many of the Dutch settlers resented the imposition of British rule, and their attitude towards non-whites. It was for this reason, combined with the desire for new farm land, that many of the Cape settlers left the colony and began the "Great Trek" inland in 1835 (Paton, 1958). In reference to the British and the trek inland one trekker wrote:

> ... it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke [British liberalism] therefore we rather withdrew in order to preserve our doctrines in purity. (Bird, 1888, p. 459)

As the Voortrekkers or Boers moved inland and attempted to establish settlements they soon met with an organized and numerically superior Zulu (Bantu) opposition. Many violent racial confrontations took place and some Voortrekker settlements were destroyed. The Boers, however, finally defeated the Zulu (Bantu) in 1838 which gave them temporary control of the Natal region of southern Africa (UNESCO, 1974). This was not the first confrontation between the Boers and the Bantu. Racial conflict took place several times between 1779 and 1850 (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959). These racial conflicts can be linked to the synthesis of the apartheid idea. Preservation of race was clearly a real crises to the Voortrekkers and the early racial clashes certainly helped consolidate this viewpoint. Rhoodie and Venter (1959) recognize the importance of this perspective in the early political development of apartheid:

> The Boer-Afrikaners struggle for national self-determination ran a parallel course with his development towards political maturity. Because nationalism and the instinct of self-preservation are so closely connected, the presence of a numerically superior Bantu race set a definite stamp on the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. (p. 187)

While the Boers controlled the Natal, they set up a sovereign government in which "Blacks had no political rights at all ... [and] ... there was no question of equality" (UNESCO, 1974, p. 18). This action caused much consternation at the Cape and in Britain there was protest over the Boers treatment of the Africans. Because of this philanthropic position the British moved to annex Natal in 1842. Subsequently the Boers moved on to the north (UNESCO, 1974).

An important event took place in the Natal in the late 1840's which proved to have an impact on future race relations. Under the supervision of British administrator Theophilus Shepstone, a system of native reserves were established for all Africans in the Natal, and they were encouraged to move into them. A UNESCO (1974) publication on race and apartheid in South Africa indicated that this action can be seen as "a forerunner of the present South African policy on requiring people of different races to live in different areas" (p. 20).

The Boers who moved north out of the Natal colonized the Orange River and Transvaal regions of South Africa. The British, however, were not far behind in their annexation of these regions. British imperialism was one of the primary reasons for moving into these areas, as in 1866-67 gold and diamonds were discovered. Van de Berghe (1970) believes that British economic imperialism made conflict between the Boers and the British unavoidable. The ensuing Boer-Briton Wars between 1899-1902 saw twenty thousand Boer women and children die in British concentration camps, and though the war was won by Britain, there was little sense of triumph (Walker, 1940). The end of the war saw the northern Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free state come under British rule. But it was clear the subjugation of the Boers was out of the question (UNESCO, 1974).

The years following the Boer War and prior to the unification of South Africa can be characterized as a period in which the four regions of southern Africa, the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange River and Transvaal attempted to come to grips with the native question. There were increasing numbers of black tribesmen descending into the white areas to work in the gold and diamond mines and Asiatic and Chinese workers were being imported to fill the shortage of workers in the Transvaal. This proved to be disturbing to the whites, who, according to Rhoodie and Venter (1959) moved towards the unification of South Africa as the "result of a common desire to formulate a uniform native policy" (p. 113).

During this time period, political leaders and parties emerged representing essentially two different perspectives on the native question. The northern position represented the Boer-Afrikaner stand of racial differentiation, the southern political position was more liberal and called for racial tolerance (Bunting, 1971). These two groups met between 1908 and 1910 and discussed both racial positions in light of the objective of unification of South Africa. Eventually a compromise position was reached and South Africa became united in 1910. It is believed that unification gave impetus to the development of apartheid as:

> The native question now became a common national problem. The protagonists of racial differentiation now had at their disposal a much larger forum in which they could expound or defend their racial attitudes (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959, p. 118).

Although the first government of South Africa represented a compromise viewpoint, non-white rights and privileges soon began to be controlled. The Native Labour Act of 1911 prohibited natives from undertaking certain tasks (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959). Broad territorial segregation measures were proposed, as well, by Native Affairs Minister Hertzog. These measures were never realized as Hertzog was expelled from the cabinet by the Liberals in 1912 for his adamant Afrikaner nationalism as well as internal conflict within the cabinet (Walker, 1940).

Other separation and segregation measures became legislation between 1912 and 1923, but these policies for the most part were easily circumvented and were reflective of the lack of a total national feeling for these apartheid ideals. The non-whites became increasingly economically integrated, and territorial racial separation during the first years of the Union failed (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959).

While British liberalism and imperialism thwarted the development of the apartheid idea nationally, a mouthpiece for Afrikaner nationalism was born during this time period. General Hertzog formed the Nationalist Party in 1914 and organized Afrikaner nationalism across the Union. In the inaugural convention Hertzog outlined the segregation idea:

> The native should develop in accordance with his own inherent capabilities, and parallel to the white, but subject to the domination and rule of the European population in a spirit of Christian guardianship ... Strict measures would also be taken to prevent miscegenation (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959, p. 125).

During the years immediately following World War I, the increasing urbanization of the Bantu gave impetus to Afrikaner nationalism. It is believed that this contributed to the election of a new government in 1924 in which Hertzog's nationalist Party formed a coalition with the Labor Party. This coalition remained in power until 1933 (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959). During this time period the government introduced legislation which increased segregation measures and counteracted the "black danger" to the socio-economic sphere of the whites (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959).

In 1933, in order to consolidate the segregationist viewpoint in parliament, Hertzog's government fused with General Smuts' South African Party to form the United Party. At this time, the most ardently racially purist nationalists decided to maintain the Nationalist Party as an independent group (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959). The out-break of the Second World War saw the ruling coalition of the United Party break up over the issue of the war. Hertzog and his nationalist orientated followers withdrew as they supported Nazi Germany (Duggan, 1973).

The years between 1923 and 1939 saw a rise in Afrikaner nationalism and a consolidation of the apartheid idea across the Union. The increasing urbanization of non-whites, and a rising awareness among the Bantu peoples began to threaten the white-nationalists. Afrikaner leaders began to address the native question and the Nationalist Party took leadership in proposing an apartheid South Africa (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959).

General Smuts' United Party lead South Africa into the Second World War on the side of the western Allies. After winning a general election in 1943, this party remained in power until 1948 (Duggan, 1973). By this time, support for Afrikaner nationalism and the Nationalist Party had increased substantially. By the time of the general election of 1948, it became clear that the voting populance of South Africa were ready to put apartheid into practice. Under the leadership of Hertzog's successor, Dr. D. F. Malan, the Nationalist Party swept the election and subsequently began to implement apartheid (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959).

SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948: APARTHEID IN PRACTICE

According to Bunting (1971), apartheid is an Afrikaner word which literally means "apartness, the state of being apart, separateness or separation and in South Africa means racial distrinction"

(p. 23). Apartheid was first used in parliament in 1944 by the Nationalist Party leader, Dr. Malan, who described the nature of the future republic as follows:

> ... to ensure the safety of the white race and of Christian civilization by the honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and guardianship (Bunting, 1971, p. 24).

Duggan (1973) suggested that at the basis of apartheid is the concept that each of the four racial sub-groups (whites, Asians, coloureds and Africans) are a nation in themselves. Each racial subgroup should develop socially, politically and economically as much apart as circumstances permit. The white racial group is considered to be the most advanced of the four, and is, therefore, considered by the whites to be the predestined ruler or trustee of the less advanced:

> The Afrikaner community is considered supreme, with God given rights of leadership. They are, in effect, "the chosen people" ... To that end all political, parliamentary, and legal activity, educational, cultural and religious actions - even business activities are aimed at insuring white supremacy (Duggan, 1973, p. 20).

Rhoodie and Venter (1959) believe the Afrikaners are fulfilling a guardianship role in the evolution of race relations in South Africa. In this role, "the civilized, more highly developed white man took the uncivilized underdeveloped black man under his protection and began to educate him, uplift him" (p. VIII). The guardianship role is a temporary phase in the evolution of race relations, ending only when the black man can demonstrate an ability to manage his own affairs in a democratic and civilized manner without danger to himself. When this occurs, the emancipation of the blacks will begin and ultimately result in "the last stage in the programme of apartheid in which white and non-white, each in his own homeland, will once again exist side by side in free flowing units" (Rhoodie and Venter, 1959, p. VIII).

Dr. Eiselen, the first Secretary of Native Affairs, is regarded by Du Toit (1966) as being largely influential in the development of the present apartheid policy. Eiselen described his perspective on apartheid as:

> ... the separating of the heterogeneous groups ... into separate socio-economic units, inhabiting different parts of the country, each enjoying its own full citizenship rights, the greatest of which is the opportunity of developing such capabilities as its individual members may possess (Du Toit, 1966, p. 202).

Bunting (1971) believes that a central notion to the apartheid or separate development idea is that, "the South African population is not and can never be integrated whole, sharing a common citizenship" (p. 25). He further stated that Nationalist Party leaders attempted to "dress-up" this notion by stressing that separate development is not the same as discrimination and that each of the four racial sub-groups in South Africa is entitled to the basic right of self-determination. At one point in time, during their respective tenures as Prime Minister, each of the four Nationalist Party leaders, (Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd and Vorster) expressed this position.

While the position of christian guardianship and separate development has been espoused by government leaders, apartheid in operation has led many authors to express different interpretations. Bunting (1971) called into question the above mentioned perspective, claiming "they are far from the harsh realities of life in South Africa" (p. 27). He further stated that apartheid is "a life of privilege and plenty for whites, based on the exploitation of cheap black labour" (p. 27).

Louw (1977) reported that the Cottesloe Consultation of 1960 (a discussion of social problems and race relations by South African churches) regarded apartheid as a situation in which "the ruling group use their position and power to safeguard and extend their scope to the detriment of other groups" (p. 109).

Duggan (1973) has described the Nationalist Party aims of apartheid as the fulfillment of a doctrine of political and cultural aims by "creating a compartmentalized society to insure continued white domination" (p. 22). The United Nations special committee against apartheid (1975) condemned it as a "crime against humanity".

The major component from which many of the differing interpretations and reactions to apartheid stem is its committment to separate development. The Nationalist government since 1948 has endeavoured, through legislation, to put this policy into practice by segregating blacks from whites in all phases of life. Because of this, apartheid has become almost a total reality in South Africa.

One segment of the implementation of apartheid has been the political segregation of all races. The political rights of all non-whites have eroded away. Since 1968 (Separate Representation of Voters Act), non-whites have had no political representation in parliament. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act (1968) forbids political parties to have members of more than one race. Subsequently, all non-white political activity has been confined to extra-parliamentary groups. In addition, non-whites have no voting privileges (UNESCO, 1974).

Since 1950, when the Suppression of Communism Act was passed, the government increasingly limited the civil liberties of all races.

The brunt of this legislation, however, has had more of an effect on the political development of non-whites as Duggan (1973) observed:

> Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, formation of opposition political parties, freedom of press, freedom of work and movement, even freedom of religious activity have been impaired or precluded ... All standard privileges of free assembly and society have gradually been diminished or erased for non-whites under the Nationalist regime. It has been difficult for liberal voices to be raised in opposition, but doubly so for Blacks (p. 26).

A result of this legislation has seen the exile, banning and detainment of members of all races which express liberal opposition to apartheid (including several sports activists). The South African Institute of Race Relations issued a formal statement in 1968 decrying the government's legal powers. The Institute contended that:

> The present powers of government exceed those required to meet the present danger and the government has interfered with established rights of individuals that should prevail in a society which claims to respect standards of western civilization (Duggan, 1973, p. 27).

Another prominent aspect of the apartheid plan is the so-called Bantustan (Bantu Homelands) program. This concept is aimed at the total segregation of blacks from whites in both the urban and rural areas. An essential aim of the Bantustan program is the compartmentalization of South African society, into components in which each racial group has its own designated homeland. Duggan (1973) suggests that the results of this program afford an underlying feeling of safety to the whites as it "embodies a barrier to (and reversal of) movement of blacks into cities ... thus buying time for the status quo of white supremacy" (p. 50).

This program, which in essence offers no social, economic or racial reform, has been used extensively for international propaganda purposes by the South African government. Nationalist party leaders emphasize that the Bantustan thesis personifies the principle of blacks in the homelands being separate but equal (Duggan, 1973). This, however, is not the case, as the total land area of the Bantustans represents only 13% of all of South Africa, while the African or Bantu population numbers close to 70% of the total population (Bunting 1971, p. 29). Further, from an economic standpoint, much of the Bantustan land is arid, land-locked and has little industry or exploitable minerals (UNESCO, 1974).

Unlike other spheres in South African life, it has been virtually impossible to put apartheid into practice in the economic sphere. There was a constant move towards economic integration. Between 1960 - 1970 total non-white employment in the South African economy increased approximately 50%. But while there is increasing economic integration, legislation has provided for differing wage scales, working conditions and job reservations between whites and non-whites (Duggan, 1973).

The common denominator in employment opportunities is race. Accordingly, apartheid legislation has insured that the higher paying, skilled and supervisory jobs are reserved for whites (Duggan, 1973). The Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) provides for the enforced reservation of certain types of jobs for different racial groups, and enforces racial separation within trade unions. The Bantu Urban Areas Amendment Act (1956) allows local authorities to deport black workers who are deemed detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order in an area. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1970) is designed to prohibit the employment of blacks to jobs which may result in labour integration and the possibility of racial strife (Duggan, 1973).

Apartheid has been legislated into the social sphere of life in South Africa as well. According to Van den Berghe (1970), the most important criteria for social status is race. The four different racial groups (whites, coloureds, Asians and Africans) make up a social hierarchy in which the socio-economic gap is wide and upward social mobility between the groups is almost impossible. At the top of the social hierarchy are whites or Europeans, who number 19.4% of the total population. They have a much higher standard of living, education and health than the majority of non-whites and monopolize all of the occupations above that of semi-skilled labour. They are the only group to have political rights, and enjoy other legal and social privileges (Van den Berghe, 1970). The nearest group to the whites in terms of suffering fewer disabilities and disruption of life style are the coloureds (9.4% of total population). But in terms of education and income they rank slightly lower than the Asians (3% of total population). Both Asians and coloureds occupy nearly the same position on the social heirarchy, considerably lower than the Europeans, but above the Africans (blacks or Bantu). At the base of the racial pyramid are the Africans, who number 68.2% of the total population. Their standard of living, education and occupational status are the lowest and they are the race most discriminated against (Van den Berghe, 1970).

One of the reasons that social mobility between groups is almost impossible is the restriction placed on social (sexual) contact between whites and non-whites. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) restricts marriage to only those within the same race, and prohibits any miscegenation outside marriage. Thus, the white race is preserved as pure, and social (sexual) contact between races prohibited (UNESCO, 1974).

Being a member of the white race entails privileges that are restricted to whites only. While many of these privileges are in the economic and political realm, they also include a number of social privileges. Europeans are subject to racial segregation in the same way non-whites are (e.g. a white person may not use facilities or live in areas reserved for non-whites), but the segregation of facilities and land works almost entirely to the white's advantage. Whites own 87% of the land, monopolize the majority of existing facilities, and in many instances are the only people to have access to a facility in a community, e.g. swimming pool, cinema, golf courses, etc. (Van den Berghe, 1970). The Separate Amenities Act (1953) institutionalized not only the segregation of facilities, but also that they be unequal. The segregation and inequality of facilities has come to be known as petty apartheid and affects many areas of daily social patterns in South Africa.

Apartheid legislation has affected almost every sphere of South African life. All of the legislation has been directed at consolidating the position of the white Afrikaner as supreme and powerful in South Africa. Listed below are some of the more important pieces of legislation that have served to consolidate apartheid as a way of life in South Africa:

1. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and Immorality Act (1950): outlawed marriage and sexual intercourse between whites and blacks.

2. Population Registration Act (1950): divided the population into racial categories, and as of 1966, it became compulsory for all citizens over the age of 16 years to possess identity cards and to produce these at the request of an authorized person. Race is one of the entries on the identity card.

3. The Group Areas Act (1950): stipulated that each racial group must live in special demarcated areas.

4. The Bantu Education Act (1953, amended in 1954, 1956, 1959 and 1961): applied apartheid to African education. Separate education was also stipulated for Indians (1965) and coloureds (1963). Under the terms of these Acts, education for whites, coloureds, Asians and Africans is separately administered, separately financed and follows different curriculua.

5. Bantu Urban Areas Act (1945 and amended in 1964): Africans working in urban areas lived in designated townships outside the actual towns.

6. Bantu Labour Act (1953): strikes by Africans are illegal as are racially mixed trade unions.

7. Separate Representation of Voters Act (1968): All non-white political rights are abolished. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970) abolished all political and social rights outside the homeland.

8. Prohibition of Political Interference Act (1968): political parties are forbidden to have members belonging to more than one race.

9. During the 1950's a series of laws introduced 'petty apartheid'

racial segregation in public places, i.e. in all buses, trains, taxis, parks, zoos, museums, galleries, cinemas, theatres, public lavatories, beaches, sports grounds, cafes, restaurants and so on (Separate Amenities Acts (1953) and (1960); Motor Transportation Amendment Act (1955); State Aided Institution (1957). Segregation is also applied to hospitals, where black and white are treated separately by staff of their own racial group, and sport where mixed teams, mixed competition and mixed spectators are all forbidden (UNESCO, 1974, pp. 45-46).

The above legislation, which has consolidated apartheid into what it is today, is rooted in South Africa's history. The following section describes how apartheid influences almost all aspects of sport in South Africa. In this regard sports apartheid exhibits a true reflection of South African society.

APARTHEID IN SPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA

There is almost no society in the world today in which sport does not play an integral part of everyday activity. Because of this, sport invariably reflects the dominant social and political values of society. It is no surprise, therefore that apartheid is prevalent in South African sport. Until recently apartheid has kept sport strictly segregated and in many ways racially discriminatory. This section reviews that relationship.

Historically sport, like all aspects of life in South Africa became associated with apartheid through traditional policy which evolved over the centuries. Prior to the crystallization of apartheid and the coming of the Nationalist government, sport was racially less rigid. Although there was little mixing between non-white and white sportsmen occasionally there was interracial competition.

> Non-white sportsmen, particularly in the Cape, can remember matches where the 'Whites' played the 'Coloureds'. On the factory floor - where there was a fair amount of mixing - it was by no means rare to see lunch hours taken up with games between whites and coloureds (Hain, 1971, p. 49).

When the Nationalist government came to power in 1948 and apartheid became law, divisions between racial groups hardened. Mixed sport, both informal and organized, became rare and sports bodies which had mixed membership split into their various racial groups. Lapchick (1975) reports that during the first few years of Nationalist government power, white sports organizations enforced segregation on their own. Formal government interference in sport only occurred following non-white international success. Horrell in her Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1951-52, recorded the case of government refusal to allow non-white boxers entrance into South Africa in 1951. Ostensibly, this action was only taken as a result of the embarrassment white South Africa felt after coloured boxer Jake N'tuli had won the British Empire flyweight boxing title in 1951 (Lapchick, 1975).

The first government statement on sport and apartheid came on June 27th, 1956. Minister for the Interior, Dr. T. E. Donges, announced that the government would encourage non-white sport, but non-white and white sport must be maintained separately in accordance with apartheid (Draper, 1964). Separate development in sport is consistent with South Africa's overall apartheid stance and is evident in many official government statements on sport.

While it is government policy to encourage separate development, there are no actual laws which legislate against the integration of sport (Schie, 1978). However, within the apartheid legislation passed during the 1950's and 1960's pertaining to everyday life in South Africa there are several stipulations which, when applied to sport, prevent multiracialism. Hawthorne (1976) points to three laws which discourage mixed sport; the Group Areas Act, the Separate Amenities Act and the Pass Laws. The Group Areas Act:

> ... delineates certain residential areas for certain racial groups and requires official permission for any one racial group to "occupy" an area of another (p. 38).

The Separate Amenities Act also affects multiracial sport. Under this Act:

> A local authority or other body controlling any public place can direct that an amenity may be reserved for a particular race or group. A public place is defined in this Act, as not only one to which the public have right to access, but also one they may enter on payment of a fee (Draper, 1963, p. 5).

The Pass Laws, a segment of the Population Registration Act, requires all South Africans to carry a reference document or "pass" book. The racial classification designated in the pass book determines where non-whites can and cannot go and in effect controls the movements of non-whites. Thus the segregated character of South African society is maintained (Hain, 1971).

Within this framework of laws, apartheid can be applied to sport. South African Asian golfer Sewsunker "Papua" Sewgolum, after winning the 1963 Natal Open, was unable to accept his championship trophy inside the clubhouse. Under the Group Areas Act, Sewgolum was not allowed in the clubhouse which was reserved for whites. Consequently, his trophy was handed through a window to where he was standing in the rain (Hain, 1971). Also, because of the Group Areas Act, interracial sports matches have often been cancelled and players have been warned by authorities not to participate. Government inspectors have visited sports grounds demanding information about players who have contravened the Act with the intent to charge those who have. Some government supervisors have on occasion closed a sports ground or removed goal posts from areas under their jurisdiction (Thompson, 1964). Under these laws, facilities are segregated and at sports events white and non-white spectators are segregated by fences and forced to use different entrances and washrooms. At a March 1978 football match in the black township of Soweto, whites were banned from attending because of the lack of segregated washroom facilities (Edmonton Journal, April 1, 1978).

The government of South Africa has manipulated these laws whenever it has been expedient for them to do so. Such is the case of granting honorary "white status" to important visiting non-whites. In 1962, Japanese business men and athletes were granted white status. There were two reasons for this. First, the government was sponsoring a trade drive with Japan and secondly, Tokyo was to host the 1964 Olympic Games. To avoid jeopardizing the trade deals or an invitation to the Olympics from Japan to South Africa, it was important that the visiting Japanese not be offended. Accordingly, Japanese business officials were given VIP treatment (i.e. white hotels, restaurants, etc.) and Japanese athletes were allowed to use first class facilities normally reserved for whites (Hain, 1971, p. 41). In recent years, because of South Africa's increasing isolation, more visiting athletes have been given "white status" and hotels have become "open internationals" (multi-racial) in order to appease international opposition to apartheid.

The Group Areas Act, Separate Amenities Act, and Pass Laws are designed to insure that as little social contact as possible occurs between whites and non-whites. Government policy statements, such as that made by Minister Donges in 1956 encouraging segregation in sport, are just that, "policies" not laws. A distinction can be made between a policy and a law. "Laws have to be observed and are enforceable by the Courts. Compliance with policy is a matter for choice on the part of individual citizens and organizations" (Draper, 1963, p. 5). Most white sports bodies have until recently complied with traditional government policy of segregated sports and hence enforced racialism on their own. The government has controlled multiracial sport outside of South Africa where it has no jurisdiction by withholding non-white passports and refusing visas to non-white sportsmen wishing to visit South Africa (Draper, 1963). Thus, the government and white sports organization have effectively maintained traditional South African policy and segregated sport except at the national level. At this level, non-white associations may, if they wish, affiliate with their corresponding white sport governing body. Most non-white organizations, however, refuse to affiliate with the white associations, opting rather for non-racial sports bodies. Brickhill (1976) believes the reason for non-white sports bodies choosing not to affiliate is because:

> ... the system of affiliation proposed did nothing to alter the discriminatory, segregated sport structures: a national black organization would be represented on the corresponding white body as the equivalent of one of about ten white provincial units. Furthermore, black organizations who accepted affiliation would have to agree to operate according to existing apartheid policies (p. 48).

Essentially then, the segregation position has remained the same over the past two decades with a few minor changes. These changes are a direct result of international opposition to apartheid and are examined in the next section.

While segregation forms the basis of South African sport, inherent within this segregation is discrimination. Hain (1971) believes the sport system in South Africa should not be viewed exclusively on the principle of separation of whites and non-whites in sport. "It is against the whole repressive mechanism of apartheid in everyday life that the sports system should be seen" (p. 35).

In terms of sports achievement, non-whites are "virtually disqualified before they start" (Hain, 1971, p. 36). White South Africans have an advantage over non-whites in that they have the wealth that job security and economic resources bring, high standards of health and nutrition, and a great deal of leisure time. Non-whites do not enjoy these advantages. Their economic situation is poor, they suffer generally from poor health and nutrition (the death rate per thousand is reported to be 270 in Port Elizabeth), and they work long hours leaving little leisure time (Hain, 1971). Draper (1964) concurs with this thesis. In her analysis of differing results between white and non-white cyclists, two of the disadvantages non-whites suffer in comparison to whites are nutritional standards and not being "able to take time off work for intensive training" (p. 17).

One of the prime forms discrimination takes in South African sport is in the availability of facilities to non-whites. Thompson (1964) argues that there is a gross inadequacy of sports facilities for non-whites:

> ... there are only a few cycling and athletic tracks, virtually no adequate gymnasium facilities, and only a handful of swimming baths for non-whites in the whole of South Africa (p. 16).

Naidoo (1970), a non-white, speaking at a conference of National Sports Organizations in Durban in 1970, expressed the inequalities he perceived in sports facilities:

> Black golfers do not have a single championship sized course anywhere in the country ... For soccer, there is only one decent ground in Durban. The open patches of ground provided by the municipalities can hardly be called playing fields. In Durban there are no tennis courts, not a single decent athletic track or a suitable venue for outdoor sports (p. 19).

Sports facilities for whites appear to be the antithesis of those available for non-whites. Several authors believe that white facilities are outstanding and readily available (Brickhill, 1976, Brutus, 1970, Hain, 1971, Lapchick, 1977, Shaw, 1976). An inequality exists in that, while whites represent a minority of the total South African population (19.4%), they control and use almost exclusively a majority of the facilities. In Durban the white population (20%) have the use of six swimming pools, while the non-whites (80% of the population) have only two pools (Naidoo, 1970, p. 19).

The non-racial swimming federation conducted a survey of municipal swimming pools:

> ... of the 75 towns or cities for which figures were available, 64 did not have a single pool for blacks, but all had at least one for whites. In respect of cities covered, there was a total of 10 pools for 2.08 million Africans (130,000 per pool), compared with 87 pools for 1.76 million whites (20,230 per pool) (Brickhill, 1976, p. 69).

A contrast to the vast inequality of facilities for non-whites throughout South Africa are the mining compounds. There, sports facilities for non-white labourers are excellent and ample. Brickhill (1976) postulates that these facilities have been provided "to occupy the leisure hours of a captive work-force" (p. 7).

The traditional policy of segregation is one reason for the lack of equality and number of facilities for non-whites. Another source of discrimination is the substantial inequality of government funding to sport. Shaw (1976) reports that money spent on white sport on a per capita basis is many times greater than funds granted to non-white sport (p. 33). During the 1974-75 financial year the total expenditure per head of population in South Africa was for Africans 2.6 cents, for whites 29.3 cents and for coloureds 14.5 cents. Of the total spent on African sport, only 7% came from public funds; for whites, however, almost all the money given to their sport came from public funds (Brickhill, 1976). Horrell, et al. (1977) reports that a member of the opposition in South African assembly during October 1976 charged the government with providing a:

> ... totally unacceptable disparity in the funds provided in the budget under the heading "Promotion of Sport and Recreation". He said that only R50,000[1] had been provided for the promotion of African sport and recreation of which R20,000 was available for grants-in-aid. For whites there was an amount of R2,480,000 of which R1,627,000 represented grants-in-aid. A mere R100 had been allocated for the promotion of coloured sport and recreation (p. 396).

A further reason for the imbalance in facilities is that the majority of high standard facilities are controlled by whites with the aid of the law. Under the Group Areas Act, non-whites playing or entering in a sports facility reserved for whites without official consent may be arrested and possibly imprisoned (Brutus, 1970). During the 1960's the government used this act many times to clamp down on informal and "illegal" mixed sport. Shaw (1976) believes:

> The fact that these Acts have been invoked many times indicates how many South Africans, including whites, favour multi-racial sport (p. 33).

The Pass Laws place limitations on the ability of non-whites to travel to use other facilities. In addition, most non-whites have neither the leisure time nor the money to obtain permits and travel (Hain, 1971).

Discrimination in sports facilities against non-whites is characteristic of South African sport and is prevalent at all levels. In addition, non-whites do not have the same sporting opportunities that whites have. This facet of sport in South Africa is closely linked with government policy of segregation, limited funding to non-white sport, and restricted access of non-whites to first class facilities.

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[1] R50,000 refers to the currency used in South Africa, the Rand.

Without proper facilities and high calibre competition the opportunity for non-whites to pursue excellence in sport does not exist. During 1967, an International Olympic Committee (IOC) commission criticized opportunities in South African sport noting:

> .. Overall much has to be done to develop facilities and grounds and provide coaches and trainers for non-white communities to measure up to opportunities available to whites (Brickhill, 1976, p. 8).

Because opportunities for high calibre competition do not exist for non-whites inside South Africa many outstanding athletes have left. Coloured cricket star Basil D'Olivera left South Africa in the mid 1960's and has since represented England in many international test matches. Similarly weight lifter Precious McKenzie left South Africa and has represented Great Britain internationally.[1] Soccer star Albert Johanneson left his homeland to play first division soccer for Leeds United and played in the F.A. Cup Final in 1965 (Hain, 1971).

Since the expulsion of South Africa from the IOC in 1970 and subsequent increasing isolation of South Africa in international sport, the government has made some changes, increasing sporting opportunities for non-whites. The majority of these opportunities occur at the national and international levels where non-whites may compete against whites as competitors from different nations. These competitions occur at special open "international" events in special "international" facilities. Whites, Africans, Asians, and coloureds each represent their own nation within South Africa. These events termed "multi-nationals" uphold the apartheid idea and are in keeping with the Bantustan policy. The government has made it perfectly clear that non-whites may not play alongside whites in these competitions and further, when South Africans compete they compete as members of their own racial nation (Brickhill, 1976). The concept and practice of multi-national sport shall be elaborated on in the next section.

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[1] McKenzie represented Great Britain in the 1968 Olympics, and the 1966, 1970 and 1974 Commonwealth Games where he won gold medals. In 1978 at Edmonton, McKenzie competed for New Zealand and again won a gold medal.

THE ISOLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL SPORT AND SOUTH AFRICA'S REACTION TO ISOLATION

Sport plays an integral part of daily life in many different cultures. Sport in white South Africa is no different. Whites enjoy the benefits of an excellent climate, a great deal of leisure time, and a wealth of facilities and sporting opportunities. It is easily understandable why many authors have described sport for whites in South Africa as a kind of "religion" (Abrahams, 1976, Brown, 1969, Hain, 1971, Lapchick, 1975). Brutus (1971) described South Africa as "the most sports mad country in the world" (p. 150). Huddleston (1950) agreed and believed that white South Africans are "obsessed" with sport (p. 200).

This obsession with sport has become increasingly recognizable over the last two decades as South Africa has seen itself being cut off culturally, socially, politically and in sporting forms because of international reaction to apartheid. Hain (1971) believes that sport has taken on increasing significance as "compensation for their exclusion from normal world cultural interplay" (p. 43). As a result, it has become very important for whites to be successful in sport internationally. Their success in sport is seen as a "vindication of the [apartheid] system", a means of national and racial assertion (pp. 43-44). Perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the importance of sport in South African life is the frequency of sports issues appearing in headlines of daily newspapers. As Brutus (1971) describes it "disasters and international affairs elsewhere are mere trifles compared to a rugby victory or even anticipation of victory!" (p. 151).

The importance of sport in South African life coupled with the increasing isolation of South Africa in international sport is reflected in a changing policy towards sport and apartheid by all segments of white society. The following section discusses how South Africa has become isolated in international sport and the ensuing reaction to isolation by South African society.

Prior to the Second World War there was little international reaction against racial discrimination in apartheid. However, since the termination of the war, South Africa has found itself becoming increasingly isolated in the world community. Worrall (1972) believes that the changing post-war attitude that was prevalent throughout the world had much to do with this:

> Conflict [with South Africa] was inevitable in the greatly altered circumstances of the post-war world, with its committment to humanism as expressed in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the various conventions against racial and other forms of discrimination, and with the coming to independence of the countries of Asia and the rest of Africa (p. 563).

The institutionalization of apartheid by the Nationalist government which swept to power in South Africa following the war no doubt contributed to this conflict.

International criticism and opposition to apartheid was first championed at the United Nations (UN). There, numerous proposals for encouraging changes in South Africa were discussed. Other organizations, pressure groups and nations voiced their opposition to apartheid. Of interest to this study are three types of criticism and pressure which were used in all facets of opposition, but notably in sport.

Pressure directed towards achieving the withdrawal of South Africa from international organizations is one such form of criticism. A noteworthy example of this was the enforced withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961. On the eve of becoming a republic, South Africa expressed the desire to remain a Commonwealth member. However, because of criticism of South Africa at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1961, South Africa withdrew its bid for continued membership.[1] Henceforth, it ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth and as a result has not competed in the Commonwealth Games since 1958 (Worrall, 1972).

Another means of expressing criticism of apartheid has been through economic sanctions and boycotts. This method was initiated by activist groups and endorsed by the UN and has met with some success (Worrall, 1972). A third method of criticism of apartheid has been through the public condemnation of South Africa for their "denial of fundamental human rights". Leadership here has been taken by the governments of many nations, among which are Canada and the United States (Worrall, 1972).

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[1] Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker was a leader in this regard.

These tactics of international opposition to apartheid have filtered down and been applied to sport. The objective of this type of criticism has varied from the desire for integrated international sports teams, and the selection of international teams on a merit basis, to ultimately the total integration of sport within South Africa at all levels.

Essentially, two positions hallmarked the trends in world opposition to sports apartheid. First, some nations believe that apartheid may be changed by competing with South Africa and showing her that an integrated multi-racial society is a viable alternative. This perspective has been labelled a "bridge building" approach to changing South African society. The second position argues that the bridge building approach will do little to encourage South Africa to change its position. The only way to achieve a desirable change is to isolate South Africa completely from international competition. Thus, the white population who are thought to be "sports mad" will demand from the government a change in sports policy in order to get back into the international sports community (Lapchick, 1975). This perspective called the "isolantionist" approach to changing sports apartheid has been the one more closely adhered to over the last twenty years. Witness to this is the near complete isolation of South Africa in international sport. The isolationist approach can be said to be responsible for the changes that have occurred in sports apartheid.

During the latter part of the 1940's and the decade of the 1950's, much of the initiative for changes in sports apartheid came from non-white sports bodies within South Africa. In 1946 T. Rangasamy, leader of non-white weight lifters asked the British Amateur Weightlifting Association for official recognition of non-white lifters in South Africa. At the time, as was the case with most South African sports bodies, only the all white South African Weight Lifting Federation was recognized. Rangasamy's proposal for change was not accepted (Lapchick, 1975).

The first international opposition to apartheid in sport was expressed at the UN by Dr. Herman Santa Cruz of Chile who presided over the UN Commission on Apartheid. Santa Cruz charged that the South African Olympic Committee had violated the International Olympic Committee (IOC) charter by excluding all non-whites. The IOC, however, took no vote on this issue (Lapchick, 1975).

In 1956, the first white South African sports governing body was expelled from an international association. The International Table Tennis Federation withdrew its recognition of the white South African body and gave it to the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board (Thompson, 1964). This was seen as a major breakthrough by non-white sportsmen. The South African government reacted to this action by making its first policy statement on sport. Horrell (1956-57) reported the extent of the statement given by Mr. Donges, Minister of the Interior:

> Whites and non-whites should organize their sporting activities separately, there should be no interracial competitions within the Union's borders, mixing of races in teams should be avoided, and sportsmen from other lands should respect the Union's customs, as she respects theirs. Within that framework non-white sportsmen would not be debarred

> from entering South Africa to compete with non-whites (P. 220).

Of importance here is the fact that government intervention into sport did not occur until international opposition to sports apartheid manifested itself by excluding white South Africa from an international body. Only then did they spell out their policy of separate development (Lapchick, 1975).

In 1958, the South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed for the purpose of bringing about multi-racial sport in South Africa. This was an important event in the history of opposition to sports apartheid as it marked the first nation-wide coordinated effort towards multi-racialism in sport. During its existence, the SASA did many things; national non-racial sports bodies were strengthened and organized, white bodies were appealed to become multi-racial and consider non-whites in the selection of their national teams, and international sports associations were also petitioned for recognition and full representation for non-white sportsmen (Hain, 1971). The SASA also successfully campaigned for the cancellation of planned government supported tours of South Africa by a West Indian cricket team and a Brazilian soccer team (Lapchick, 1975). In 1961 the non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF) was successful in achieving the suspension of the all-white Football Association of South Africa from the International Football Association (FIFA) (Hain, 1971).

Hain (1971) believes the small measures of success the SASA achieved led to government interference in the non-racial movement. As early as 1959 South African security police interfered with SASA, as officials were often "visited and interrogated" (p. 55). During this period the government also withheld passports and travel documents to the non-white table tennis team on the eve of their departure for the world championships (Thompson, 1964). In addition, an Egyptian non-white table tennis team was refused admittance into South Africa. This action was in direct opposition to the government statement of 1956 which allowed non-white sportsmen from abroad to compete with non-whites in South Africa (Lapchick, 1975).

The 1960 Sharpville massacre of sixty-nine people who had gathered to protest the Pass Laws, saw the government declare a state of emergency in South Africa. The results of this incident are significant to sports apartheid in two ways. First, it intensified the protest against apartheid abroad, and second, it resulted in an increased police suppression of non-white protest at home (Lapchick, 1975). A number of laws are designed to give the government the right to detain, ban and control the movements of "subversive" people. Using the pretext of a state emergency the police armed with these laws, raided the homes of SASA leaders. Many files, documents and letters were seized. In addition, SASA secretary Denis Brutus was kept under surveillance and later, in 1961-62, was banned and restricted to the magisterial district of Johannesburg (Hain, 1971, pp. 29-32, 55).

In October of 1962 SASA created the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) to act as a sub-committee on Olympic sport and apply to the IOC as the "truly representative Olympic committee in South Africa" (Lapchick, 1975, p. 48). This body eventually succeeded SASA as the organization responsible for the furthering of multi-racial sport in South Africa. One of SAN-ROC's first actions was to go to the October, 1963 IOC meeting in Baden Baden and present a case for the suspension of the South African Olympic Committee (SAOC). This task was attempted by SAN-ROC's honorary president Denis Brutus who left for Baden Baden while under a ban. Before he was able to get out of Africa, Brutus was arrested by the Mozambique police and returned to South Africa. Brutus' attempt to go to the IOC meeting was followed by SAN-ROC's official President, John Harris, but he also was arrested (New York Times, May 23, 1963). Harris was, however, able to get a tape recorded message to the IOC with SAN-ROC's position on it (Lapchick, 1975).

At the IOC meeting, the question of racism in South African sport was discussed with reference to the first clause in the Olympic code which states:

> ... no discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of colour, religion or politics (Leiper, 1976, p. 81).

Holding to this principle, the IOC passed a resolution which told the SAOC that it must make a declaration of acceptance of the Olympic code and obtain from their government a change in sport policy regarding racial discrimination. If this was not achieved by December 31, 1963, then South Africa would be barred from the 1964 Tokyo Games (Leiper, 1976).

Most indications showed that South Africa would not do this, as, earlier that year, the Minister for the Interior reiterated government policy on sport:

> In South Africa whites and non-whites must play separately. Whites and non-whites must not compete against one another, whether in individual events or as teams or parts of

> teams ... Participation in international sports tournaments or competitions of mixed teams as representatives of South Africa could not be approved (Horrell, 1964, p. 283).

South Africa did not comply with IOC demands by the end of 1963 and consequently the IOC passed a resolution which saw their invitation to the Tokyo Olympics withdrawn (Leiper, 1976).

During 1964 and 1965 the campaign within South Africa for its isolation in international sport met with little success. Lapchick (1975) attributes this in part to the incarceration of SAN-ROC leaders Brutus and Harris. The few successes that did occur were the reinstatement of the suspension on South Africa from world football by FIFA (Horrell, 1965), a banning from international competition by the World Fencing Federation (United Nations, 1975), and a ban on participation in the World University Games in Budapest in 1965 (Horrell, 1966).

In September of 1965 there were indications given by members of the South African Rugby Board that Maoris would be welcome in a New Zealand rugby tour of South Africa to take place in 1967. Prime Minister Verwoerd quickly dispelled this illusion in his so-named Loskop Dam speech on September 4, 1965, when he said that Maoris would not be welcome on the New Zealand team. As a result this tour did not take place (Worrall, 1972).

During 1966 the protest over sports apartheid increased internationally. SAN-ROC leader Brutus was allowed to go into exile in Britain. There he campaigned vigorously for the isolation of South Africa in international sport (Lapchick, 1975). In December of 1966, Brutus attended a significant conference in Bamako at which thirty-two African nations formed the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA). The objective of the council as stated in their major resolution was to attack apartheid sport:

> It is the firm decision of the Supreme Council to use every means to obtain the expulsion of South African sports organizations from the Olympic movement and from International Federations should South Africa fail to comply fully with the IOC rules. Finally, the Supreme Council invites all its members to subject their decision to participate in the 1968 Olympic Games to the reservation that no racialist team from South Africa takes part, and to ask all national Olympic committees to support the attitude of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (Lapchick, 1975, p. 180).

The formation of this organization is an important date in the history of opposition to sports apartheid in South Africa. Together the SCSA member nations formed a powerful lobby group which could effectively threaten, via a boycott, the success of any major international sports event. This they have done by refusing to compete with South Africa, and in the 1970's, by boycotting those nations which have maintained sporting links with South Africa. The success of this organization is notable today by the near complete isolation of South Africa in international sport.

During 1966 the IOC set up a committee to investigate sport in South Africa. This committee was to visit South Africa in September 1967 and report back to the IOC at the 1968 Winter Olympics in Grenoble (Leiper, 1976).

At the May 1967 meeting of the IOC in Tehran, South African Olympic delegate Frank Braun announced five concessions that the government was prepared to make to insure South African participation at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. These were:

> A. In future non-whites and whites would form one team to represent South Africa.
>
> B. Whereas previously white and non-white participants were to have travelled separately, they would in future do so together.
>
> C. White and non-whites ... would now wear the same uniform, stay together and march as an integrated team under the South African flag.
>
> D. White and non-white competitors may now compete against one another at the Olympic Games or other international meetings.
>
> E. In future an equal number of white and non-white officials, under the chairmanship of the president of South African Olympic and National Games Association (SAONGA) would be responsible for selections in all those sports in which different population or racial groups took part (Horrell, 1969, p. 296).

Braun's five concessions were reflected in the policy of new South African Prime Minister Vorster. After describing the concessions, Vorster outlined the method of selection to the Olympic team:

> Each of the four population groups ... would select its own representatives for various events. There would then be liason between white and non-white administrators' under the aegis of SAONGA, to decide on the composition of the South African contingent (Horrell, 1968, p. 319).

The IOC considered the changes and concessions that South Africa was prepared to make, and decided to put off its decision on participation at Mexico until its Grenoble meeting (Leiper, 1976). Also, at this meeting the Mexico Games Organizating Committee withdrew an invitation to South Africa to compete in a Mini-Olympics, as they were still under suspension by the IOC (Lapchick, 1975).

When the IOC met again at Grenoble there was discussion about the progress of non-white sport which was favourable towards South Africa (Leiper, 1976). In a postal vote which followed, the IOC passed a resolution granting South Africa permission to compete at Mexico. The resolution noted the progress made by SAONGA towards selecting a team on merit, irrespective of race. It indicated that in view of the five concessions made, a team would be allowed to compete on the understanding that in the future, racial discrimination in sport would be eliminated (Horrell, 1969).

There was considerable reaction to the IOC decision. An editorial in The Times (London) noted the integrated team was only a temporary compromise to apartheid. However, it emphasized that this accomplishment showed the importance of sport as a "peaceable leverage greater than any other in the outside world" (February 19, 1968). Protest over the decision followed quickly. By February 18, nine countries had withdrawn from the Games (The Times, February 19, 1968). On February 20, Kenya announced that it too would boycott the Games. This marked the loss of several world class African athletes, including Kipchoge Keino who made it clear that it was not his decision:

> We, as sportsmen have to obey decisions made by the Kenya Government. It is the policy of the government to have nothing to do with South Africa and we can do nothing but accept this policy. I do not mind running against anybody. But if I am told I cannot run against certain people I will not (The Times, February 21, 1968).

At the February 20 meeting of the SCSA in Brazzaville the thirty-two member African nations indicated they would all boycott the Games

(The Times, February 27, 1968). Various Asian nations such as Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, India and Kiwait joined the boycott as did Italy and the Soviet Union. By the middle of April approximately fifty nations had either officially or unofficially stated their opposition to South African participation at Mexico (Horrell, 1969).

There was substantial pressure on the IOC to reconsider it's position, and with the prospect of a disasterous Mexico Olympics in the balance, a special executive meeting of the IOC was called for at Lausanne on April 20 (Leiper, 1976). At that meeting the IOC recommended that, in view of the international climate, the invitation to South Africa be withdrawn (The Times, April 22, 1968). A few days later, by a vote of forty-six to fourteen, the IOC announced that they were withdrawing their invitation to South Africa (Horrell, 1969).

In reaction to the reversal of the decision The Times reported that the exclusion of South Africa from the Mexico Games would damage the Olympic image, as two world class South African athletes, swimmer Karen Muir and sprinter Paul Nash would be excluded. The Times also recorded a sarcastic statement from Prime Minister Vorster who commented:

> If what has happened is to be the pattern of how world events are going to be arranged in the future, we are back in the jungle. Then it will no longer be necessary to arrange Olympic Games, but rather to have tree climbing events (April 25, 1968).

At the Games in August a meeting was held between the IOC and the International Sports Federation. There it was urged by the Afro-Asian and Communist delegates that South Africa be suspended from these bodies. The IOC postponed it's decision until the next IOC Congress in Warsaw in June of 1969 (Horrell, 1969).

Shortly after their suspension from the 1968 Olympics, the South African government announced that they would host the 1969 South African Games. Several international and Olympic stars would be invited. There would be separate Games for whites and non-whites to be held at different places and months apart (Lapchick, 1975).

As the Games drew near, athletes from only twelve countries including South Africa had accepted their invitation. These countries were Britain, New Zealand, Austria, West Germany, Holland, Belguim, Greece, Switzerland, Denmark, France and the U.S.A. (Lapchick, 1975). At the request of SAN-ROC, SCSA president Ordia called upon all its member nations to boycott those nations which competed with South Africa. This immediately threatened both the 1970 British Commonwealth Games[1] and the 1972 Olympics. On March 20, 1969, an SCSA statement proclaimed that all the African nations would boycott the Munich Olympics if West Germany sent a team to South Africa (The Times, March 18, 1969). West Germany immediately withdrew, as did most of the other remaining countries. When the Games finally did take place, only one athlete from Britain and a full contingent from New Zealand participated. The non-white segment of these Games were postponed and did not take place until May, 1970 (Lapchick, 1975).

There were other events in 1968 which further isolated South Africa. A scheduled cricket tour of South Africa by a British national team was cancelled. This team was selected by the Marleybone Cricket Club (MCC), the governing body for English cricket, and had amongst its players a South African non-white, exile, Basil d'Oliveira. This team was unacceptable to South Africa, as Prime Minister Vorster stated:

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[1] The boycott threat of the 1970 British Commonwealth is treated in Chapter III.

> We are not prepared to accept a team thrust upon us by people whose interests are not the game, but to gain certain political objectives which they do not attempt to hide (The Times, September 18, 1968).

The MCC subsequently cancelled the tour.

In 1969 aside from a poorly attended South African Games, South Africa was refused membership in the International Judo Federation (United Nations, 1975). Later that year at the IOC meeting in Warsaw, it was decided by a majority vote to defer the decision on South Africa until the Amsterdam meeting in May 1970 (Horrell, 1970).

The year 1970 was devastating for South Africa in international sport. A proposed Springbok[1] cricket tour to Great Britain was cancelled by the MCC at the British Government's request. The tour was stopped because of SCSA threat to boycott the 1970 Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. (This event is examined in detail in the next section.) In May, at the IOC meeting in Amsterdam, the question of South African participation at Munich in 1972 was discussed. After much deliberation and a vote, South Africa was expelled from the Olympic movement by a margin of thirty-five to twenty-eight with three abstentions (Leiper, 1976). The Guardian (Manchester) attributed South Africa's expulsion to abraisive remarks directed at the IOC by representative Braun (May 16, 1970). Horrell (1971) notes that the threat to boycott by member nations of SCSA may also have contributed to the expulsion.

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[1] Springbok is a name given to South African International sports teams. These teams are nationally selected and recognized by the government.

Also in 1970, South Africa was increasingly isolated from international sports federations. It was suspended by the International Amateur Wrestling Federation and barred from the World Cycling Federation. The Jamaican Government refused to give South African women visas to compete in the World Netball Championships. Similarly, South Africans withdrew from the World Gymnastics Chmapionships after it became clear that the Yugoslavian government would not allow them visas. It also withdrew from the World Softball Championships in Japan over concern for demonstrations and protest by Zambia. Big game fishermen from South Africa were excluded from an annual Tuna Match held in the Bahamas (Horrell, 1971). South Africa was also suspended from the Davis Cup following demonstrations in Scandinavia and boycotts in Europe. In athletics, South Africa was barred from international competition by the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) (United Nations, 1975).

By the end of 1970 South Africa's isolation in international sport was extensive. Within South Africa many white sportsmen were calling for multi-racial sport. A statement by cricketer Peter Pollock expressed the sentiments of many sportsmen:

> It is my sincere belief that there is a growing body of sports opinion - which like mine is not politically inspired - that echoes my sentiments ... I'm sticking my neck out all the way. I feel that the government owes something to people who play sport in this country (The Guardian, June 1, 1970).

The government, however, faced with increasing isolation, remained adamant. Frank Waring, Minister for Sport, gave the government's reaction to isolation in sport:

> The government rejects a policy which would allow white teams to compete with non-white teams ... nor will it consider any form of mixed trials ... I wish to make it quite clear at this early stage that the government is in no way going to be intimidated by the demands made for integrated multiracial sport in South Africa (Lapchick, 1975, p. 198).

South Africa faced even greater isolation in world sport in 1971. In April, Minister for Sport, Waring, declared that South Africa was barred from nine international sports competitions in 1970 and the first three months of 1971 (Horrell, Horner and Kane-Berman, 1972). It appeared to be time for a change in sport policy. Prime Minister Vorster indicated the government was prepared to make some concessions with regard to international sport:

> ... the time has arrived for the non-whites to be afforded the opportunity of participating in international sport ... also of improving the standard of their sport in South Africa (Worrall, 1972, pp. 583-584).

Horrell, Horner and Kane-Berman summarized these changes in government policy:

> A. The policy is based on the conception of South Africa as a "multi'national" (Veelvolkige) rather than a multi-racial country ... whites and non-whites will only be able to compete against one another within the country in certain "open international" events. Mixed or multi-racial sport on club, provincial or national teams will be not allowed, nor will South Africa be represented internationally by mixed teams except in special cases.
>
> B. A distinction is made between the international and 'open' international events ... A cricket tour is an international event, while the Olympics, the Davis Cup competition, the world cycling championships and so forth are open internationals. Open internationals held in South Africa will be open to non-whites as well as whites, but they will be competing as individuals and not as members of

> South African teams.
>
> C. Multi-racial teams from countries with which South Africa has traditional sporting relations can tour South Africa but only to play against separate white and non-white teams[1] at segregated venues.
>
> D. South Africa will not send multi-racial teams overseas, except in four specified instances: the Olympic Games, the Canada Cup golf competition, the Federation Cup and Davis Cup tennis competitions. These exceptions are only made because the rules of admission to these contests require it. There will be no mixed trials to select overseas teams, but an open international tournament held in South Africa with participation of both whites and non-white teams will serve the purpose (pp. 315-316).

These policy changes indicate a significant shift in government policy on international sport. Non-whites could now compete against whites at selected "open international" competitions in South Africa and participate outside South Africa at World Championships. During 1971, three disabled Africans represented South Africa at the World Paraplegic Games in England. At an "open international" athletics meeting in Capetown, ten black south Africans competed. All competitors shared the same facilities, but the spectators were segregated (Horrell, 1972, pp. 316, 320). Brickhill (1976) states that these policy changes convinced the International Lawn Tennis Federation to allow South Africa to host the Federation Cup Tournament in 1972. They did this only with the assurance that South Africa's team be selected on merit. Mixed trials for the Federation Cup Team were held in private but no blacks made the team. South Africa also sent her first racially mixed team overseas in 1971. Two whites and a black sprinter competed in

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[1] Non-white teams were to be split into their separate racial group; Africans, Asians and coloured for these competitions.

West Germany (Horrell, Horner and Kane-Berman, 1972).

While it appeared that the new policy of multi-national sport would bring about changes in apartheid sport, non-white sportsmen were not convinced. Non-racial sports bodies refused to co-operate with multi-nationalism and affiliate with white sports bodies. Consequently, they were excluded from "open international" sports events (Lapchick, 1975). A case in point is the refusal of the non-racial cricket body to recommend two non-white cricketers to be included on a proposed Springbok tour of Australia. They were opposed to any sports apartheid at all, nothing less than multi-racial cricket from the club level up was satisfactory. They maintained that only then could a truly representative team be selected on merit (Horrell, Horner and Kane-Berman, 1972). The new multi-national sports policy was not completely acceptable internationally. The proposed Springbok cricket tour to Australia was cancelled because of intense opposition in Australia (Brickhill, 1976).

In preparation for a bid to regain entry into the Olympic Games, three blacks were appointed to SAONGA. Two of the blacks, along with two white officials, represented South Africa at IOC meetings in Munich during the 1972 Olympics. It was hoped that the new sports policy would convince IOC delegates to change their position on South Africa, but following the expulsion of Rhodesia from the Olympic Games they considered it inopportune to apply for readmission (Horrell, Horner and Kane Berman, 1973).

During September of 1972, the government refused to allow the white South African Rugby Board (SARB) to select players for a 1973

Springbok tour of New Zealand on merit. Similarly, the government refused to allow the white Football Association of South Africa (FASA) to select its international teams on a merit basis. Seventy percent of FASA's members were in favour of multi-racial soccer at the international level (Horrell, Horner and Kane-Berman, 1973).

South Africa's traditional sporting ties with Australia and New Zealand were cut back in 1972 as new Labour governments came to power. In December, the Australian government officially informed South Africa that no racially selected teams would be allowed to participate in their country (Brickhill, 1976). In New Zealand, Labour Prime Minister Kirk cancelled a South African rugby tour to be held in 1973 after it became clear that the team was not going to have multi-racial trials (Thompson, 1975).

Also during 1972 the IAAF ban on South African teams competing overseas was extended for two more years. They still allowed foreign athletes to compete in South Africa and individual South Africans to compete abroad (Horrell, Horner and Kane-Berman, 1973).

In 1973 the government restated its policy on sport, repeating that no mixed sport would be allowed at club, provincial or national levels. At the international level, however, there would be no ceiling on opportunities for non-whites (Horrell and Horner, 1974).

South Africa received a great deal of positive publicity from the South African Games held during March and April of 1973. These Games were designated as an "open international" event in which all South African sportsmen, regardless of colour, possessing sufficient ability would be allowed to compete. An exception to this were team events where South African athletes represented their own racial group. Thirty-two different nations attended this event including 861 South African and 673 sportsmen from other countries. The soccer series during the Games was significant to South African sport because of its departure from government policy. Soccer did not qualify as an "open international" competition because FIFA had refused to allow its member nations to participate. Consequently, the only teams which participated were teams selected from each of South Africa's four racial groups. The government approved this exception to the rule (Horrell and Horner, 1974).

The South African Games were not supported by the non-racial sports bodies in South Africa. As a result, many outstanding sportsmen who chose not to affiliate with white dominated racial bodies were not allowed to compete. Despite this, many international sports figures praised the games for their progress and speculated as to the possibility for South Africa's readmittance into the Olympics. But as Lapchick (1975) observed, "the militancy of South Africa's opponents has so far kept the question from being raised" (p. 211).

Also during 1973, South Africa was suspended from International Swimming Federation (FINA). After sending a fact-finding mission to the South African Games, FINA determined the South African Amateur Swimming Union (SAASU) did not totally represent all South African swimmers. Such being the case, FINA expelled SAASU stating that it would be readmitted only when a single, totally representative and integrated body existed (Horrell and Horner, 1974).

During 1974 the government announced another major concession in its sports policy. In the future South African sports bodies under suspension by their international bodies, would be able to hold multiracial competitions without requiring the presence of foreign nations. It was hoped that these measures would show the international bodies that progress was being made towards multi-racial sport in South Africa (Horrell, Horner and Hudson, 1975).

In Parliament, Minister for Sport, Dr. Koornhoff, observed that South Africa was excluded from nine international sports competitions held in other countries. As of June 15, 1974 Japan announced that South Africans would no longer be granted visas. Faced with this ever increasing isolation many South African newspapers as well as Nationalist politicians called for merit selection of international touring teams (Horrell, Horner and Hudson, 1975).

On the international sports scene, South Africa won the Davis Cup in 1974 by default following India's withdrawal from the Davis Cup final. After officially withdrawing, India issued the following statement:

> ... in the absence of any assurance for for the removal of racial discrimination and starting of integrated and mixed play in all sports in the country at national and international levels, India is not in a position to play South Africa (Horrell, Horner and Hudson, 1975, p. 398).

In addition to not playing the Davis Cup final, South Africa was barred from the World Gymnastics Championships in Bulgaria and suspended by the IAAF for two more years (Horrell, Horner and Hudson, 1975). Brickhill (1976) reports that South Africa withdrew from the Womens World Hockey Championships in Britain at the request of the

International Federation following threats of withdrawal of British government financial support and a possible African nations boycott. South Africa was also excluded from the World Snooker Championships in Ireland and the Eisenhower Cup Golf Championships in Malaysia in 1974.

Within South Africa there were two incidents of multi-racial sport in 1974. Five Indian players competed on the multi-racial Aurora Cricket Club in the all-white Maritzburg Second League Division. A multi-racial sports "intervarsity" took place between the white University of Capetown and the coloured University of the Western Cape on a private sports ground, so as not to contravene the Group Areas Act (Horrell, Horner and Hudson, 1975).

In an April 1975 statement, the Minister of Sport and Recreation clarified the government's policy of multi-national sport:

> Each nation practices and administers its sport separately on club level, provincial level and national level ... We then say to the world that we grant the opportunity to every sportsman and sportswoman irrespective of race or colour or creed, to reach the highest rung, unrestricted, within his or her own national bounds ... and further to grant every sportsman ... the opportunity to compete with the sportsmen of any other country in the world (Horrell and Hodgson, 1976, p. 279).

The government's policy statement was reflected in a number of multinational sports events within South Africa during 1975. On June 7, a French rugby team played against the first multi-racial South African Invitation XV. This team included two African and two coloured players. A multinational soccer tournament was held in March which saw one of the best African teams meet one of the best white teams. On May 31, sixteen non-whites entered the Comrades Marathon (Horrell and Hodgson, 1976).

This progress did not totally satisfy the rest of the sports world as South Africa was suspended for two years from the International Netball Federation and excluded from a pre-Olympic competition in Montreal. The Montreal exclusion occurred because the Canadian government and the organizing committee for the 1976 Olympics (COJO) refused to encourage the exchange of athletes between the two countries (Montreal Gazette, March 19, 1975). In addition, for the first time in 1975 individual South African athletes were not allowed to compete in a tennis tournament in Columbia (Brickhill, 1976).

During late 1975, the international protest over sports apartheid in South Africa took on a new form. The SCSA shifted their attention from the isolation of South Africa to the isolation of those nations which still competed with South Africa. New Zealand became the first target of this protest after an election which saw newly elected Nationalist Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon reintroduce reciprocal sports tours with South Africa (Thompson, 1975). In the spring of 1976, the African Nations warned New Zealand that a boycott would go ahead at the Montreal Olympics to be held later that summer. This move was approved and supported by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (Lapchick, 1977). But, Muldoon ignored this warning as he encouraged and supported an All Blacks tour to South Africa which started just prior to the Montreal Games (Osugo, 1976).

At the Games, during the first few days of competition, the SCSA asked New Zealand sports officials to either withdraw from the Games or ask their government to recall the All Blacks rugby team. The New Zealand officials refused and the consequences were devastating for the Montreal Games. For the first time there was a mass pull-out from the Olympics, twenty-nine of thirty-one African nations choosing to boycott rather than compete against New Zealand (Montreal Gazette, July 17-20, 1976).

South Africa's isolation from the rest of the sports world became more complete in 1976. On two different occasions black South Africans competing abroad were boycotted or banned. In January, FIFA banned South Africa's top black football club, the Kaiser Chiefs from playing any FIFA affiliated team on an overseas tour. Also in January, Kenya boycotted an athletics competition in Brazil because a South African black was competing. The fact that he was black made no difference to Kenya because the athlete represented the South African Athletics Federation, a racialist body (Brickhill, 1976). In August 1976, several nations boycotted the Federation Cup tennis tournament because South Africa was competing (Lapchick, 1977A). At International Sports Federation meetings during the Olympics, South Africa was expelled from the IAFF (athletics), FINA (swimming), and FIFA (soccer) (Africa, February, 1977).

Within South Africa in 1976, the government changed its policy with regard to racially mixed sport. In a statement which apparently paved the way for inter-racial sport at the club level, Minister for Sport and Recreation Koornhof made the following significant conces-

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[1] The events surrounding the African boycott at Montreal are examined in detail in Chapter IV.

1. White, Coloured, Indian and Black sportsmen and women should all belong to their own clubs. Each should control, arrange and manage its own sporting fixtures.
2. Inter-group competition in respect of individual types of sport will be allowed at all levels, should the controlling bodies decide so.
3. Where mutually agreed, councils or committees may, in consultation with the Minister, arrange leagues or matches enabling teams from different racial groups to compete.
4. Each racial group should arrange its own sporting relationships with other countries or sporting bodies.
5. If and when invited or agreed, teams comprising players from all racial groups can represent South Africa (Horrell, et al., 1977, p. 394).

On a different occasion, Koornhof is reported to have said that South African international sports team would be selected on the basis of merit at racially mixed trials (Horrell, et al., 1977).

Following the government's realization of offical sports policy a few incidents of mixed sport occurred. White rugby players joined black sides and competed in a match in Port Elizabeth and were carried off the field after the game by blacks (Hawthorne, 1976). The match took place despite warnings from Dr. Koornhof, who is reported to have said that the match was contrary to sports policy which did not allow mixed sport. The match was illegal because, according to the Group Areas Act, the white players required permits to play on the public sports ground which was in the African area. Koornhof stated that inter-racial matches planned in co-operation with the government would be possible (Horrell, et al., 1976).

In October of 1976, following the New Zealand All Blacks rugby tour of South Africa, Dr. Koornhof announced that on the next rugby tour of New Zealand, a merit-selected and integrated South African team would be sent (Horrell, et al., 1977). Shaw and Shaw (1977) question whether mixed teams and multi-racial trials will really be representative of all South African sportsmen. According to the new policy athletes must be affiliated with their own (racial) national body before they are eligible to play in mixed events (Shaw and Shaw, 1977). In February of 1977, SCSA president Ordia rejected the new government policy as just an extension of the apartheid multi-national sports policy. The SCSA, he said, wanted to see integrated sport in South Africa (Africa, February, 1977).

Despite the misgivings of South Africa's critics, the change in government policy in 1976 resulted in numerous cases of inter-racial sport. Between October 1976 and March 1977 there were 1,305 competitions at the club level, 71 at the provincial level and 56 at the national level. In addition, there was evidence of mixed club level sport. There were several cricket clubs with mixed teams and some mixed athletics competitions at the club and provincial level (South African Panorama, August, 1977).

There was also evidence in 1977 that South Africa was moving towards the multi-racial and merit selection of future international sports teams. In February, Dr. Craven, president of the South African Rugby Board, announced that a multi-racial team chosen for the 1978-79 Springbok tour of Britain would be selected from mixed trials in front of mixed crowds (The Guardian, February 1, 1977). In April of 1977 a merit selected multi-racial Springbok national soccer team, playing in front of a multi-racial crowd in Johannesburg, defeated Rhodesia 7 - 0 (South African Panorama, August, 1977). In May, Minister for sport, Koornhof made a statement which indicated how future international sports teams would be selected:

> In terms of the new sports policy teams representing South Africa in any sport will now be selected on pure merit after multi-racial trials by multi-racial selection committees and such South African teams can have an emblem and colours of their choice, including the Springbok, if that is their choice (News Point South Africa, July 29, 1977).

Schie (1978) a former South African international athlete, believes that great strides have been made over the past few years (1973-78) towards eliminating apartheid in South African sport. He states that there is now no apartheid in sport and that mixed sport is legal at all levels. According to Schie, most white sportsmen in South Africa want multi-racial sport and the only barrier to it are the political intrusions of the Nationalist Government. The government maintains that there must be separate facilities for whites and non-whites (i.e. change rooms, toilets, and spectator areas) and it is these types of barriers that are keeping the sportsmen apart.

Schie's comments on mixed sport appear to be born out as, in February of 1978, Dr. Koornhof told visiting International Tennis Federation officials that in the future no permit or legal permission would be required by any player to play on any court or join any club in South Africa. Koornhof's statement was hailed by South African sports leaders as a major breakthrough. But, Koornhof came under pressure from hard line members of Parliament and was never allowed to follow his statement up with a formal set of regulations (Edmonton Journal, February 24, March 4, 1978).

In March of 1978, South Africa competed against the United States in the Davis Cup tennis tournament and for the first time a coloured was selected as an alternate member of the South African team. The competition was played despite demonstrations and a boycott of the Davis Cup by the Soviet Union, Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico. South African tennis officials stated that they may withdraw from the Davis Cup in 1979 because of the mounting protest and the prospect of a larger boycott (Edmonton Journal, February 24, March 15, March 20, 1978).

South Africa's isolation in international sport has become more complete. In May of 1978 one of South Africa's few remaining sports allies, Rhodesia, cancelled its soccer competitions with South Africa. Soccer officials in Rhodesia claimed that continued competition between the two countries would damage the future recognition of Zimbabwe (the name for Rhodesia when it comes under black majority rule) by the SCSA and the African Football Confederation (Edmonton Journal, May 10, 1978).

CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AND THE COMMONWEALTH GAMES

The question of apartheid and the Commonwealth Games was first raised prior to the Second British Empire Games in 1934. Originally these Games had been awarded to South Africa at the conclusion of the 1930 Hamilton Games. However, South Africa's racial policies were not consistent with those set down in the British Empire Games Federation's constitution. Agbogun (1970) in his study on the history of the Commonwealth Games quotes an excerpt from the Minutes of the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada which explains wny the site for the 1934 Games was moved from Johannesburg to London, England:

> The Empire Games could not be run unless it was realized that no colour question could be recognized. South Africa raised the colour question. They have to be very careful of the question of colour, so we agreed that this was one point that narrowed the locale of the Games (Agbogun, 1970, p. 32).

The first case of South African non-whites expressing their desire to compete in the Games occurred in August of 1957. The totally non-white South African Amateur Weightlifting Association applied for membership in the British Empire and Commonwealth Games Federation in order to allow its competitors to participate in the 1958 Cardiff, Wales, Games. This application was referred by the Games Federation to the South African Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association (SAOCGA) as it was perceived to be an internal matter. The SAOCGA discussed the matter with regard to the affiliation of non-white bodies to white associations but could reach no conclusion. The Commonwealth Games Federation subsequently ruled that South African non-whites would not have the right to compete until they were affiliated to the International Federations controlling their individual sport. This effectively eliminated all non-white sportsmen as none were affiliated (Horrell, 1959).

During the Cardiff Games, an unsuccessful attack was made on the South African colour bar in sport. The Times reported that more than five hundred people demonstrated against South Africa's participation. The demonstrators, in a meeting on July 12, 1958, unanimously adopted a resolution expressing "profound concern" at the SAOCGA selection of a team "based on colour and not ability". The resolution asked the SAOCGA, the British Empire and Commonwealth Games Federation, and the South African High Commissioner in London to ensure that all nations applied the principle of the Olympic Games, "No discrimination against any country or person on grounds of colour, religion or politics" (The Times, July 13, 1958). Lapchick (1975) reports that this was the first mass demonstration against South Africa's sport policy outside the Union.

In Spetember of 1961 the SASA urged all national Commonwealth Games Associations to ban South Africa from participation in any future Games until all South African sportsmen were offered participation in national sport bodies as equal members. This included the selection of future national teams on a merit basis. This, however, proved not to be necessary as the Advisory Committee of the Commonwealth Games Federation met in October of 1961 and decided that South Africa could not compete in the 1962 Perth, Australia Games, as it had left the Commonwealth (Horrell, 1962).

With South Africa no longer competing in the Commonwealth Games, little attention was given to expressing opposition to apartheid through these Games until the end of the 1960's. By that time, the focus of criticism of apartheid was shifting, as mentioned earlier to those nations still competing with South Africa. Prior to the Games in Edinburgh in July of 1970, Great Britain became the focal point of this opposition. Several African, Asian, and West Indies Commonwealth members threatened to withdraw from the Games unless the British severed sporting contacts with South Africa.

The central issue surrounding the possible boycott was a scheduled (June, 1970) cricket tour of Great Britain by a South African Springbok team. The instigators of the boycott, the SCSA, were made aware of this possibility after members of SAN-ROC successfully lobbied for a boycott at the General Assembly of the SCSA at Cairo in March of 1970 (Hain, 1971). Following this, on April 24th, the British government announced that it had received a telegram from the SCSA which called upon the government to cancel the South African tour. Contained in the telegram was the threat that, if the tour was not called off, all thirteen African members of the Commonwealth would boycott the Games (The Guardian, April 24, 1970).

This prompted quick action from Commonwealth Games Federation Chairman Sir Alexander Ross, who flew to Nigeria on April 25-26 to talk with SCSA President Abraham Ordia. Ross reported the African countries would almost certainly withdraw from the Games should the cricket tour go ahead (The Guardian, April 30, 1970).

On April 28, shortly after Ross' trip, Ordia publicly announced that the SCSA's thirteen African Commonwealth countries would definitely boycott the Games if the tour went ahead (Hain, 1971). By early May, Pakistan and India announced that they also would withdraw from the Games should the cricket tour go ahead. By May 12th, support was given by Guyana and Trinidad who said they also would boycott (The Guardian, May 12, 1970).

This serious threat to the Commonwealth Games put a great deal of pressure on the British government and Edinburgh Games officials to persuade the British governing body for cricket, the MCC, to call off the tour. On May 1 Prime Minister Wilson voiced the hope that the MCC would call off the tour in light of the threat to the Games (Haim, 1971). On May 12 Games Federation president Ross visited the MCC and expressed his concern about the impact the boycott would have on the Games (The Guardian, May 12, 1970).

On May 21, as public opposition to the tour increased, Home Secretary Callaghan met with MCC officials and requested, in an official letter, that they call off the tour. Four reasons were given:

> The impact of the tour on relations with Commonwealth countries, race relations here [Great Britain], the diverse effect on society, and the effect on the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in July ... (The Guardian, May 23, 1970).

The 1970 Games were threatened on another front during the periods before and after the 1969 South African Games. Lapchick (1975) states that in early March, 1969 SAN-ROC called upon African and West Indies nations to boycott the 1970 Commonwealth members which had sent teams to the South African Games. Kenya immediately announced that it would boycott and Abraham Ordia, speaking as a representative of Nigeria, said that they would probably do the same. At that time the only Commonwealth countries sending teams were Great Britain and New Zealand.

On March 26th of 1969, the SCSA took a stand against nations sending teams to South African Games. With direct reference to the Commonwealth Games, a SCSA press release said that "any white country which supported the South African Games would bear full responsibility for the consequences" (SCSA press release March 26, 1969, quoted from Lapchick, 1975). As the Games came to pass, only one British athlete and a full official contingent of New Zealand athletes participated.

New Zealand quickly felt the repercussions of its attendance at the Games. At an IOC meeting in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia in October of 1969, African delegates warned New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Chairman Lance Cross, that an upcoming tour of New Zealand by South African athletes would have serious consequences. This possibility was noted with dismay by the Commonwealth Games Promotion Committee (the committee responsible for the promotion of New Zealand's bid for the 1974 Games). After it was announced that South African athletes would be invited to tour New Zealand in March, 1970, there was opposition in both Christchurch and Auckland. When Commonwealth Games Federation Honorary Secretary Sandy Duncan visited New Zealand, he stated that the tour would be unwise. He pointed out that should the tour go ahead, Christchurch would lose its bid as the site of the 1974 Commonwealth Games. Duncan added there might be a demand for the exclusion of New Zealand from the 1970 Edinburgh Games, or possibly a boycott of the Games by some countries as a protest of New Zealand sporting contacts with South Africa (Thompson, 1975). After a meeting between Duncan and members of the New Zealand Amateur Athletic Association (NZAAA), the decision to invite South Africa was reversed. The managerial committee of the NZAAA said in Wellington that it had received insufficient information about the make up and capabilities of the South African team (The Guardian, December 10, 1969). Lapchick (1975) reports that Ces Blazey, president of the NZAAA, announced the withdrawal of the invitation out of a fear that New Zealand would not be invited to the 1970 Games in Edinburgh.

Duncan also visited Australia during this period and asked the Australian Swimming Union to cancel a tour to South Africa. He emphasized that a tour could lead to the disruption of the 1970 Games and jeopardize Australia's chances of hosting the 1974 Games (The Guardian, December 11, 1969).

New Zealand sporting links with South Africa threatened the success of its bid to host the 1974 Commonwealth Games. At the Edinburgh Games, New Zealand submitted, along with its bid, a statement from the Foreign Affairs Ministry which, in essence, said that "the New Zealand government had consistently held the view that it should not interfere in the affairs of sport bodies except where the fundamental principle of New Zealand life was at stake" (Thompson, 1975). This position contributed to New Zealand winning the support of the Commonwealth countries and the right to host the 1974 Games in Christchurch.

When New Zealand became host country it inherited the sensitive issue of Commonwealth sports relations with South Africa. As was the case with the 1970 Games, the possibility of a boycott was again raised. In February 1972, the council of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU), issued an invitation to South Africa to send a team to New Zealand in 1973. SCSA president Ordia reacted swiftly and gave a familiar warning, if the Springbok rugby team toured New Zealand the Africans would boycott the Christchurch Games (Thompson, 1975).

The prospect of an African boycott created a crisis in New Zealand. Citizen groups both opposed to and supportive of the tour emerged. Halt All Racist Tours (HART) and Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), began to plan tactics to disrupt the tour if the Springbok team was not selected on merit (Lapchick, 1975). War Against Recreational Disruption (WARD) planned to provide squads of bouncers should demonstrations take place (Thompson, 1975).

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the 1974 Commonwealth Games Organizing Committee went to London armed with assurances from the government, which he hoped would minimize the threat of a boycott. He was given approval to say that the government was taking steps to insure that the South African team was selected on merit only without discrimination of race (Thompson, 1975).

The opposing viewpoints regarding the tour were reflected in the position that the New Zealand government and the official opposition took. The Nationalist government held that the tour should go ahead, however, and it would prefer South Africa to select the Springbok team on merit. The opposition Labour Party disapproved of the tour, and would express its disapproval to rugby officials. It would not, however, interfere with the Rugby Union's position. In November 1972, a general election was called in which the Rugby tour was one of the issues. At that point there was a general decrease in public support for the tour. This may have been one of the reasons for the landslide victory of the Labour Party (Thompson, 1975).

Early in 1973, newly elected Labour Prime Minister Kirk implemented his sports policy of disapproval by attempting to persuade the NZRFU to call off the tour. A report was sent to the Rugby Union documenting the probable consequences for the Commonwealth Games should the tour go ahead. It was pointed out that the tour was "not in the larger interests of New Zealand" and further that:

> The tour would impose a severe strain upon domestic race relations, make it difficult to maintain law and order, comprise New Zealand's reputation in its broader international relationships and result in the failure or cancellation of the Commonwealth Games (Thompson, 1975).

The Rugby Union reviewed and commented on the points raised in the report but maintained that plans for the tour would go ahead. Successive attempts to dissuade the Rugby Union failed. Finally, when it became clear that cancellation was not in sight, the government stated that if the Springbok team was not selected on merit the tour would be called off. When it became clear that this was not going to happen, Prime Minister Kirk informed the Rugby Union to withdraw its invitation. This it did under protest (Thompson, 1975, p. 67).

Osugo (1976 A) notes that when Kirk withdrew the invitation he said the tour was only a "postponement" and that New Zealand had not "slammed the door" on future sports exchanges with South Africa. This position angered SCSA President Ordia who demanded that the New Zealand government take a definite stand against apartheid. Ordia described the wording "postponement" as "offensive" (Osuga, 1976 A).

Rugby was not the only sport to meet with government disapproval. In November 1973, Kirk refused to allow the 1974 Federation Cup Tennis Tournament to be held in New Zealand as South Africa was to be a participant (Lapchick, 1975). These actions by the government did much to insure that there was full participation in the 1974 Commonwealth Games.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS BOYCOTT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

Like the two previous Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh and in Christchurch, the 1978 Commonwealth Games were threatened with a boycott by African Commonwealth members. In this chapter the events leading up to the boycott threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games, and efforts made to avert a boycott are reviewed chronologically over a six year period, 1972 to 1978.

WINNING THE BID TO HOST THE XI COMMONWEALTH GAMES: 1972

Although the proposed African Commonwealth members boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games was not realized until 1976, the issue of apartheid at the 1978 Games first surfaced during Edmonton's quest to win the bid to host the Games. In June 1972, just two months before the Munich Olympics where Commonwealth Games Federation members would select a site for the 1978 Commonwealth Games, Edmonton's mayor Dr. Ivor Dent toured Africa. This trip was made in an effort to win African Commonwealth members' support for Edmonton's bid. During Dr. Dent's tour of Africa, he was questioned by African sports leaders as to Canada's position on apartheid and sport contact with South Africa.

The first indication that apartheid would pose a problem in future sports festivals was made by SCSA President Abraham Ordia. Dr. Dent met with Ordia in Lagos, Nigeria, on June 15. The African and Nigerian sports leader predicted that African nations might boycott the 1976 Olympics if New Zealand maintained sporting links with South Africa (Dent, 1977). From Nigeria, Dr. Dent travelled to Ghana where he discussed Edmonton's bid with Francis Salormey, Director of the Sports Council of Ghana. Mr. Salormey asked what Canada's position on apartheid was. Dr. Dent assured him that Canada was opposed to South Africa's apartheid policies and that it was unlikely Canadians would compete in South Africa. Salormey indicated that Edmonton's bid would receive Ghana's support as long as Canada did not send athletes to compete in South Africa prior to the Munich Olympics. Dr. Dent was also questioned about Canada's policy on competition with South Africa while in Lesotho. Mr. Rakhetla, the British Commonwealth Games representative there, asked Dr. Dent if coloured athletes would be segregated in Edmonton and whether coloured people would be treated as equals in Canada (Dent, 1977).

After returning home from Africa, Dr. Dent issued a strong statement of his views of apartheid which was disseminated among African Commonwealth nations. Included in the statement was the Commonwealth Games Federation thesis that neither Rhodesia nor South Africa[1] would be invited to the Edmonton Games. According to Dr. Dent (1977), this effort combined with his trip to Africa in June 1972 contributed to Edmonton receiving African support at Munich and hence winning the bid to host the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

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[1] South Africa's inclusion in the statement was not necessary as they were no longer members of the Commonwealth.

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY ON APARTHEID IN SPORT: 1972-1976

During the four year period following the Munich Olympics leading up to the 1976 Olympics in Montreal, Canada began to articulate its policy on apartheid in sport. The Canadian government supported the suspension of South Africa from the Olympic movement and periodically made statements regarding Canadian opposition to apartheid (Morse, 1978).

In 1974, the Canadian government made a policy statement pertaining to Canadian sportsmen competing with South Africa. This policy indicated the government would give neither financial nor moral support to Canadian sport bodies for the purpose of travelling to South Africa to compete. In addition, the government would no longer financially or morally support events hosted in Canada in which South African athletes were to compete. These efforts were being made in consort with other countries in the hope that the increasing isolation of South Africa would encourage that government to take substantive steps to abandon apartheid. While the Canadian government would in the future withdraw financial and moral support of participation with South Africa, they were not prepared to limit the freedom of Canadians to travel abroad (Lalonde, 1975; Campagnolo, 1977, 1978 (See Appendix 1).

In addition to this policy, the Canadian government would not prevent Canadians from going to another country to compete in athletic events at which South African athletes were in attendance. The government would express its disapproval of competition with South Africa and towards this end if an individual on the Canadian team chose not to compete against South Africa, the Canadian government would not pay to have that individual replaced. The government took the perspective that competitions in third countries are the problem of the host country (Morse, 1978). This was the policy of the Canadian government on apartheid in sport prior to the 1976 Olympics.

LEAD UP TO THE BOYCOTT OF THE 1976 OLYMPIC GAMES: NOVEMBER 1975 - JULY 1976

It is probable that many of the efforts made to discourage a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games might not have occurred had there not been a boycott of the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. The Olympic Games boycott was caused by a conflict between the New Zealand government and Prime Minister Robert Muldoon with the SCSA, a specialized sports agency of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In this section, the historical sequence of events which are believed to have contributed to this conflict are reviewed.

In November of 1975, during New Zealand federal elections, the National Party regained power from the Labour government. In terms of sport policy, this change in government indicated a return to a policy of "non-interference" in New Zealanders' sporting exchanges with South Africa. Confirmation of the policy change was evident by the acceptance of South African participation in the World Softball Championships held in New Zealand during January, 1976.

South Africa's anticipated competition in The World Softball Championships received immediate reaction from the SCSA. On January 11, 1976, Abraham Ordia called for a world boycott in protest over the participation of the South African team. Ordia noted that New Zealand's former Labour government had refused visas to South Africans, and he condemned the apparent change of policy by the newly elected National Party government:

> If New Zealand is determined to resume participation in apartheid sport against the wishes of virtually the entire world, they can expect a much harder time internationally as the Africans demonstrate their disgust ... The invitation to South Africa was a deliberate slap in the face to the entire third world (Hawkes Bay Herald Tribune [New Zealand], January 13, 1976).

Later that week, Ordia threatened African sanctions against New Zealand:

> African countries reserve the full right to boycott any sporting competition in which New Zealand takes part if it allows South Africa to compete in the World Softball Championships (Auckland Star, January 17, 1976).

Ordia further indicated the threatened boycott would be extended to the Olympic and Commonwealth Games.

In New Zealand, there was growing protest and opposition to the government's policy of non-interference in sport. New Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, however, did not agree with those who said South Africa was not welcome in New Zealand:

> My impression is to the contrary ... I think they will find that when the two teams the stirrers [protesters] have given thumbs down to [South Africa and Taiwan], come on to the field at the softball tournament, they will be welcomed (New Zealand Herald [Auckland], January 21, 1976).

Despite the opposition inside New Zealand and the boycott threats of the Africans, South Africa competed in the World Softball Championships. This action provoked a further threat by the SCSA to boycott the 1976 Olympics. In a letter to the New Zealand Herald on March 9, 1976, Abraham Ordia indicated that African countries "and their friends" would boycott the Montreal Games if New Zealand took part. Ordia wrote, "If New Zealand persists in its support of racist South Africa ... it must be prepared to face the consequences".

In April, Prime Minister Muldoon rejected a new demand by the SCSA which called for New Zealand to end sporting contacts with South Africa or be responsible for a mass boycott at the Olympics in July. In his response Muldoon said:

> We are certainly not going to be blackmailed by Mr. Abraham Ordia or anyone else telling us what we can do in our country (Auckland Star, April 12, 1976).

During May, at the SCSA executive meetings in Nairobi, Kenya, the African nations confirmed their threat to boycott New Zealand. At that meeting, the executive unanimously voted to boycott the Olympics if New Zealand competed at Montreal, should New Zealand go ahead with the All Blacks rugby tour to South Africa in June (The Standard [Nairobi], May 1, 1976). In a telephone interview with the Auckland Star, Ordia said that sending the rugby team to South Africa "will be the straw that will break the camel's back". He added that, "if Africans go to Montreal they will not compete in events in which New Zealand takes part" (Auckland Star, April 30, 1976). By this time the Canadian Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (COJO) was aware of the potential boycott, but publicly dismissed the threat (New York Times, May 23, 1976).

On May 24, Prime Minister Muldoon announced the government would look favourably on a request from the Rugby Union that it hold an official reception for the All Blacks before they left New Zealand (New Zealand Herald, May 25, 1976). At about the same time, at a United Nations seminar against apartheid in Havana, Cuba, a call was made by Abraham Ordia for New Zealand to sever sporting contacts with South Africa (The Press [Christchurch], May 28, 1976). In the seminar's Programme of Action, the SCSA call was noted, and New Zealand and all governments and organizations were urged to "act immediately to stop all sport exchanges with South Africa" (Brickhill, 1976, p. 43).

Ordia went from the United Nations conference to New Zealand, arriving on June 3. His purpose for being there was to meet with Prime Minister Muldoon and discuss the ramifications of the impending rugby tour. Upon his arrival he said, "I have come to have dialogue. I have come with an open mind" (Auckland Star, June 5, 1976). Speaking at a press conference, Ordia warned that if the rugby tour went ahead African athletes would not compete against New Zealanders in Montreal. He added that the timing of the rugby tour was a "slap in the face" for African nations (The Ghanaian Times (Accra), June 4, 1976).

One of Ordia's commitments in New Zealand was to participate in a television debate. There, he confronted two hundred New Zealanders with varying opinions on the All Blacks tour. Prime Minister Muldoon responded to Ordia's participation in the television debate by saying, "there is no way we are going to alter our policy" on the All Blacks racial riots did little to enhance the African feeling about the All Blacks tour. Three days later, Jean-Claude Ganga said:

> It is not advisable for African countries to boycott all the [Olympic] Games events. But if New Zealand goes ahead we will have no alternative but call on our countries to refuse taking part in events which include New Zealand (The Standard, June 22, 1976).

On his return home from Europe, Ordia issued a press release in which he chastised Muldoon and the New Zealand government for doing nothing to discourage sports bodies from engaging in sport contacts with racist South Africa. Ordia also said that Muldoon had "treated me like a common criminal" (S.C.S.A. press release, June 30, 1976).

As the Games approached, the African nations took action which indicated that a boycott might occur. At the OAU meetings in Mauritius, a motion was put on the floor and subsequently carried, which called on African nations to boycott the Olympic Games in protest against New Zealand's presence. The high feelings among Africans after the Soweto riots are believed to have contributed to acceptance of the motion. By this time, many nations were already in Montreal preparing to compete (Morse, 1978). Prior to the opening ceremonies, thirty-one African nations were present. As previously mentioned, during the first few days of competition, the SCSA attempted to persuade New Zealand sport officials to have their government recall the All Blacks rugby team. The New Zealand officials refused (see page 66). In addition, Gilbert (1978) reports that Abraham Ordia and Jean-Claude Ganga attempted, with little success, to persuade the IOC executive to ban New Zealand from competing in the Games. The IOC, at the time, were more concerned with the Canadian government's refusal to allow tour of South Africa, nor was the government going to meet with Ordia: "He is not a diplomat or a member of a government. He is some sort of sports administrator" (Auckland Star, June 5, 1976).

On June 6, Ordia cut short his visit to New Zealand and left for Europe. Ordia's decision to leave came as a result of Muldoon's comments about Ordia and the rugby tour. Before leaving, Ordia made a final statement to the press:

> I do not feel anything will be achieved by remaining in New Zealand, in view of the Government's statement that no talks are possible between myself and government representatives (New Zealand Herald, June 7, 1976).

Following Ordia's departure, Prime Minister Muldoon said that Mr. Ordia should not have visited New Zealand and added, "the whole thing was a disaster - he knows our position - he's known it all along - he's chosen to misrepresent it". The leader of the opposition, Mr. Rowling, who had planned to meet Ordia in Wellington on June 7 said, "We have seen an international figure treated to a series of gratuitous insults" (Auckland Star, June 4, 1976).

On June 11, The Standard reported that Prime Minister Muldoon had cabled the SCSA saying his government was elected on a policy of not interfering with sport. He said the government had no intention of asking the Rugby Union to cancel the tour. On June 19, the All Blacks left for South Africa. At the sending off festivities there was some protest by New Zealand anti-apartheid groups (The Standard, June 19, 1976).

The departure of the All Blacks team coincided with much unrest and killings in the South African black township of Soweto. These

Taiwan to compete as the Republic of China. The African's lack of success in forcing neither change in New Zealand sports policy not the banning of New Zealand from the 1976 Olympics, combined with the OAU motion agreed to at Mauritius, resulted in the mass pullout of African nations on July 17. As the Games progressed, a total of twenty-nine African nations which were to compete chose to boycott. This they did between July 19 and 20.

CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE OLYMPIC BOYCOTT: AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1976

The boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games took most Canadian observers by surprise. Mr. Eric Morse (1978), a sports liason officer in the Cultural Affairs Division of the Department of External Affairs said the federal government was not aware prior to the Games that a boycott would take place in Montreal. The government, he said, had "no reaction time" to prevent the boycott from occurring. Dr. Maury Van Vliet (1978), President of the Commonwealth Games Foundation, the organizing committee for the XI Commonwealth Games held in Edmonton, August 1978, recalled that the boycott of the 1976 Olympics was the first indication of a possible boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

On July 20, 1976, Jean-Claude Ganga, Secretary-General of the SCSA told the press the possibility of a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games existed if New Zealand competed. Ganga said that Edmonton could solve the problem by excluding New Zealand from the Games invitation list. Failing that, New Zealand would have to change its sport policy regarding government non-interference in sports exchanges with

South Africa (Edmonton Journal, July 20, 1976).

The realization that a possible boycott against New Zealand at the 1978 Commonwealth Games existed prompted a number of reactions. In Edmonton, a number of aldermen called for a special council meeting to determine if the Games should go ahead as planned. One alderman believed the City of Edmonton should get assurances from the Commonwealth Games Foundation and the federal government that the Games would go ahead with their assistance. There were fears the City of Edmonton would be left to pay the complete cost for facilities. At the provincial level in Alberta, Social Credit opposition leader, Bob Clarke, urged the Commonwealth Games Foundation officials to start dealing with the New Zealand problem immediately (Edmonton Journal, July 20, 1976). In Montreal, Dr. Van Vliet said the barring of New Zealand was a consideration that he would discuss with Commonwealth Games Federation Chairman, Sir Alexander Ross, in the future. Van Vliet added that the barring of New Zealand was not the responsibility of the Commonwealth Games Foundation (Edmonton Journal, July 20, 1976).

On August 4, Dr. Van Vliet and K.S. (Sandy) Duncan, honorary secretary of the Commonwealth Games Foundation, announced that invitations to nations eligible to participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games might be delayed until early 1977. The delay was considered in light of the conditions following the 1976 Olympics. In a press release Mr. Duncan said, "We must let the dust settle. Let's see what happens over the next four or five months; this will give all nations a chance to assess their positions." (Edmonton Journal, August 4, 1976).

Immediately following the 1976 Olympics, the Olympiad for the Physically Disabled was held in Toronto. In these Games, an integrated South African team comprised of eight blacks and thirty whites competed. At that time, the Canadian government policy regarding competition with South Africa was one of withdrawing financial and moral support to teams travelling to South Africa or to events in Canada to which South Africa attended. Accordingly, the Canadian government withdrew its $500,000 contribution to the Olympiad's budget (The Globe and Mail, [Toronto], August 5, 1976). Public reaction to the government decision combined with the presence of the Olympiad in Toronto, overshadowed for the federal government, awareness of the potential effects of African boycott on the 1978 Commonwealth Games. For this reason the Canadian government did not consider the future of the Commonwealth Games until after the Olympiad for the Physically Disabled was over (Morse, 1978).

On August 28, the African Commonwealth members threatened to boycott in Edmonton. SCSA Secretary-General Ganga told a press conference that unless New Zealand changed its sport policy on South Africa, not one African Commonwealth country would attend the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, August 29, 1976).

By early fall of 1976, the Canadian government recognized the importance of African presence at the Commonwealth Games and realized that an African boycott would be far more disasterous for the Commonwealth Games in political terms than the Olympics. According to Morse (1978), the government took the position that, while the Olympics are not in any way identified with a political body, the

Commonwealth Games are very much identified with the Commonwealth as a political institution and a community of nations in the world. For this reason, any boycott by a member of the Commonwealth would have political repercussions for harmony in the Commonwealth as a whole. Based on this rationale, the government's objective was to do everything possible to bring New Zealand and Africa together to reconcile their differences. The government could not interfere directly by bringing overt or covert pressure on either New Zealand or the African countries because it cannot interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state. Thus, Canadian efforts in the fall of 1976 and in 1977 were directed towards bringing New Zealand and the African countries together. Towards this end, the Canadian government consulted with the "old established" Commonwealth countries, Australia and Great Britain, with Jamaica, which has a high profile in the struggle against apartheid, and with Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal, a man of vast influence in the Commonwealth (Morse, 1978). The majority of this work was done through the Department of External Affairs, who, through Canadian High Commissions in other Commonwealth countries, liaised with foreign affairs ministers, sports ministers, and sports bodies.

DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND AFRICA: FALL 1976

Canadian diplomatic efforts overseas were evident early in September 1976. In Wellington, New Zealand, External Affairs Minister

Allan MacEachern met with New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Talboys, and other cabinet members and relayed Canada's concern about the success of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. At a press luncheon, MacEachern said that "Canada was in no doubt as to the seriousness of the African intentions in Edmonton regarding the subject of contacts with South Africa" (Edmonton Journal, September 1, 1976).

Later that month, an Edmonton audience was warned by Cecil Abrahams, the vice-president of SAN-ROC, that African, Asian, and Caribbean nations would boycott the 1978 Commonwealth Games if New Zealand was invited to attend. In a panel discussion, Abrahams urged Commonwealth Games Foundation president, Dr. Van Vliet, to apply pressure to Canadian politicians to resolve the New Zealand problem. Dr. Van Vliet said that he had no authority to speak on international affairs and therefore was resisting any personal involvement in the New Zealand issue (Edmonton Journal, September 17, 1976).

In the October 1976 meetings of the IOC in Barcelona, Spain, Jean-Claude Ganga lobbied with delegates to have New Zealand expelled from the IOC, unless it changed its policy on sporting contacts with South Africa. Ganga also indicated there may be future boycotts by African nations. During the meetings it was decided that no sanctions would be imposed upon the African nations who boycotted the Montreal Olympic Games (The Globe and Mail, October 14, 1976).

By mid-October there were indications that New Zealand was changing its sport policy. Sir Keith Holyoake, a New Zealand Minister of State speaking at the United Nations said "there would be an element of discouragement" directed towards New Zealand sport bodies, in their contacts with South Africa. Prime Minister Muldoon said that his government had to do many things to dissuade sport bodies from touring South Africa, but the government, he added, had no intentions of taking away travel rights of New Zealanders (Edmonton Journal, October, 19, 1976). The statement by Muldoon followed a trip by New Zealand's Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Talboys to East Africa. Talboys promised African leaders to dissuade New Zealand sporting organizations from contact with South Africa (Edmonton Journal, July 26, 1978).

In late October, diplomatic talks in an effort to solve the dispute which threatened the Commonwealth Games, took place in Ottawa between Canadian Prime Minister, Trudeau and Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley. During their talks, the two first ministers noted that unlike the Olympics where prospective participants are invited, for the Commonwealth Games member countries participate as a right. Thus, there was no question of Canada banning any country from competing. The Canadian government considered Manley to have a great deal of influence in the Third World, and his cooperation in the Games boycott matter was regarded as essential (Edmonton Journal, October 29, 1976). Mr. Manley believed that the Commonwealth Games would be "safe", if a consensus could be reached among the Commonwealth member nations on the issue of apartheid in sport. He added, however, that if this did not happen the prospect of a successful Edmonton Games would be "very dim". If no settlement on the question of New Zealand's participation was reached, "Jamaica would not be able to take part" (The Citizen [Ottawa] October 30, 1976).

On November 5, Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath S. Ramphal visited Ottawa and discussed the possibility of a boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games with newly appointed External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson (The Citizen, November 3,6, 1976). A few days lated, on November 9, Nigeria's Foreign Minister Brigadier N.S. Garba visited Ottawa and warned Mr. Jamieson that there would be a toal boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games if New Zealand maintained its sporting links with South Africa. Garba added that Canada, as one of the oldest Commonwealth members, should put pressure on New Zealand to change its attitude towards South Africa. Mr. Jamieson said that Canada had been talking to other Commonwealth countries in order to remove the boycott threat (The Citizen, November 10, 1976). In Edmonton, Dr. Van Vliet, in response to Garba's boycott threat, stated that he was confident that most nations would attend. He believed that New Zealand would be moving soon to "clear the air" on the issue and change government policy. Any changes by the New Zealand government, Van Vliet said, would be "a tremendous step towards successful resolution" of the dispute (Edmonton Journal, November 11, 1976).

Later in November, Abraham Ordia was in London to meet with officials of the Commonwealth Games Federation. During those meetings, Ordia warned that if there was no change in New Zealand's sport policy regarding South Africa by the end of 1976, no African athletes would compete at Edmonton. Ordia also attempted to persuade the Commonwealth Games Federation to condemn all sport contacts with South Africa by member nations. While he failed at this task, he did receive a sympathetic response from Commonwealth Games Federation Chairman Sir Alexander Ross who stated:

> Commonwealth countries should give careful and earnest consideration as to whether any of their teams should compete against those countries which openly practice racial discrimination in sport (Edmonton Journal, November 18, 1976).

At those same meetings, Ordia brushed aside recent hints that New Zealand might be changing its sport policy regarding South Africa. He responded to a statement by New Zealand's Brian Talboys that there would be no more rugby tours of South Africa until apartheid policies had been modified. Ordia asserted:

> It's not what they say, it's what they do that matters. From what we know of the New Zealand government I very much doubt there will be any change (Edmonton Journal, November 18, 1976).

The Canadian government continued its diplomatic efforts into December. On December 6, 1976 in London, Don Jamieson asked the British Foreign Affairs Minister, Anthony Crosland, to help Canada avoid a repeat of the Olympic boycott at the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Jamieson enlisted British support to relay to New Zealand that African states want more concrete action than the pledges made to that date. Jamieson also hoped the British government could convince the Commonwealth Games Federation who had recently made reference to staging an all-white Commonwealth Games, that talk of this nature was not helpful. While in London, Jamieson also discussed the boycott issue with Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal. At that time, the Canadian government was afraid the boycott problem might "sour" the Commonwealth heads of government meeting to be held in London in June of 1977 (Edmonton Journal, December 7, 1976). Meanwhile, at Edmonton

City Council in December, a motion was put on the agenda by Alderman Ed Leger which proposed that the City of Edmonton begin planning alternate arrangements for the Games in the event of a boycott. After some discussion, this motion was struck from the agenda, as it was believed it would create damaging press for the Games (Edmonton Journal, December 8, 1976).

Later in December, there were further signs that New Zealand's National Party government was changing its traditional policy of non-interference in sport contacts with South Africa. When the Rugby Football Union announced it would not accept an invitation for a Maori team to tour South Africa in 1977, Foreign Affairs Minister Talboys welcomed the move as a reflection of changing attitudes. Prime Minister Muldoon, however, denied that his government had changed its non-interference sport policy. The only change, he said, was that if any sport body wanted to approach the government, he would set out for that body the United Nations resolutions on apartheid and apartheid in sport. At the same time, Mr. Muldoon also recognized the possibility of an African boycott at the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. He believed that some African nations were determined to prevent their athletes from going to Edmonton, in order to keep up world attention on apartheid in South Africa. In his opinion, any New Zealand decision on sport policy was largely irrelevant to the determination of the Africans to uphold the anti-apartheid struggle. For this reason, the New Zealand government was not going to change its sport policy. Mr. Muldoon believed that once the Africans were through with Edmonton, they would turn around and boycott someone else

(Edmonton Journal, December 10, 1976).

GAMES INVITATIONS GO OUT WITH OPTIMISM: JANUARY 1977

The new year found officials of the Commonwealth Games Foundation optimistic about the future of the 1978 Edmonton Games. It appeared that New Zealand was changing its sport policy and the SCSA would call off the boycott. On January 12, Dr. Van Vliet announced that "dramatic improvements" in international relations meant that invitations for the Games could be mailed out by the end of January (Edmonton Journal, January 13, 1977). On January 25 the invitations were sent out to forty-eight Commonwealth countries.

The optimism of the Commonwealth Games Foundation officials appeared to be justified as in a late January SCSA meeting at Yaounde, Cameroon, the executive decided against a boycott of the 1978 Games. The boycott was lifted conditional upon assurances from the New Zealand government that all sports contacts with South Africa had been broken. In Ottawa, New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner to Canada, Frank Muller, stated there had been no major significant sporting contacts between South Africa and New Zealand since the fall of 1976, and that public opinion on the sport contacts had definitely changed. Muller believed that this change was primarily a result of the boycott of New Zealand at Montreal (Edmonton Journal, February 5, 1977).

In February, the OAU at meetings in Lome, Togo, "surprised" the Canadian government and the organizers of the 1978 Games by voting in favour of boycotting the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, unless New Zealand severed its sporting ties with South Africa (Mrose, 1978). The decision occurred following an exchange of letters between Jean-Claude Ganga, Abraham Ordia and Prime Minister Muldoon. Muldoon's letter explained New Zealand's change in sport policy regarding South Africa and noted the sporting events which had been cancelled between New Zealand and South Africa to 1980. Muldoon also explained that while his government would discourage sport exchanges with South Africa, sport bodies are free to do as they wish. The government would not ban athletes from going to South Africa nor would it refuse visas to South African athletes. In Edmonton, Dr. Van Vliet expressed dismay at this decision to boycott. He said it was his impression that New Zealand was trying to make it clear to every Commonwealth member that it was not encouraging sport contacts with South Africa (Edmonton Journal, February 25, 1977).

In a February interview with Africa magazine, Abraham Ordia said, if New Zealand were admitted into the Commonwealth Games while maintaining sporting links with South Africa, the African boycott would go ahead as planned. Ordia added, however, that if New Zealand publicly declared its opposition to apartheid in sport and severed its sports relations with South Africa, the African nations will compete in Edmonton. Ordia was in London to discuss these problems with Commonwealth Games Federation Officials and British Minister of Sport, Denis Howell (Africa, February, 1977).

By early March, it appeared the OAU decision to boycott was being accepted by SCSA executive members. John Kasyoka, an executive member from Kenya, reported the African nations would come to Edmonton only if New Zealand was barred. He said, "The African stand is solid." The Canadian government responded to the OAU decision by announcing that African Commonwealth Nations would be polled, to ascertain the effect the OAU decision would have on the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton (Edmonton Journal, March 4, 1977).

LEAD UP TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: FEBRUARY - JUNE 1977

According to Morse (1978), the OAU decision to boycott made it "clear and obvious" to the Canadian government, that there was no forum in which the issue between New Zealand and the African nations could be resolved except the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in London:

> ... that was the only neutral territory available, and since it was composed of first ministers, it was also the court of last resort. We [the Canadian government] had one chance ... only to settle the dispute between the Africans and the New Zealanders (Morse, 1978).

From that point, Canadian government diplomatic efforts were directed towards preparing for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference to be held in June. Towards this end, the government adopted as "low a profile as possible" because the dispute between New Zealand and the African nations did not directly involve Canada. The Canadian government had an interest in the dispute because Canada was hosting the 1978 Commonwealth Games, but, "we Canadian government] could not show our heads too high because the dispute was simply not one in which we had a part" (Morse, 1978).

Early in March, the Commonwealth Games Foundation acknowledged that a resolution of differences between New Zealand and the African Commonwealth nations would probably occur at the Commonwealth Conference in London during June (Edmonton Journal, March 1, 1977).

The Canadian government's "low profile" diplomacy began in the first week of March, when Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain visited Ottawa. One of the topics of discussion between Prime Minister Trudeau and Mr. Callaghan was the boycott issue. Trudeau requested British assistance in convincing Prime Minister Muldoon to publicly declare New Zealand opposition to apartheid, when Muldoon visited London later in March (The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1977).

Later that month, Tanzania indicated that it would not attend the Commonwealth Games if the invitation to New Zealand remained open. However, Tanzania Olympic Committee Chairman, Mirisho Sarakikya, stated that Tanzania would take part in the Games "if New Zealand proves by action that it has severed all sporting ties with South Africa". Commonwealth Games Foundation president Dr. Van Vliet said the Foundation had no authority to withdraw the invitation and that the responsibility lay with the federal government (Edmonton Journal, March 28, 1977). In Ottawa, Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport Iona Campagnolo responded to Sarakikya's statement by saying "there is no chance in the world" that the invitation to New Zealand would be withdrawn (Edmonton Journal, March 30, 1977).

Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, apparently accepted the Canadian government assessment of the seriousness of a possible boycott. When Muldoon visited Canberra in March, Fraser made it clear that the Australian government disagreed with New Zealand's sport policy. While there, Muldoon made the statement "We'll engage in sports contacts with whoever we wish" which indicated New Zealand would maintain its position (The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1977).

In preparation for the Commonwealth heads of government meeting, Secretary-General Ramphal drafted a resolution which he hoped would find agreement among all the Commonwealth members. The original idea for this resolution is believed to have originated with Britain's Denis Howell. In March, the British minister suggested to Mr. Ramphal that a "formula" was needed to which all Commonwealth nations could agree to, on how to oppose apartheid in sport. Ramphal took this resolution to the Canadian government (Morse, 1978).

At the end of March, Mr. Ramphal met with External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson in Ottawa. Iona Campagnolo was quoted in the press as stating that the two men were preparing for the Commonwealth heads of government meeting. The minister also hinted that a quiet "retreat", possibly in Scotland, might be the scene where a conciliatory resolution could be worked out prior to the heads of government meeting. Campagnolo also stated that the Department of Fitness and Amateur Sport was working jointly with the Department of External Affairs towards solving the dispute, "although External Affairs has had the higher profile because most of the action is on the diplomatic front" (The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1977).

Morse (1978) reports that the Canadian government, through the

Department of External Affairs, took the "formula" or resolution which the Commonwealth Secretary-General drafted, through Africa, the Caribbean and the old Commonwealth countries. Essentially, Canadian officials asked the Commonwealth member nations how they would react if a "suitable agreement" on apartheid in sport were devised for the Commonwealth heads of government meeting. The general reaction throughout the Commonwealth was one of "wait and see" what New Zealand's position was when a "suitable and meaningful" agreement was discussed at "the bargaining table" in London.

There were indications that the African nations were prepared to lift the boycott when, in a March international cross-country meet in Dusseldorf, African athletes competed in spite of New Zealand's presence. This encouraging sign led Canadian diplomats to believe the issue between the Africans and New Zealand could be resolved if there was a modification in New Zealand's sport policy (The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1977). In mid April, seven African broadcasting organizations agreed to carry coverage of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. The seven countries were Ghana, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia. The decision to broadcast the Games was perceived as another positive sign by all parties concerned (Edmonton Journal, April 13, 1977).

The position of the province of Alberta regarding the boycott issue was made evident by Recreation, Parks and Wildlife Minister Al Adair in April. The government of Alberta was "concerned" about the boycott threat and interested in the developments, but desired to stay out of the debate to avoid complicating the issue. Adair said the government had discussed the potential boycott with both Iona Campagnolo and with Dr. Maury Van Vliet (Edmonton Journal, April 23, 1977). The Alberta government asked the federal Department of External Affairs to keep it informed of developments. This, the federal government did (Morse, 1978).

During May, the Africans again warned of a possible boycott. On this occasion, Abraham Ordia predicted that it would be "very, very unlikely" that African athletes would compete alongside New Zealanders, unless Muldoon publicly changed government policy regarding sport exchanges with South Africa (The Globe and Mail, May 12, 1977).

On May 11, 1977, Iona Campagnolo issued a policy statement on sporting contacts with South Africa to all sports federations in Canada. The full text of this letter appears in Appendix 1 and is summarized below:

> Canada ... has maintained since 1974 a firm policy of not giving either financial or moral support to Canadian sports bodies for the purpose of travelling to South Africa for competition, or of hosting events in Canada in which South African teams or athletes are allowed to participate.
>
> The Government does not consider itself to be in a position to place restrictions on the right of Canadian citizens to travel abroad. Nonetheless, the Government firmly disapproves of all sport contact with South Africa.
>
> As part of the international effort to eliminate racially discriminatory practices from sports, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions (in 1971, 1975 and 1976) calling on all member states to (among other actions): refuse any sponsorship, assistance or encouragement to sports contacts with South Africa, including official receptions for teams; refuse payments of grants to sports bodies or teams or sportsmen; and encourage national sports bodies to support the exclusion of South Africa from all international sports bodies, competitions or tournaments. The Canadian Government has supported these resolutions and has declared its intention to

> implement their provisions ...
>
> You will recall that African and other states boycotted the Montreal Olympics as a means of expressing their disaffection over the policies of New Zealand regarding sporting relations with South Africa. While some progress appears to have been made in recent months in reconciling the differing views of the countries concerned, the Government believes that there remains a possibility that the success of the Edmonton Games may be undermined by a boycott along the lines of the Montreal example. The Government is anxious to minimize this possibility and is particularly concerned that such a boycott should not come about as a result of continuing sporting relations between Canada and South Africa.
>
> In order to avoid such a development, the Government is concerned that Canadian sports federations and individuals should not undertake actions which might cause adverse international attention to be focussed on Canada or on Canadian sports federations. I therefore strongly urge you and other Canadian sports federations to do your utmost to discourage sports contacts with South Africa at all levels within your sport, whether national, provincial or local (Campagnolo, 1977).

While there was negative reaction and cries of "dangerous political interference" by some Canadian sports federations, Campagnolo's letter was perceived as a move to ensure Canada of going into the Commonwealth conference in London with a clean record regarding sports policy (Edmonton Journal, June 15, 1977). The Canadian government policy statement which came out in May was issued for a number of reasons. First, it was issued to address a prominent and increasingly sensitive situation - apartheid and sport, on which no single policy statement yet existed. In addition, Canada's position as host of the upcoming Commonwealth Games made it essential that a clear stance on apartheid in sport be taken. Finally, the issue of apartheid and sport was to be discussed at the upcoming Commonwealth conference. Campagnolo's policy statement was given a high profile in Africa. Every African government received a copy of that statement and it was disseminated in the United Nations (Morse, 1978).

Prior to the government policy statement on apartheid and sport, the Canadian Rugby Union received a request from South Africa for an invitation to tour Canada in the summer of 1977. This request was turned down. Rugby Union executive director Stephen Baines commented: "We are upholding government policy ... but hope it will be reconsidered after the Commonwealth Games" (The Globe and Mail, May 12, 1977).

In London, on May 12, Prime Minister Trudeau indicated the controversy between New Zealand and the African nations would be resolved at the Commonwealth conference in June. Trudeau said he was encouraged after bilateral talks with other Commonwealth countries and with Secretary-General Ramphal:

> I think there has been a movement in the direction of understanding [by Prime Minister Muldoon] ... of the very real and justifiable concern of the African and other Commonwealth members over the apartheid practices of the Government of South Africa. In negotiations that are taking place it seems to me he [Muldoon] is coming very much closer to the British and others. We are not saying that no one should go to South Africa, but that they shouldn't be subsidized by Government funds (The Globe and Mail, May 12, 1978).

The stage was set for the Commonwealth heads of government conference. Diplomatic efforts made by Canada through the Department of External Affairs, by Prime Minister Trudeau "who worked very hard ... and fought for Canada" and by Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal, who worked hard throughout the Commonwealth, appeared to have been well received (Van Vliet, 1978). But whether or not an agreement would be reached at the conference depended on the position taken by New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon (Morse, 1978).

COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS
CONFERENCE (JUNE 8 - 15, 1977)

The Commonwealth heads of government conference opened the week of June 8 in London. The first topic on the agenda was global economics. Conference planners put this topic first to avoid antagonizing Prime Minister Muldoon. Discussions on the more sensitive topic of apartheid began on Friday, June 10 (Edmonton Journal, June 8, 1977). During the discussions on apartheid, New Zealand's standing at the conference changed dramatically when Mr. Muldoon announced that his country was prepared to accept the Maputo Declaration. This was a statement drawn up at a United Nations convened conference in Mozambique, which called for united opposition to apartheid including a mandatory arms embargo of South Africa and a communications boycott of Rhodesia. At the Commonwealth Conference, several African delegations had mentioned the Maputo Declaration as a basis on which the conference could make a decision on initiatives towards Rhodesia (Morse, 1978). When Mr. Muldoon heard of this he obtained a copy of the declaration, reviewed it, and subsequently supported parts of it. After supporting the Maputo Declaration, Muldoon said, "We thought a firm statement was appropriate so it would be clear where New Zealand stood on the issue" (New Zealand Herald, June 13, 1977).

New Zealand's readiness to accept the declaration was seen by many observers as a shrewd strategic move, designed to prepare the African nations to accept the agreement on sports apartheid that was to be proposed to the conference delegates the next week (New Zealand

Herald, June 13, 1977) (Morse, 1978).

During the weekend of June 11 and 12, at the Gleneagles golf resort in Scotland, an agreement was worked out between New Zealand and the African nations. The discussions took place in the suite of Jamaican Prime Minister Manley, with the Jamaican leader chairing the meeting (Edmonton Journal, July 26, 1978). Present at these informal discussions were Prime Minister Muldoon (New Zealand), Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal, Prime Minister Trudeau (Canada), and External Affairs Commissioner Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua (Nigeria). Not present, but also consulted, were Prime Minister Fraser (Australia) and Dr. Kaunda (Zambia) (New Zealand Herald, June 14, 1977). Together these men drew up and accepted a three-page statement, which followed closely the "formula" drafted by Ramphal in March (Morse, 1978).

The agreement made at the informal weekend meetings at Gleneagles was an important event as it signified, for the moment, a reconciliation between New Zealand and the African states. Following the meeting, Prime Minister Muldoon described the outcome of the talks:

> We have agreed that none of us would publicly claim either victories or defeat ... There has been a coming together of our views ... In our draft, we have laid emphasis on misunderstandings of the past and an understanding now of the views and positions of the various countries which were represented in the discussions we had (New Zealand Herald, June 14, 1977).

When the conference reconvened in London following the weekend at Gleneagles, the agreement on sports apartheid was put before the Commonwealth heads of state. After some debate the 700 word agreement, officially called the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport and popularily called the "Gleneagles Agreement", was approved by the thirty-three Commonwealth countries present. A copy of this statement is found in Appendix 2 and is summarized below:

> The member countries of the Commonwealth embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths ... Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognizing that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations ... they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organizations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organized on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.
>
> They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognized that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter ...
>
> ... Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally (London, June 15, 1977).

REACTION TO THE COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT: JUNE 1977

While there was skepticism that the Gleneagles Agreement would not satisfy the more militant African nations, statements by leading

African figures put these rumors to rest. Sir Harold Walter of Mauritius, Chairman of the OAU Council of Ministers, said that nothing but good could result from the agreement and "everything will work out all right now." The leader of the Nigerian delegation at the conference, Brigadier Shehu Yar'Adua believed the Commonwealth Statement to be a breakthrough and he praised Prime Minister Muldoon on the understanding attitudes he had adopted. Tanzanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. B. Mkaps said, "if the spirit which pervaded our talks can be maintained, then it marks a hopeful beginning Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said the agreement was "a remarkable achievement and a very significant advance" (New Zealand Herald, June 16, 1977).

Prime Minister Trudeau and his aides offically were optimistic and pleased at the acceptance of the Gleneagles agreement. The ratification, however, did not provide assurance that the Africans would participate at Edmonton. While the African states were satisfied with the statement on apartheid in sport, most of them maintained that their attendance at the 1978 Commonwealth Games was contingent upon New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries' adherence to the agreement. A spokesman for the Kenyan delegation to the Commonwealth Conference recognized that the agreement was a step in the right direction, but added, "... there is still a year before the Commonwealth Games in Canada and a lot can happen before then" (New Zealand Herald, June 16, 1977). A Nigerian delegate to the conference described the Commonwealth Statement as "really an interim agreement." He said, "it now depends on how the Commonwealth countries who agreed to the statement act in the next few months" (Edmonton Journal, June 15, 1977).

In Edmonton, Commonwealth Games Federation Chairman, Sir Alexander Ross, was enthusiastic about the Gleneagles agreement:

> ...[it was] the very thing I hoped for and may well provide an atmosphere which melts away any possibilities of a boycott or other reprisals against the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, June 15, 1977).

Ross also praised Prime Minister Trudeau as a highly respected Commonwealth leader, who had played a vital role in the diplomatic efforts which led to the resolution.

The primary question in New Zealand following the Gleneagles Agreement concerned the implications of that accord. On June 15, Deputy Prime Minister Talboys gave motion that Parliament:

1. Invite the responsible and autonomous sports bodies of New Zealand to note the Commonwealth Statement on apartheid in sport adopted by heads of government at their meetings in Britain.
2. Endorse unanimously the accords reached by the heads of government.
3. Call on the understanding, support and active participation of individuals and sports organizations in implementing the agreed objectives (New Zealand Herald, June 16, 1977).

In an interview in the New Zealand press, Mr. Muldoon stated that, in future, New Zealand sporting bodies which were considering going to South Africa would be asked to read and consider the Commonwealth Statement. He hoped "they would act in accordance with it" (New Zealand Herald, June 16, 1977).

POST-GLENEAGLES EVENTS: SUMMER 1977

The Gleneagles Agreement would have had little significance were it not ratified by the OAU. For this reason, the OAU meetings in Libreville, Gabon, on June 30, were watched closely by all interested parties. During its meetings the OAU considered the agreement and accepted it (Morse, 1978).

On July 19, Secretary-General Ramphal wrote a letter to national sporting organizations in Commonwealth countries, appealing for cooperation in implementing the Gleneagles Agreement. He believed it essential to do so both "in the interest of Commonwealth harmony and the healthy development of international sport." A copy of this letter , which includes the text of the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport, is included in Appendix 2. Ramphal's letter quite possibly assisted in ensuring that national sports organizations throughout the Commonwealth adhered to the Gleneagles Agreement.

In early August individual New Zealanders disregarded Ramphal's request and the Gleneagles Agreement. Five New Zealand All Blacks rugby players accepted individual invitations to play for an international team against a South African team in Pretoria on August 27. The New Zealand government strongly protested this planned visit to South Africa. New Zealand deputy high commissioner to Canada, Barry Brooks said, "our government is more than displeased that the rugby players will be going to South Africa." The New Zealand Rugby Football Union passed the invitation along to individual rugby players. According to Mr. Brooks, this action provoked a critical comment from

Prime Minister Muldoon (Edmonton Journal, August 2, 1977).

The Africans were quick to react to the news of the sports exchange. John Kasyoka, a Kenyan member of the SCSA executive, expressed the opinion that African states would consider boycotting the September World Cup track meet in Dusseldorf and the 1978 Commonwealth Games if the rugby players went to South Africa. On the question of African participation in the 1978 Games, Kasyoka asserted:

> The Canadian Government should perhaps step in and try to get the New Zealand government to stop the rugby visits if it wants to have the Edmonton date ... [The New Zealand government's failure to do so] ... constituted a betrayal of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers June agreement to which New Zealand was party (Edmonton Journal, August 8, 1977).

The New Zealand government claimed it had carried out their obligations under the Gleneagles Agreement. Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Talboys, who had already expressed disappointment at the rugby players decision to visit South Africa, stated that individuals in New Zealand wishing to travel to any country did not have to be cleared by the government (Edmonton Journal, August 8, 1977).

The Canadian government reacted to Kasyoka's statement by telexing the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi. They asked the mission to check the statement to see if it represented a government view (Edmonton Journal, August 9, 1977). Morse (1978) states that Kasyoka's statement represented an individual position and was not repeated elsewhere. Eventually, five New Zealanders went to South Africa in late August. Regardless of New Zealand government statements and efforts, the rugby trip to South Africa was not well-received by African states and New Zealand's position was not enhanced.

In late August and early September, the first two of the thirteen African Commonwealth members accepted their invitations to the 1978 Games. On August 26, Lesotho, a land locked nation surrounded by South Africa, accepted and on September 14, Tanzania accepted its invitation (Edmonton Journal, September 14, 1977). These acceptances appeared to indicate that the New Zealand rugby trip to South Africa in August would not result in an African boycott of the Commonwealth Games. In addition, the African nations took part in the World Cup track meet in Dusseldorf despite the participation of New Zealand athletes.

DR. VAN VLIET'S TRIP TO AFRICA:
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1977

Commonwealth Games Foundation president Dr. Van Vliet proposed to the federal government that he visit Africa in the spring of 1977. At that time, government officials advised Dr. Van Vliet that he wait until after the Commonwealth heads of government conference in June. When Dr. Van Vliet approached the government following the acceptance of the Gleneagles Agreement, preparations were made with the Department of External Affairs for a fall tour to Africa. Following consultation over the details and itinerary of the trip, the government advised Dr. Van Vliet as to which countries he should visit. Subsequently, the government, through diplomatic channels and Canadian missions in Africa, arranged for Dr. Van Vliet to meet representatives from all Commonwealth African countries. Towards this end, receptions and appointments were made with leaders of sports councils, sports ministers and in some countries with the prime ministers and presidents. As Dr. Van Vliet prepared for the fall trip, Canadian missions in Africa were briefed as to what the Foundation President wanted to accomplish and were well-prepared for his arrival (Morse, 1978).

From the Canadian government's point of view, the trip could not have come at a better time. The Gleneagles Agreement had been accepted and for the first time Canada could go out and publicize, without the embarrassment of political implications, the Commonwealth Games as an international sports fesitval in itself (Morse, 1978).

Dr. Van Vliet left Edmonton on September 21, accompanied by Dwayne Erickson, the Commonwealth Games Foundation Manager of Media Services, and by John Jeffrey, Air Canada's Edmonton Manager. The first stop on the tour was London, England where, on September 22, Dr. Van Vliet spoke at a British Sports Writers Association luncheon and met with the Advisory Committee of the Commonwealth Games Federation. Dr. Van Vliet then took a one week holiday before beginning his two week five nation tour of Africa (Edmonton Journal, September 20, 1977). The African tour began on October 2 in Accra, Ghana. From there the party flew to Lagos, Nigeria and then to Nairobi, Kenya arriving on October 9.

In Nairobi, at the mid-way point of his trip, Dr. Van Vliet assessed the progress of the tour to that date. He was very "optimistic" about full African participation in Edmonton and while there were still some "pinpricks and difficulties" in terms of acceptance of invitations, he did not feel that there would be a boycott of the

1978 Commonwealth Games. Dr. Van Vliet believed the African states were reluctant to accept their invitations because they wanted assurances that the Gleneagles Agreement would be adhered to by Commonwealth members (Edmonton Journal, October 11, 1977).

In an interview with the author, Dr. Van Vliet (1978) described the form and substance of his discussions with African officials. The first topic discussed pertained to the New Zealand problem. Dr. Van Vliet noted the Gleneagles Agreement and expressed the opinion that the declaration was "something more than a piece of paper", and that all countries were committed to opposing apartheid and doing as much as possible to discourage sporting links with South Africa. He asserted in his discussions that politics were becoming "overbalanced" in the Commonwealth Games and consequently "the purpose of the Games was being forgotten." The purpose was for friendly competition between Commonwealth family members. On this point Dr. Van Vliet believed that "90% of the Africans were reasonable" and in agreement.

Setting aside the New Zealand problem, Dr. Van Vliet relayed the message that Canada was "keen" to have the Africans attend. He wanted to give African officials the message that there were "no ogres" in Canada, that Canada was friendly and hospitable. Following this, African officials were given "up to date information" on the Games' progress. Travel arrangements were also discussed (Van Vliet, 1978).

While in Lagos, Dr. Van Vliet met with Abraham Ordia, the Nigerian president of the SCSA. Van Vliet described Ordia as:

> A little more reticent than anyone else I talked to. He has certain views which may not correspond to views of other people in his own country (Edmonton Journal, October 11, 1977).

Ordia and the SCSA were sponsoring the Pan-African Games to be held in Algeria two weeks before the Commonwealth Games. For this reason, he was reluctant to commit his support for African participation in Edmonton. In the past, Ordia had made statements which indicated that the closeness of the two major sport festivals would make it physically difficult for the African nations to get to Edmonton for the Games. In addition, Ordia, as president of the SCSA, was not yet prepared to call off the boycott of New Zealand and commit African participation. He was not yet sure that New Zealand had changed is sports policy (Van Vliet, 1978).

Another purpose of the Commonwealth Games Foundation trip to Africa was to discuss air travel arrangements. The task was taken care of by John Jeffrey who explained to African officials the plan to place a Boeing 747 jet with a seating capacity of 429 in Algiers at the close of the All-African Games on July 27, 1978. The aircraft would be available to pick up all athletes, coaches, managers, officials and possibly the news media, transport them to Edmonton, then back to London at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, October 23, 1977). Dr. Van Vliet (1978) reports that the Africans were pleased that Canada made an extra effort, "beyond the call of duty" bringing John Jeffrey along to make first hand travel arrangements. These efforts made the trip more successful. While most African officials looked favourably at the efforts to make travel arrangements, Abraham Ordia questioned the endeavour. According to Morse (1978), Ordia asked why travel arrangements were being made when the issue of New Zealand and the boycott had not been settled.

Dr. Van Vliet's party left Nairobi on October 11 for Lusaka, Zambia.

After meeting with officials there, the African tour ended in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Dr. Van Vliet, with good reason, left Africa more confident than when he arrived. While the tour party was there, Kenya and Zambia accepted their invitations bringing the total number of African nations which had accepted invitiations to four out of a possible thirteen.

Dr. Van Vliet described the September-October tour to Africa as very valuable. The trip afforded the opportunity for "face to face" discussions and meetings with African Commonwealth members and allowed for "first hand experience" of the boycott problems. The fact that "an effort was made to encourage the Africans to come", to show them Canada was "keen", gave Dr. Van Vliet and Commonwealth Games Foundation officials an "optimistic and positive" feeling about the impact of the five nation tour (Van Vliet, 1978).

At a news conference given after returning home, Dr. Van Vliet stated he was optimistic about full African participation at Edmonton. He cited overall recognition of the Gleneagles Agreement as a contributing factor:

> In all cases, the atmosphere was cordial. It was most refreshing to find that the people we met generally recognized the value of the Gleneagles statement condemning apartheid in sport ... As a result they were all quite positive in their preparations for participation by their athletes and officials in the Games (Edmonton Journal, October 23, 1977).

AFRICANS ACCEPT GAMES INVITATIONS:

WINTER 1977 - 78

In late October, the Commonwealth Games Foundation became aware of a proposed Scottish Rugby tour to South Africa. Dr. Van Vliet said that he was "unfortunately well aware" of the proposed tour. "I'm very unhappy about any such possibility, and I hope that particular arrangement will die a natural death." He believed, at that stage, the tour was "all conjecture" but added that, if necessary, the Foundation and the federal government would work to prevent the tour from taking place (Edmonton Journal, October 30, 1977). The invitation from South Africa to the Scottish Rugby Union was not accepted. According to Morse (1978), British Minister for Sport, Denis Howell, put a stop to it.

During September, 1977, Canadian national swim coach Deryk Snelling visited South Africa. In November, Doug Fraser, executive-director of the Canadian Amateur Swimming Association (CASA), announced that Snelling was suspended from international and national competitions for three months, and ineligible to be head coach of the 1978 Commonwealth Games and World Championship teams. The CASA ordered the suspension in accordance with a rule set by FINA, the international swimming federation which forbids contact with South Africa (Edmonton Journal, November 9, 1977). Snelling's visit to South Africa was also not consistent with the Canadian government's policy on apartheid and sport, as stated in Iona Campagnolo's letter to all Canadian sport governing bodies dated March 11, 1977 (see Appendix 1).

Later in November, the African boycott threat was renewed. A radio report origination in Lagos, Nigeria, stated that the SCSA accused New Zealand of violating the Gleneagles Agreement. The report added that unless New Zealand honoured the agreement, all African Commonwealth nations would reconsider their participation in the Commonwealth Games (The Globe and Mail, November 15, 1977).

The alleged boycott threat was short lived. During the Seventh General Assembly of the SCSA in Rabat, Morocco, November 23, a resolution was adopted which urged the thirteen African Commonwealth members to take part in the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. Secretary-General Jean-Claude Ganga said the decision to participate in the Edmonton Games was taken without any conditions attached to it. He added, however, the resolution recommending participation also "mandates the SCSA executive committee in this regard to take any decision that may be necessary in light of future developments." This rider was attached to the resolution primarily to cover the possibility, however unlikely, of a Commonwealth nation competing with racist South Africa (The Standard, November 25, 1977). The SCSA Rabat resolution is significant because it denoted definite acceptance of the Gleneagles Agreement's value as an instrument in combating apartheid. Consequently, the SCSA recommended to the African Commonwealth members that they go to Edmonton if they judged it desirable (Morse, 1978). Dr. Van Vliet believes his trip to Africa may have contributed to the acceptance of the Gleneagles Agreement at Rabat (Van Vliet, 1978).

The events of 1977, the Gleneagles Agreement, African acceptance of that resolution, and the success of Dr. Van Vliet's trip, left Commonwealth Games Foundation and Canadian officials optimistic about maximum

African participation at Edmonton in 1978. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Games Foundation, in concert with the Canadian government, continued to encourage African participation through every diplomatic channel available. The Department of External Affairs, acting as a channel of communication between the Games Foundation and the Games associations in Africa, passed on pertinent and up to date information (e.g. accreditation forms). At higher political diplomatic levels, the Canadian missions in Africa used every opportunity to remind influential people in the African governments how important Canada considered their participation to be (Morse, 1978). In London, Canadian diplomats preparing for the annual Maple Leaf Ball deliberately planned an entertainment line-up which included Nigerian singers and New Zealand dancers on the same stage. It was hoped this arrangement would ease strained relations between New Zealand and the African states (Edmonton Journal, November 19, 1977).

The Canadian missions in Africa played a vital role in bringing New Zealand and the Africans together. New Zealand has no diplomatic missions in Africa, nor do the Africans have any missions in New Zealand. Because of this, it was agreed to after the Commonwealth Conference in London, that Canadian missions in Africa would be the channel through which New Zealand and Africa could exchange information. This move was made to avoid any incidents which might lead to a misunderstanding and possible disruption of the Commonwealth Games. In this regard, the Canadian government made every effort possible (Morse, 1978).

In the month of January, 1978, two more African nations, Ghana and Mauritius, accepted their invitations to compete at Edmonton. Commonwealth Games Foundation officials regarded Ghana as a major

African acceptance. This brought the total African nations participation to six of the thirteen members and the total number of countries participating to thirty-four out of a possible forty-eight (Edmonton Journal, January 16, 1978).

At the news conference which announced Ghana's and Mauritius' acceptance, Dr. Van Vliet said he believed the boycott threat to be over, citing the support the SCSA gave to the 1978 Commonwealth Games during their November Rabat meeting. While Dr. Van Vliet was confident that most African nations would come to the Games, he could not promise Nigerian participation. Nigeria was reluctant to accept their invitation because it remained unhappy about New Zealand sports policies (Van Vliet, 1978). Believing the boycott issue to be resolved, the Commonwealth Games Foundation in a press release gave a rationale for African participation:

> It would now appear that the African nations are basing their decision to attend the Games solely on the strength of their athletes and the level of competitive standards they are achieving in their training programs (Edmonton Journal, January 17, 1978).

Later in January the Canadian government intervened to stop the outgoing president of the Canadian Modern Rhythmic Gymnastic Federation, Evelyn Koop, from travelling to South Africa to give a clinic. Ms. Koop reported that the government asked her not to go against government policy by visiting South Africa. The government also asked Ms. Koop to reconsider her trip until after the Commonwealth Games in August. She said she was forced to reconsider the trip after it became clear that the government would probably withdraw funding in excess of sixty thousand dollars to the Modern Rhythmic Gymnastics Federation (The Globe and Mail, January 25, 1978).

The seventh African nation to accept its invitation was Uganda, which did so in late February. Uganda's acceptance raised the possibility of a boycott and protest on another front. It was possible some Canadian groups and citizens would protest or demonstrate Uganda's presence, to draw attention to the policies of Uganda's government (Edmonton Journal, February 28, 1978). Uganda later withdrew from the Games on May 12, 1978, for this reason. Because of the uniqueness of the Uganda issue in the discussion of African participation at the 1978 Commonwealth Games, the topic is dealt with separately in Appendix 3.

In March, Canadian national swim coach Deryk Snelling, already suspended by the CASA for two months for visiting South Africa in September of 1977, was given further suspensions to September, 1979 by FINA. The decision was made at a special meeting of FINA in Mexico City. FINA's secretary Robert Helmick said that FINA board members felt the two month suspension handed down earlier by the CASA was "merely a mild slap on the wrist." He added, "we have to enforce the propriety of the International Federation ... otherwise there is no purpose in affiliating." Snelling's suspension meant that he would not be able to coach the national swim team until after the 1979 Pan-American Games (Edmonton Journal, March 23, 1979).

The eighth African country to accept their invitation to compete in Edmonton was Swaziland. The acceptance received at the end of March brought the total number of nations intending to compete at the 1978 Commonwealth Games to thirty-nine. At that point, Games officials were confident that a record number of nations would participate

(Edmonton Journal, March 27, 1978).

ORDIA AND GANGA VISIT EDMONTON:
APRIL 1978

The request for SCSA President Ordia and Secretary-General Ganga to visit Edmonton was initiated by Jean-Claude Ganga in the fall of 1977. Ganga had been unable to meet with Dr. Van Vliet in Africa and consequently indicated to the Canadian High Commissioner in the Cameroon that he and Abraham Ordia would like to visit Edmonton (Van Vliet, 1978). This message was relayed back to the Canadian government and the Commonwealth Games Foundation through the Department of External Affairs. In December, the Department of External Affairs answered the request in the form of a formal invitation from Dr. Van Vliet and Iona Campagnolo to the two leaders (Morse, 1978). Early in April, Ordia and Ganga accepted the invitation and tentative dates were set for the third week in April. The two leaders would visit Edmonton after attending an IOC meeting in Mexico City (Edmonton Journal, April 5, 1978).

Ordia and Ganga arrived in Edmonton on April 18 and over the next few days visited facilities, met with Games officials, and discussed travel arrangements for participating African teams. During their visit, the SCSA leaders discussed African participation at a news conference. When asked by the media if Nigeria would be present at the 1978 Commonwealth Games, Ordia replied:

> I am not in a position to speak for my country ... I am here as President of the Council [SCSA]. Nigeria is only one of my fifty-one countries in the council (Edmonton Journal, April 20, 1978).

Regarding Nigeria's participation, Ganga pointed out that each African member of the SCSA "is a sovereign state. To take part in the Games is a political decision. We [the SCSA] can only advise". Despite the fact that Nigeria had yet to accept its invitation, there were several indications that an acceptance was imminent. Mr. John Onochie, Nigeria High Commissioner to Canada, said that discussions were under way between Canadian and Nigerian governments. In addition, Nigerian officials had inquired about placing their athletes on the Air Canada charter jet that was to transport African athletes to Edmonton. In Lagos, officials from the Department of External Affairs and a representative of the Commonwealth Secretariat were discussing the matter with Nigerian officials (Edmonton Journal, April 20, 1978).

On another topic, Mr. Ordia was asked if he was satisfied that the spirit and letter of the Gleneagles Agreement was being upheld. To this he answered, "my answer would be no, it's not working." Ordia produced examples of mail he had received from New Zealanders which called on Ordia to "keep your nose out of our business". These letters and telegrams referred to African opposition to a visit to South Africa in September 1977 by New Zealand rugby players. Ordia said he receives "heaps and heaps" of correspondence of a similar nature. He also acknowledged Prime Minister Muldoon's opposition to that rugby tour, however, he objected to the New Zealand Prime Minister not taking action to prevent the athletes from going to South Africa (Edmonton Report, April 23, 1978). The federal government viewed the outcome of the Ordia and Ganga visit as very positive. Both parties, Ordia and Ganga, and Canadian government and Commonwealth Games officials left with a better understanding of the problems surrounding African participation at Edmonton (Morse, 1978).

Early in May, Nigeria accepted its invitation. In the note given to the Department of External Affairs by Nigeria, the wording said the acceptance was tentative (Morse, 1978). Nigeria's acceptance brought the total number of African nations who had accepted their invitations to nine out of a possible thirteen.

On May 8, Uganda officially withdrew from the 1978 Commonwealth Games. A note was delivered to Canada's External Affairs Department. The contents of the note were not made public under an agreement between the Ugandan High Commission to Canada and the External Affairs Department. Mr. David Akongo, Uganda's High Commissioner to Canada, gave the following reason for withdrawal: "Canada has used Uganda's intention to participate in the Games to mount a vicious and entirely unwarranted anti-Uganda campaign." (Edmonton Journal, May 19, 1978). Morse (1978) reports the withdrawal came about because of media speculation as to the possible attendance of Ugandan President Idi Amin at the Games. This speculation reached the House of Commons where the Amin question was raised by the opposition. These "public comments" within Canada antagonized the Ugandans and Amin, consequently Uganda withdrew from the Games. A detailed account of Uganda's participation and subsequent withdrawal is given in Appendix 3.

In the month after Uganda's withdrawal, Malawi and the Gambia became the tenth and eleventh Commonwealth African nations to accept their invitations to the 1978 Games. This left only two African countries, Sierra Leone and Botswana to respond to their invitation

(Edmonton Journal, June 21, 1978).

DR. IVOR DENT'S TRIP TO AFRICA:
JUNE-JULY 1978

During the latter part of June and the few days of July, former Edmonton Mayor Ivor Dent led a group of nine Edmonton businessmen and one woman on a goodwill trip to Africa. The trip was funded by Edmonton organizations and received no government or Commonwealth Games Foundation support. According to Dr. Van Vliet, the Commonwealth Games Foundation was not directly involved in the goodwill trip to Africa in any capacity (Van Vliet, 1978). The federal government, through the Department of External Affairs, helped Dr. Dent plan the trip. It informed the missions in Africa of Dent's itinerary and what he wanted to accomplish. The missions then arranged for receptions, the use of a band, and the showing of a film which Dr. Dent brought with him. The prupose of the trip was to publicize the Commonwealth Games and, since the Department of External Affairs was committed to doing this, it assisted Dr. Dent in every possible way (Morse, 1978). The Government of the Province of Alberta provided services to Dr. Dent's group through the Department of Culture. Travel assistance for the Edmonton group was provided by Air Canada (Edmonton Journal, July 6, 1978).

Dr. Dent's group arrived in London on June 19 and from there went to Ghana. In Ghana, a reception was held in which Ghanian athletic and government officials attended. Dr. Dent's group also appeared on television in Accra, Ghana's capital, where it answered questions about the Games. While they were there, Dr. Dent and other members of his group were received by Ghana's Chief of State, General L.K. Acheampong (Edmonton Journal, June 29, 1978).

From Ghana, Dr. Dent's group went to Lagos, Nigeria. There, a reception was held at which approximately two hundred athletic officials and government representatives attended (Edmonton Journal, June 29, 1978). While in Nigeria, Dr. Dent met with SCSA President Abraham Ordia. According to Dr. Dent, his discussions left him with the feeling that it "solidified the participation of Nigeria in the Games" (Edmonton Journal, June 29, 1978).

From Nigeria, the Edmonton goodwill group went to Nairobi, Kenya, where they participated in official Canada Day celebrations. On Friday, June 30, they moved on to Tanzania, their last stop before going home.

LATE EFFORTS TO ENSURE AFRICAN PARTICIPATION AT EDMONTON: July 1978

One month before the Games were to open, the Canadian government was still working hard at the diplomatic level to ensure maximum participation at Edmonton. Early in July, Prime Minister Trudeau sent a message to all the Commonwealth heads of government asking them to pass his greetings to their teams. Further efforts to ensure a successful Commonwealth Games were made by Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal. In the first week of July he sent a message to all Commonwealth Heads of State saying that in his opinion as Secretary-General, all Commonwealth governments had adhered to the Gleneagles

Agreement (Morse, 1978).

Later in July, Sierra Leone became the eleventh African nation to accept its invitation to the Games. This left Uganda and Botswana as the only Commonwealth African nations not attending the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, July 7, 1978). Botswana indicated that it was unable to attend because it was reorganizing its sports structure (Edmonton Journal, June 7, 1978). In a letter to the author (see Appendix 4), E.S. Mpoto, First Secretary in the Embassy of Botswana in Washington, D.C., gave the following reasons for not participating at Edmonton:

> Botswana does not at the moment have sufficient means to develop sports facilities to train athletes ... it is also quite expensive for a country such as Botswana to send athletes to participate at the Commonwealth or any other games (July 7, 1978).

Three weeks before the Games were scheduled to open, the Canadian government made an additional policy statement on apartheid in sport. Iona Campagnolo added to her statement of May 11, 1977, that; South Africans in any sports capacity, athletes and sports representatives would be refused non-immigrant visas into Canada. Ms. Campagnolo said the government move was a "follow-up" to the Gleneagles Agreement designed to "ensure the success of the Commonwealth Games" and demonstrate Canada's "good faith" to other Commonwealth countries. In this regard, she said, "We couldn't take any chances that there may be some South African representatives coming to the Games who could precipitate some unpleasantness" (Edmonton Journal, July 15, 1978). In addition, Campagnolo stated the new policy would take an "undue" burden off Canadian sporting bodies which were previously expected to make their own decisions on preventing South Africans from coming to Canada for sports events. By doing so, the Canadian government would; "... meet the requests of many sports people that the government take full responsibility for administration of the South Africa sport policy" (News Release, Minister of State, Fitness and Amateur Sport, July 14, 1978) (see Appendix 1).

Later in July, any fears by the Commonwealth Games Foundation and the Canadian government that the Africans might still boycott were diminished. The Executive Committee of the SCSA, during a July 19 meeting at the Pan-African Games in Algiers, formally authorized the African Commonwealth members to participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, July 21, 1978). On July 23, the Commonwealth Games Foundation received a telex from SCSA confirming that authorization. A day later a telex was received from Nigerian officials which said there was a good chance their delegation would increase from 76 to 150 in number. Another telex about Nigerian participation arrived from the External Affairs Department which gave additional details on the Nigerian team's participation. On July 25, Abraham Ordia informed Edmonton that the Nigerian team was looking forward to coming to the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, July 26, 1978).

NIGERIA WITHDRAWS FROM THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES: JULY 26, 1978

On July 26, eight days before the Games were scheduled to begin, all parties concerned were optimistic the Games would open with eleven of thirteen African Commonwealth members attending. Later that day, Nigeria shocked the Commonwealth by announcing they would boycott the Games. The decision to boycott came in the wake of a cabinet shuffle within the Nigerian government. The new Minister for Youth and Sports, Sylvanus Williams, stated that Nigeria was boycotting the Commonwealth Games because of the participation of New Zealand, which maintains sports contacts with South Africa (Edmonton Journal, July 26, 1978). The Nigerian government was not satisfied that New Zealand had lived up to the Gleneagles Agreement and cited the participation of five New Zealand rugby players at an international match in South Africa in 1977 as an example (Edmonton Sun, July 27, 1978).

As the shock of the Nigerian boycott set in, officials of the Commonwealth Games Foundation and Federation, as well as Canadian government representatives at all levels, became extremely concerned that other African nations would follow Nigeria's lead and join the boycott. It was clear that action was needed to convince the remaining African nations not to boycott. The External Affairs Department took action immediately, sending a note to the Nigerian government in Lagos which made two points. The first point noted that Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal did not believe any Commonwealth country, including New Zealand, had broken the Gleneagles Agreement. The second point noted that the SCSA had recently recommended that its member nations participate in the Games. Following this, officials of the Department of External Affairs called the High Commissioners of all the Commonwealth countries which had offices in Ottawa. The officials explained Canada's position and attempted to dissuade the other African Commonwealth members from joining Nigeria. In a meeting with Nigeria's High Commissioner no attempt was made to change Nigeria's position (Edmonton Sun, July 28, 1978).

At a press conference, Dr. Van Vliet said that three representatives of the External Affairs Department were in Algiers, the site of the Pan-African Games which were in progress, lobbying other African Commonwealth members to "persuade them not to follow Nigeria's lead." He added that the Canadian High Commissioners abroad had been "instructed to talk to their counterparts" (Edmonton Sun, July 28, 1978).

On the morning of July 27, the Canadian Embassy in Algiers received a phone call from Abraham Ordia. The African sports leader said he had not been aware of the boycott decision and was sorry it happened (Edmonton Journal, July 27, 1978).

On July 28, fears of a mass boycott of the Commonwealth Games diminished. Daily newspapers in Kenya and Tanzania carried reports of athletes' preparation for departure to Edmonton. The Nation and The Standard in Nairobi carried articles which quoted Kenya's Assistant Minister Responsible for Sport, Dr. Julia Odjiambo, as saying the country would not follow Nigeria in the boycott of the Commonwealth Games (Edmonton Journal, July 28, 1978). Meanwhile, in Edmonton, Games officials could only wait and hope that the remaining African Commonwealth members would board the Air Canada charter which was to pick up the African athletes in Algiers on July 29.

At 9:30 p.m. Mountain Daylight Time on July 29, the chartered Air Canada 747 from Algiers via London arrived in Edmonton. On board were over two hundred athletes and officials from six African Commonwealth countries; Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, and Zambia. Later that evening the Tanzanian team arrived on another Air Canada jet. The Swaziland team arrived the following night, July 30, as did Ghana. One team which was expected but not on the Air Canada charter was Sierra Leone. A spokesman for Sierra Leone said funds could not be raised to send their five man team to Edmonton (Edmonton Journal, July 31, 1978). A few days later, prior to the Games opening, the Sierra Leone team was financially assisted by the Canadian government and flown to Edmonton for the Games. The cost was nine thousand dollars and paid for by the Canadian government (Edmonton Sun, August 15, 1978). After the Air Canada charter arrived in Edmonton, Games organizers and African sports leaders appeared both pleased and relieved. Upon arrival, Secretary-General Jean-Claude Ganga of the SCSA, who had arrived with the African delegation, made the following assessment:

> Africa has come to the Games ... It doesn't matter that Nigeria might choose to stay home, that Sierra Leone runs out of money, or that Uganda is not here ... Most African countries are here ready to compete and that's what counts (Edmonton Sun, July 30, 1978).

Two days before the Games opened, Shridath Ramphal reflected on Nigeria's boycott of the Games. He believed there was no difference of opinion between Nigeria and the other African nations on the need to continue to pressure South Africa to change its policies. The difference he believed was "one of judging the degree to which one or more countries have fulfilled their obligations" under the Gleneagles Agreement. It was Mr. Ramphal's opinion that New Zealand had gone to considerable lengths" to live up to the Gleneagles Agreement. The Commonwealth leader noted that individual New Zealanders had not been prevented from obtaining passports to travel to South Africa. On this problem he said, "Freedom of travel is a very hard thing to stop" (Edmonton Journal, August 2, 1978).

THE XI COMMONWEALTH GAMES: AUGUST 3-12, 1978

On Thursday, August 3 nineteen hundred athletes from forty-six Commonwealth countries, ten of which were African, entered the Commonwealth Games Stadium through the marathon gate to help officially open the XI Commonwealth Games. It was estimated that approximately five hundred million people watched the opening ceremonies on television (Edmonton Journal, August 4, 1978).

Only three of thirteen African Commonwealth nations were not present, Botswana, Nigeria and Uganda.

Three days after the opening ceremonies, Abraham Ordia arrived in Edmonton. While in Edmonton, he refused to comment on the withdrawal of Nigeria from the Games (Edmonton Sun, August 9, 1978). Ordia did, however, attend the Commonwealth Games Federation Annual Meetings. On August 10, he was successful in persuading the Federation to unanimously pass a resolution opposing apartheid in sport. Ordia's resolution noted "with appreciation" the Gleneagles Agreement and, in its text, the resolution:

> ... calls upon all member countries [of the Federation] to work actively for the full implementation of this declaration Gleneagles by refraining from participating in sports events with countries which practice apartheid in sport, particularly South Africa which has been expelled by the International Olympic Committee from the Olympic movement for their apartheid views (Edmonton Journal, August 11, 1978).

A few days later as the Commonwealth Games neared completion, Ordia expressed his own opinion on the Nigerian boycott. In doing so he stated that Nigeria respected Canada and was extremely sorry the "Games happened to be on the soil of the country with which Nigeria had the friendliest relations." He did not question, however, Nigeria's decision to boycott. According to Ordia, New Zealand had not taken enough positive steps in support of the Gleneagles Agreement. He admitted that some progress had been made but the pace of the progress was slow. Ordia contrasted New Zealand's attitude towards Africa with Canada's:

> New Zealand does not have a single embassy or mission on the whole continent of Africa. But there's hardly a country where Canada hasn't a presence. She is represented in trade, culture, travel, education and sports. If an African wants to go to Canada to study he knows where to go for advice.
>
> If New Zealand doesn't have a single official representative in Africa, how can she tell what are the aspirations, the hopes [and] the thoughts of Africans (Edmonton Journal, August 12, 1978).

On August 12, the ten African members attending the 1978 Commonwealth Games participated in the closing ceremonies. In addition, Africa was represented in a cultural pageant to help celebrate the official closing of the Games. During the Games, the politics of the Nigerian boycott and the African boycott threat was lost to the friendly competition which took place at the venues. The 1978 Commonwealth Games were most successful.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The proposed boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games resulted in much consternation and subsequently considerable efforts to minimize the possibility of a boycott. In this chapter, the impact the proposed boycott had on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games is discussed with reference to attempts made to alleviate the African Commonwealth threat. Towards this end, the diagram presented in Figure 1 will be utilized. The diagram illustrates those nations, organizations and individuals which proposed the boycott and those which attempted to prevent a boycott. The model also presents New Zealand which was the subject of the boycott. Each individual, nation and organization will be discussed with respect to their involvement in the boycott threat. In addition, consideration will be given to the implications of the events surrounding the boycott to politics in international sport.

NEW ZEALAND: THE SUBJECT OF THE BOYCOTT

The conflict between New Zealand and the African states originated, and still exists at this time 1978 because New Zealand has had very strong and traditional sporting links with South Africa. These it are reluctant to give up. Prior to 1976, New Zealand's National Party government, led by Prime Minister Muldoon, remained quite adamant that New Zealanders maintain the right to compete with whom they wishes, and that Africa should not interfere in New Zealand affairs. For this

FIGURE 1

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, NATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN EVENTS

SURROUNDING THE BOYCOTT THREAT OF THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

Proposers of the Boycott	Supreme Councilfor Sport in Africa (SCSA) (Abraham Ordia, Jean-Claude Ganga) Organization for African Unity (OAU). African Commonwealth Nations Nigeria	
Subject of the Boycott Threat	New Zealand: it's sporting links with South Africa	
Allevaitors of the Boycott	International Efforts	Efforts made inside Canada
	1. Commonwealth secretariat (Shridath Ramphal) 2. Other Commonwealth governments 3. Canadian government (External Affairs, P.M. Trudeau)	1. Federal government (Fitness and Amateur Sport) 2. Province of Alberta 3. City of Edmonton 4. XI Commonwealth Games Foundation (Maury Van Vliet) 5. Concerned individuals (Ivor Dent)

reason, thirteen African Commonwealth nations threatened to boycott the 1978 Commonwealth Games.

New Zealand's position changed significantly at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in June, 1977, when it agreed to support the Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport. A reconciliation, if only tentative, had thus been reached between New Zealand and the African states.

Individual New Zealanders competed with South Africans on several occasions in the year between the reaching of the Gleneagles Agreement and the 1978 Commonwealth Games. These sports exchanges were actively discouraged by the New Zealand government. Within the democratic framework in New Zealand, the government was not prepared to limit the individual freedom of New Zealanders to travel abroad. In this regard, the New Zealand government did not break the letter of the Gleneagles Agreement which states:

> ... it was for each government to determine in accorddance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments [combating apartheid by discouraging contacts with South Africa] (see appendix 2).

This, however, did not convince Nigeria who, claiming New Zealand had broken the Gleneagles accord, subsequently boycotted the Commonwealth Games. In this writer's opinion, the Nigerian boycott was to a certain extent, political blackmail of New Zealand, the XI Commonwealth Games Foundation and the Commonwealth Games Federation. No nation, organization, or federation in the free world should be obliged to break from the tenets of democracy to satisfy a requirement of another.

Accountability for the Nigerian boycott at the 1978 Commonwealth

Games partially rests with the New Zealand government, who, in the opinion of Nigeria, did not go far enough in their efforts to discourage sports contacts with South Africa. Another reason for the boycott may be attributed to the lack of dialogue between the New Zealand government and the Africans. New Zealand had no missions in Africa and the African states had no missions in New Zealand. Consequently, neither party may have been aware of the others perspective on upholding the Gleneagles Agreement.

THE AFRICAN BOYCOTT THREAT OF THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

Most African nations abhor the policy of apartheid as practiced in South Africa. For this reason, they are committed to completely isolating South Africa in international sport. They view isolation as the only vehicle through which change can be made in South African sport. Ostensibly, the African strategy is working, as the only change which has occurred in South African sport has taken place over the last five to seven years, the years in which South Africa has witnessed its greatest isolation. Yet these changes have been by African and Canadian government standards, minimal and "cosmetic."

When twenty-nine of thirty-one African nations walked out of the 1976 Olympics because of New Zealand's participation, the possibility of a boycott at Edmonton became a legitimate and very real possibility. Africa's political power in international sport had come of age. Evidence for this assumption is readily observable in three significant outcomes which emerged out of efforts to reduce the boycott threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. First, the Commonwealth heads of government supported the Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport (Gleneagles Agreement). Second, New Zealand, South Africa's traditional sports ally agreed to support the Gleneagles Agreement. Third, the Commonwealth Games Federation which had previously refused to make any statements on apartheid in sport, did so during the Games in Edmonton.

The power that the African nations have in international sport today is directed and administered by the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA). Since 1966, this agency has coordinated and united Africa in its opposition to apartheid. The SCSA has been very successful and is the group most responsible for the extent of South Africa's isolation in world sport. It is a legitimate arm of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and for this reason has the right to be recognized throughout the world at the governmental level.

The SCSA was the group responsible for threatening to boycott the 1978 Commonwealth Games because of New Zealand's participation. They finally withdrew that threat long after the Gleneagles Agreement had been reached, and at that point (the Rabat meetings, November, 1977), left participation at the Games in Edmonton up to the discretion of individual Commonwealth nations. In July 1978 at the Pan-African Games, the SCSA authorized all African Commonwealth nations to go to Edmonton. They believed all Commonwealth nations had honoured the Gleneagles Agreement. Ten African nations eventually did participate at Edmonton with only Nigeria boycotting.

The SCSA is led by two men, Abraham Ordia, its president, and Jean-

Claude Ganga, secretary-general. These two men have been called sports politicians (Van Vliet, 1978). In terms of their mandate as a division for sport within the OAU, this title would seem appropriate. For this reason they deserve to be recognized at the political level. They have been recognized at the governmental level in Canada. Fitness and Amateur Sport Minister Iona Campagnolo officially hosted the two African leaders in April of 1978.

Prior to the 1976 Olympics, Ordia visited New Zealand and was refused permission to see Prime Minister Muldoon. The New Zealand leader stated the government was not obliged to see "sports administrators." Ordia left New Zealand and later likened his treatment by Muldoon to that of a common criminal. In the opinion of the author, this "slap in the face" to the African leader contributed to the decision by the OAU and the SCSA to boycott at Montreal and threaten to boycott at Edmonton. Only New Zealand's public statement of opposition to apartheid at the 1977 Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference convinced the OAU and the SCSA to lift the boycott of New Zealand. Even then, it was contingent upon New Zealand's honouring of the Gleneagles accord.

THE BOYCOTT BY NIGERIA

Over the months following the SCSA meetings in Rabat, African nations accepted their invitations to the Games. Nigeria, however, was reluctant to accept and when it finally did so it was only on a tentative basis. One week before the Games were to begin, Nigeria announced that it was boycotting New Zealand's participation at Edmonton.

Two possible explanations may be given for Nigeria's decision to boycott. The first reason for the boycott is the official explanation given by the Nigerian government. Nigeria chose to boycott New Zealand because they believed the New Zealand government had not gone far enough in discouraging sporting contacts with South Africa. Individual New Zealanders were still going to South Africa to compete. This position was to a certain extent true, because the New Zealand government still refuses to limit their citizens right to travel abroad. While this rationale for a boycott is plausible, it must be questioned in the light of the following events. The day before Nigeria announced its plan to boycott, SCSA president Ordia, a Nigerian and a very influential figure, telexed Edmonton and said the Nigerian team was looking forward to coming to Edmonton. Two days before the boycott, Nigerian officials informed Games organizers of the possibility of a larger Nigerian team. These events indicate the decision to boycott was made very suddenly without the knowledge of Nigerian sports leaders. Yet New Zealand athletes had competed with South Africa on several occasions during the year prior to the Games. If Nigeria was going to boycott New Zealand primarily on the basis of their competition with South Africa, the decision would not have been the surprise it was to the Nigerian sports leaders. They would have been prepared for that eventuality. Based on this evidence, it would appear Nigeria boycotted for an additional reason.

Shortly before the decision to boycott was announced there was a cabinet shuffle in Nigeria's military government. This may have resulted in a shift in power in the government and consequently a militant position pertaining to opposition to apartheid. In addition, this vigorous opposition to apartheid may have been adopted to reassert Nigeria's position as a leader among black African nations. In the past, Nigeria has been a leader in African opposition to apartheid (Bissell, 1977). Nigeria is also an economic leader in Africa because of its rich oil reserves (Edmonton Sun, July 31, 1978). The fact that no other African nation chose to boycott the Games lends additional credence to the idea that other motives for the boycott existed. As this is written, August 1978, no evidence to certify the validity of this interpretation of events, despite the present lack of evidence, the author believes that, given the circumstances surrounding Nigeria's boycott, the explanation is plausible.

EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARDS ALLEVIATING THE BOYCOTT OF THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

The African Commonwealth members boycott threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games evoked considerable effort towards the alleviation of that threat. Efforts in this regard were made at the international level by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the federal government of Canada and other Commonwealth governments. The boycott threat also resulted in initiatives taken inside Canada by the three levels of government, the Commonwealth Games Foundation, and concerned individuals. These efforts and initiatives and the rationale for taking these steps are discussed below.

1. International Efforts

Efforts made at the international level were primarily directed towards bringing New Zealand and the African states together to reconcile their differences. No direct pressure was put on New Zealand to change its sport policy, as all agencies were not prepared politically to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state. After much diplomacy, a reconciliation between the African states and New Zealand occurred at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in June 1977. There, all Commonwealth nations laid to rest differences of the past and agreed to combat apartheid by all possible means. Following the arrival of the Gleneagles Agreement, further efforts were made to alleviate the boycott threat. These consisted of maintaining open lines of communication between New Zealand and Africa and encouraging the African Commonwealth members to participate at Edmonton.

International efforts made were considerable, and not without reason. The rationale for eliminating the boycott possibility is believed to involve the role of the Commonwealth as an institution in the world and as a community of nations.

A. The Commonwealth

Dr. Arnold Smith, the first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth described the role and purpose of the Commonwealth to be for the promotion of international understanding and cooperation. "The world", he said, "needs to maintain such bridges as available across the great fissures of society" (The Commonwealth Today, 1973, pp. 1-2). Smith also portrayed the Commonwealth as "one tool among many with which the world has equipped itself to improve relations between people" (Ingram, 1969, p. 128). The first paragraph of the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles further describes the purpose of the Commonwealth:

> The Commonwealth of Nations is a voluntary association of independent sovereign states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and cooperating in the common interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace (The Commonwealth Today, 1973, p. 30).

Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth at the time of the Edmonton Games, described the strength of the Commonwealth as existing in its cultural variety and shared commitments and values:

> It [the Commonwealth] shares ... an important set of common values. These values include a shared commitment to elective democracy ...; a shared rejection of racism and racial discrimination; a shared commitment for human rights ...; and a shared sense of fairness, involving an insistence on a just system of government administered by a humane bureaucracy (Ramphal, 1978).

The boycott threat at the 1978 Commonwealth Games is contradictory to the principles, purpose and values of the Commonwealth. It would indicate disharmony and hence challenge the Commonwealth's viability as a volunteer unit with shared commitments to international cooperation, understanding and common values.

In the opinion of the author, the office of the Commonwealth Secretariat took into account these considerations after recognizing that a boycott possibility existed for the Edmonton Games. Subsequently, they made every effort to reconcile the differences between New Zealand and the African states. In this regard, Mr. Ramphal was a leader. He drafted a formula to which both parties could agree and with the assistance of Canada and other Commonwealth leaders brought New Zealand and the African states together at Gleneagles. The document which emerged at that Scottish resort is a credit to the Commonwealth principles.

Following the reaching of the Gleneagles accord, Mr. Ramphal, through his office, made numerous diplomatic endeavours towards Africa to encourage African participation at Edmonton. In July 1978, he stated that in his opinion as Secretary-General, all Commonwealth nations had adhered to the Gleneagles Agreement.

B. Other Commonwealth Governments

The leaders of many Commonwealth governments were actively involved in bringing New Zealand and the Africans together at Gleneagles. They too were concerned with Commonwealth harmony and acted in concord with the Commonwealth secretariat and the Canadian government. Leaders in this regard were Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica who chaired the informal meetings at Gleneagles, and Prime Ministers Callaghan of Great Britain and Fraser of Australia who worked to persuade Prime Minister Muldoon to reconsider New Zealand sport policy.

C. The Federal Government of Canada

Unlike the boycott of the Olympic Games in Montreal, a boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton would be disastrous for Commonwealth harmony. The Olympics have no political affiliation whereas the Commonwealth, as its name implies, is a political unit. This was the position the Canadian government took when it engaged in efforts to save the Edmonton Games from an African boycott (Morse, 1978). The rationale was consistent with governmental attitudes throughout the Commonwealth.

There were other reasons for actions taken by the Canadian government. The Games were being held in Edmonton and the government had invested millions of dollars to the capital, operating and service costs of the Games. In addition, twenty-nine African nations had walked out on the Montreal Olympics, tarnishing the success of those Games. Another boycott at Edmonton would most certainly have been disastrous. Canada would not only suffer the effects of hosting another incomplete international sports festival, but her image and prestige abroad would suffer because of it.

One of the major benefits of hosting a sport festival the magnitude of the Commonwealth Games is the monetary gain the host country can accrue from its success. From this perspective, the importance of staging a successful Commonwealth Games was apparent. Had the Games been marred by a boycott, it is doubtful the amount of tourist dollars spent in Canada, both during and following the Games, would be as substantial as it was. Further, the positive image of Canada portrayed to five hundred million viewers around the Commonwealth may have contributed to foreign capital investment in Canada's future. The successful Commonwealth Games portrayed Canada as a stable and solid, low risk country, worthy of investment. This rationale applies also for the Province of Alberta and the City of Edmonton.

The Canadian government has endeavoured to encourage and promote Canadian participation in sport, one purpose of which was to enhance fitness and leisure patterns (Campagnolo, 1977A). The success of the Commonwealth Games, in which world class competitors from all over the Commonwealth participated, may have encouraged a considerable number of Canadians to become more actively involved in the various Commonwealth events. This may be an additional reason for Ganadian government efforts to alleviate the boycott possibility.

For the previously mentioned reasons, the goal of the Canadian government during 1976-1977 was to bring New Zealand and the African states together. Towards this end, they consulted with Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal and other Commonwealth heads of government. When it became clear early in 1977 that the boycott was still an issue, Canada endeavoured to bring New Zealand and the Africans together at Gleneagles. They took the formula drafted by Mr. Ramphal and were leaders in promoting the idea throughout the Commonwealth. At the heads of government conference, Prime Minister Trudeau was instrumental in promoting the Gleneagles Agreement. Following the conference, Canadian missions in Africa acted as a liaison between New Zealand and the Africans.

The Canadian government took every opportunity to encourage the African nations to come to Edmonton. The Department of External Affairs acted as the line of communication between the Commonwealth Games Foundation and national sport bodies in Africa. Also, the government, through Air Canada, provided travel assistance to enable the African nations to come to Edmonton. Sierra Leone would not have come to the Games were it not for last minute financial assistance by the Canadian government.

In addition, the Canadian government, over the months leading up to the 1978 Commonwealth Games, moved to economically isolate South Africa. In December, 1977, External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson announced that Canada would phase out all its government sponsored and commercially sponsored activities in South Africa. This move was well received in Africa (Africa, April 1978).

Canadian government efforts internationally to insure that African

Commonwealth members competed at Edmonton, played a significant role in the ultimate success of the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Were it not for these efforts it is doubtful that New Zealand and Africa would have reconciled their differences, or that the Africans would have the respect for Canada they displayed by participating at Edmonton. This respect was uniquely described in this statement made by an African sport official attending the 1978 Commonwealth Games:

> If, by sheer chance these had been the Christchurch Games, I think it would have been a very different African attitude indeed. But Canada has been in our corner so long and helped so often we ... feel we just had to be here for these Games (Edmonton Sun, July 31, 1978).

2. Efforts Inside Canada

Substantial efforts were made inside Canada to reduce the possibility of a boycott. These were two fold: to encourage Africans to come to Edmonton, and to convince the African nations that Canada was opposed to apartheid.

A. Federal Government of Canada

Following the boycott at the 1976 Olympics the federal government made a number of policy statements which curbed Canadian contact with South Africa (see Appendix 1). These measures were in part designed to enhance Canada's position in Africa as well as to support the United Nations apartheid stance.

In May, 1977 the government made a policy statement on apartheid in sport. The statement indicated the government would neither financially nor morally support sporting contacts inside South Africa or in Canada. Copies of this statement were disseminated to governments throughout Africa. In December, 1977, Don Jamieson announced among other things that the Department of Employment and Immigration would require South Africans to obtain non-immigrant visas to enter Canada. This move was well received in Africa (Africa, April 1978). On July 14, 1973, Iona Campagnolo stated that visas would not be given to South African citizens representing their country, wishing to compete at sports competitions or attend sport congresses inside Canada. This move, three weeks before the opening of the Commonwealth Games, was designed in part to insure Africa's participation. The high African opinion of Canada is evidence of the success of these statements.

In addition to making policy statements on apartheid in sport, the Department of Fitness and Amateur Sport officially hosted a visit to Edmonton in April 1978 by SCSA leaders Ordia and Ganga. Meetings held in Edmonton were beneficial to the eventual outcome of the boycott issue. It gave both parties an understanding of the problems surrounding African participation. A possible reflection of the importance of this visit may lie in SCSA approval of the Edmonton Games given at Algiers in July 1978.

B. The Province of Alberta

The government of the province of Alberta was not directly involved in the efforts to resolve the dispute between New Zealand and the African Commonwealth members. It chose rather to let the federal government handle the international diplomatic efforts. They requested that they be kept informed of all developments concerning the boycott issue and the federal government did this. The government of the province of Alberta did supply Dr. Dent's tour group to Africa with support services through the office of the Department of Culture. The trip was designed to encourage the African Commonwealth nations to come to Edmonton.

C. The City of Edmonton

The municipal government's support for eliminating the boycott threat was channeled through the Commonwealth Games Foundation, an organizational body which was created by the city in 1972. However, in the fall of 1976 some city council members did react to the boycott threat. At that time there were qualms that a boycott might cause problems in terms of financing capital facilities and in the hosting of a first class international sports festival. It was suggested that alternative plans be made. No action was taken on this because the majority of city council members believed that it would only increase the probability of a boycott.

D. The XI Commonwealth Games Foundation

The Commonwealth Games Foundation believed that a boycott of the Games would have a disastrous effect on their plans to stage a first class international sports festival featuring some of the world's top athletes. Consequently they were concerned that every effort possible be made to encourage African participation. This was achieved with the help of the federal Department of External Affairs, which arranged for Dr. Van Vliet's trip to Africa and passed on Games information progress and accredition to the Africans. Dr. Van Vliet's trip to Africa must be considered as an important contribution to encouraging African participation. His face to face dialogue with the Africans gave them their first real exposure to the Games plans and progress. Results of Dr. Van Vliet's trip are evident in that two African nations accepted their invitations while he was in Africa. Further, one month following Dr. Van Vliet's trip, the SCSA at Rabat encouraged African Commonwealth members to go to Edmonton.

E. Individual Efforts

Individual efforts towards encouraging African participation at the Commonwealth Games were made by over 30 Edmonton business and service organizations. These groups financially support the trip by former Edmonton mayor Dr. Ivor Dent to Africa in June and july 1978. Dr. Dent's trip was given organizational assistance by the federal Department of External Affairs, and service assistance by the province of Alberta Department of Culture.

Dr. Dent's trip to Africa included a group of musicians from Alberta, a film on the Commonwealth Games and some of Edmonton's leading citizens. The purpose of the trip was to promote the Commonwealth Games and as a goodwill gesture. Dr. Dent met with many sport officials and government leaders, including SCSA president Abraham Ordia. The trip was valuable to the 1978 Commonwealth Games because it further promoted the Games in Africa and demonstrated Edmonton and Canada's goodwill towards the Africans.

In the opinion of this writer, a number of possible reasons exist for the extra effort made in July, 1978 by the group of Edmontonians. Like the Government of Canada, those individuals probably recognized the monetary gain which would be accrued by staging a first class Commonwealth Games. In addition, they may have sincerely desired to witness the best athletes in the world compete. For Dr. Dent, a former mayor of Edmonton, the goodwill trip may have been used to promote himself politically.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE BOYCOTT THREAT ON POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL SPORT

Under the leadership of the SCSA, African nations have used the boycott threat at international sport festivals and competitions as a political tool to effect change in South African sport. In this regard, united African boycott threats have had a dramatic influence on politics in international sport. International political organizations and national governments have taken ever increasing measures to isolate South Africa in international sport. This stronger global opposition to apartheid can be explained as occurring for two possible reasons. First, the boycott threats have raised global awareness of apartheid and consequently increased support in the anti-apartheid struggle. Secondly, the boycott threats have forced changes in sport policy to insure maximum African participation at international sports events.

The African boycott threat at the 1970 and 1974 Commonwealth Games resulted in changes in government attitude towards participation with South Africa. Prior to the Edinburgh Games in 1970, the British government intervened to stop a South African Springbok cricket tour of Great Britain. In New Zealand in 1973, a year prior to the Christchurch Commonwealth Games, the Labour government refused to allow a Springbok rugby team to tour New Zealand. These government interventions into sport occurred to minimize the possibility of a boycott. In both countries, the governments had previously not interfered in sport exchanges with South Africa.

The boycott threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games effected some significant changes in Commonwealth attitude towards apartheid in sport. Notable among these are: the Gleneagles Agreement, New Zealand's adherence to that Agreement, a strong Canadian government policy statement on sports contacts with South Africa, a resolution by the Commonwealth Games Federation opposing apartheid in sport, and considerable diplomatic efforts internationally to bring New Zealand and the African nations together to reconcile their differences. These efforts were made because a boycott would be detrimental to the Commonwealth.

It is clear that the boycott threat at the 1978 Commonwealth Games contributed to increasing opposition to apartheid throughout the Commonwealth. This, therefore, is evidence of the expanding influence of politics on sport. The boycott issue may have been used for other political purposes. Nigeria quite possibly used the boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games to reassert her position as a political leader among black African nations.

On another front, sport contacts with South Africa were a political issue in the New Zealand national elections of 1972 and 1975. Further, in June 1976 the leader of the opposition party in New Zealand used Prime Minister Muldoon's refusal to see Abraham Ordia to gain some political mileage out of the incident.

SPORTS BOYCOTT OF SOUTH AFRICA

VS.

POLITICAL REALITIES IN AFRICA

Considerable evidence has been presented which describes efforts made by member nations of the OAU to isolate South Africa in international sport and hence change its policy of sports apartheid. While the object of these efforts are commendable, the extent which they have taken must surely be questioned in light of the political realities outside sport on the African continent.

There are many accounts of atrocities occurring in African nations other than South Africa. Notable among these is the case of Uganda. Killings by the forces of the Ugandan state authorities between 1971 and 1977 have been estimated at between 80,000 and 90,000 (African Currents, No. 8, Spring 1979). Nigeria, long a leader among African nations in condemning the racist regime in South Africa, is not without its own problems in human rights. African Currents (No. 4, Winter 1975-76) reports that Nigeria, for a considerable length of time allowed its nations to be contracted for labour in Equatoris Guinea. The work in that country amounted to indentured slavery and much suffering for Nigerians, a situation which the Federal Military Government of Nigeria was slow to react to.

Every year black African governments commemerate the 67 people who were killed in the 1961 Sharpville massacre by the South African government. The SCSA has unceasingly advocated the exclusion of South Africa in international sport because of its policy and practice of apartheid. But where other members nations of the OAU are guilty of massacres and oppression there is little protest or call for justice. Reasons given by African leaders for their silence about these atrocities is a non-interference clause in the OAU charter (African Currents, No. 8, Spring 1977).

In light of this evidence all efforts made towards the isolation of South Africa must be questioned. Is it just to comdemn South Africa when atrocities occur in black Africa's own backyard? This author believes the black African nations should consider the political realities that surround them to the same degree with which they comdemn South Africa.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

Many nations throughout the world are opposed to the practice of apartheid and believe the only way in which change can be effected in South Africa is through its complete isolation internationally. Presently, one prominent medium through which changes have been made is sport. Leaders in sports isolation have been black African nations who, in recent years, have become increasingly adament in the anti-apartheid cause. Their boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics, and subsequent proposed boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games because of New Zealand's participation, were evidence of this stance. New Zealand was the target of the boycott because of its reluctance of sever sporting contacts with South Africa.

The realization of a possible boycott at Edmonton gave rise to substantial efforts to minimize that possibility. To determine what effects the boycott threat had on the development of the 1978 Commonwealth Games, this thesis has described, historically and chronologically, the events which occurred and initiatives which were taken during the two year period leading up to the Games.

Over this period, efforts were made by; the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal, the Government of Canada, other Commonwealth governments, the XI Commonwealth Games Foundation, and concerned individuals. A significant event which evolved as a result of these efforts was the Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport commonly referred to as the Gleneagles agreement. In this document, all Commonwealth heads of government agreed to combat apartheid by all possible means.

New Zealand's adherence to that accord, along with additional Canadian efforts in Africa to encourage participation at Edmonton proved to be successful, as ten of thirteen African nations competed at the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Nigeria was the only African nation to officially boycott the Games. Ostensibly, ~~it did this~~ because it believed New Zealand had not gone far enough to discourage sport contacts with South Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

The considerable efforts and the events which were the product of the boycott threat of the 1978 Commonwealth Games lend themselves to statements about the role of this international sport festival in society. In the opinion of this writer, these efforts and initiatives demonstrate that sport is important across many cultures. Presented below are conclusions derived from the study which establish the validity of this tenet.

At the Commonwealth level, substantial efforts made by Secretary-General Ramphal and Commonwealth Prime Ministers indicate the importance of the Commonwealth Games for harmony within that organization. In addition, the concensus among all Commonwealth governments on the Gleneagles Agreement reflects the perceived importance of Commonwealth sport as a means through which apartheid can be combated. The Commonwealth Games are also valuable for international exposure of the

Commonwealth as a political and cultural units.

In Canada, it was very important that the Games were a success. A great deal of prestige accompanies the hosting of a festival the magnitude of the Commonwealth Games. In addition, considerable monetary gain, it terms of tourist dollars and possible future investment in Canada may result from a successful Games. The Canadian government's financial commitment to the Games' capital, service and operating costs was another reason for efforts to ensure African participation. The government was also committed to encouraging Canadian participation in sport.

From an African perspective, the 1978 Commonwealth Games were an important vehicle through which a political cause could be furthered. Because of the boycott threat, there is now increased international awareness and opposition to apartheid. The Gleneagles Agreement, New Zealand's adherence to that agreement, Canadian anti-apartheid sport policy, and the Commonwealth Games Federation resolution are all evidence of this. While those results indicate sport is important to the African nations, they also demonstrate the increasing relationship between politics and sport. While African nations have used sport for political ends to promote changes in South Africa this author believes they should take into consideration political atrocities which are occurring around them in Africa before restricting their condemnation to South Africa alone.

The Commonwealth Games are important to Nigeria. It's government may have boycotted the Games to reassert their position as a leader in black Africa. In addition, the boycott may put additional pressure on New Zealand to go further in their opposition to sporting contacts with South Africa.

In New Zealand, sports plays a very important role. The New Zealand government has been reluctant to oppose sport contacts with South Africa as vehemantly as the rest of the Commonwealth members because it would be unpopular with many New Zealand people. Sports contacts with South Africa are deep rooted and consequently difficult to break. It appears likely that unless New Zealanders become convinced of the value of sports isolation, they will continue to be the subject of boycotts at future international sports events.

There are other conclusions that can be derived from the historical evidence in this study. New Zealand was chosen as the subject of the boycott because, in addition to competing with South Africa, they have, in Prime Minister Muldoon, a leader who in the past was insensitive to the political realities in Africa. New Zealand has no missions in Africa and presumably is therefore not aware of the feelings and attitudes of the African peoppe.

Canada's sport policy as it pertains to competition with South Africa became increasingly strong as the Commonwealth Games drew near. Those policy statements can be attributed to a desire to create a positive image of Canada in Africa, with the hopes that it would encourage the Africans to come to Edmonton. It was successful.

The evidence gathered in this study demonstrates the increasing relationship between politics and sport. This premise is based on the use of the 1978 Commonwealth Games as a vehicle to effect changes in South Africa and the international diplomatic efforts which were to ensure African participation at Edmonton.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that a follow-up study be undertaken whereby the historical data collected here is applied to a theoretical framework of international politics. It is hoped that in such a study the role of international sport in international politics be better understood.

2. It is also recommended that the efforts made by the Canadian government described in this study be applied to the theoretical framework of politics in Canadian sport.

3. A suggestion for further research would be to compare the Canadian government's attitude towards participation with South Africa prior to the 1978 Commonwealth Games with its posture following the Games.

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APPENDIX 1

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

POLICY ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

1975 - 1978

SEP 2 2 197

CANADA

MINISTER OF NATIONAL HEALTH AND WELFARE
AND
MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STATUS OF WOMEN

MINISTRE DE LA
SANTÉ NATIONALE ET DU BIEN-ÊTRE SOCIAL
ET
MINISTRE CHARGÉ DE LA SITUATION DE LA FEMME

OTTAWA, K1A 0K9

SEPTEMBER 1 8 1975

Ms. Kathy Whitty
President
Canadian Women's Field Hockey Association
c/o Sports & Recreation, Department of Youth
Centennial Building
FREDERICTON, N.B.
E3B 5H1

Dear Ms. Whitty:

The Canadian Government has on many occasions, in the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and in other international forums expressed its strong condemnation of the practices of apartheid and racial discrimination in the Republic of South Africa as a denial of fundamental human rights. Apartheid is rigorously enforced in athletic competition no less than in any other sphere of South African life. This situation is in direct opposition to the Olympian principle which forbids discrimination on racial, religious or political grounds, and for that reason the International Olympic Committee in 1970 suspended South Africa from participation in the Olympic movement. This position was given unqualified support by the United Nations and it is supported fully by the Government.

You will also be aware that present Canadian Government policy denies funding to any Canadian athlete or group of athletes who intend to travel to South Africa for the purpose of participating in an athletic competition. While we fully recognize that the decision rests with the individual and/or sport governing body concerned, we have pointed out that competition in South Africa, under conditions of racial discrimination which are universally condemned, is a matter of considerable Canadian public concern. Although the Government of Canada does not support such visits, neither is it prepared to limit the freedom of Canadians to travel abroad where they wish.

Ms. Kathy Whitty

More recently, events have been awarded to Canada in which athletes from South Africa have been invited to participate. This letter will confirm the position taken by the Government in July of this year of not providing either moral or financial support to any event in Canada to which South African athletes have been invited. This policy is being implemented in concert with many other nations in the hope that concern over increasing isolation will encourage the South African Government to take real and substantive steps to abandon the policy and practice of apartheid.

Yours truly,

Març Lalonde.

CANADA

MINISTER OF STATE
FITNESS AND AMATEUR SPORT

MINISTRE D'ÉTAT
SANTÉ ET SPORT AMATEUR

OTTAWA, K1A 0K9

May 11, 1977.

Miss Sue Neill,
President,
Canadian Women's Field Hockey
  Association,
c/o Faculty of Physical Education,
University of Alberta,
EDMONTON, Alberta.

Dear Miss Neill:

As you are aware, the question of sporting contacts with the Republic of South Africa is an issue that has caused increasing concern to the international athletic community over the last several years. In 1970, the International Olympic Committee decided to expel the South African National Olympic Committee because that country's racist sports policies and practices were considered to be in violation of the IOC regulations.

Similarly, Canada and the international community, including a growing number of international sport governing bodies, have implemented policies designed to express to South Africa firm opposition to the application to sports of the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination and to impress upon the South African Government and South African sporting federations the need to make significant changes in these discriminatory practices. Some countries and sports federations have imposed a total ban on all sporting contacts with South African athletes. Other countries have sought to restrict and discourage such contacts by other means. Canada, for example, has maintained since 1974 a firm policy of not giving either financial or moral support to Canadian sports bodies for the purpose of travelling to South Africa for competition, or of hosting events in Canada in which South African teams or athletes are allowed to participate.

... 2

The Government does not consider itself to be in a position to place restrictions on the right of Canadian citizens to travel abroad. Nonetheless, the Government firmly disapproves of all sport contact with South Africa, and within the limits of the policy described above, has done all that it can to discourage such contacts since that policy was adopted in 1974.

As part of the international effort to eliminate racially discriminatory practices from sports, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions (in 1971, 1975 and 1976) calling on all member states to (among other actions): refuse any sponsorship, assistance or encouragement to sports contacts with South Africa, including official receptions for teams; refuse payments of grants to sports bodies or teams or sportsmen; and encourage national sports bodies to support the exclusion of South Africa from all international sports bodies, competitions or tournaments.

The Canadian Government has supported these resolutions and has declared its intention to implement their provisions. The Government considers that such measures as these are necessary to strengthen the international effort to bring about substantial change in South African sports policies and practices. While the Government recognizes that certain limited steps have been taken in South Africa in this direction, we consider that until now these modifications have been largely cosmetic, are designed solely to give the appearance of change, and are not indicative of any real and substantial alterations in the present racially discriminatory policies and practices in South African sports. Sport activities constitute a very important element in South African society, and it is clear that that society's self-esteem has been markedly affected by the growing isolation of South Africa in international sport. It is equally clear that the modifications undertaken to date have come about partly as a result of this isolation.

... 3

It is with the above considerations in mind that I wish to discuss the question of future Canadian attitudes towards continued sporting contacts with South Africa. You will recall that African and other states boycotted the Montreal Olympics as a means of expressing their disaffection over the policies of New Zealand regarding sporting relations with South Africa. The possibility of some such action was raised in Mr. Lalonde's letter of May 3, 1974, to all sport governing bodies, as was the possibility of a similar boycott against the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. While some progress appears to have been made in recent months in reconciling the differing views of the countries concerned, the Government believes that there remains a possibility that the success of the Edmonton Games may be undermined by a boycott along the lines of the Montreal example. The Government is anxious to minimize this possibility and is particularly concerned that such a boycott should not come about as a result of continuing sporting relations between Canada and South Africa.

In order to avoid such a development, the Government is concerned that Canadian sports federations and individuals should not undertake actions which might cause adverse international attention to be focused on Canada or on Canadian sports federations. I therefore strongly urge you and other Canadian sports federations to do your utmost to discourage sports contacts with South Africa at all levels within your sport, whether national, provincial or local. For its part, the Government will continue to enforce the policies expressed above. Furthermore, as a reflection of the seriousness with which we regard this matter, the Government will in the future strongly discourage and, if necessary, take a very critical attitude in public towards any proposed sporting contact between Canadians and South Africans, whether federal funding is involved or not. This concern would necessarily include proposals by Canadian sport bodies to host world-class events at their own expense in those sports where South Africa is a member of the International Federation and, as such, would be eligible to participate.

... 4

Miss Sue Neill

With your assistance and cooperation, the Government is hopeful that these actions will convince South Africa of the need to abandon apartheid policies and racially discriminatory practices in sport once and for all.

Yours very truly,

Iona Campagnolo

CANADA

MINISTER OF STATE
FITNESS AND AMATEUR SPORT

MINISTRE D'ÉTAT
SANTÉ ET SPORT AMATEUR

OTTAWA K1A 0X6

July 14, 1978.

Mr. David Hoy,
Department of Physical Education,
Faculty of Physical Education and Recreation,
University of Alberta,
EDMONTON, Alberta.
T6G 2H9

Dear Mr. Hoy:

This is in reply to your letter of May 10, 1978 concerning the Canadian Government's position in relation to sporting contacts with South Africa.

As you are aware, the question of sporting contacts with South Africa is an issue that has caused concern to the international athletic community over the last several years. In 1970, the International Olympic Committee expelled the South African National Olympic Committee because that country's racist sport policy and practices were in violation of the I.O.C. regulations.

Similarly, Canada and the international sport community, including a growing number of international sport governing bodies, have implemented policies designed to express to South Africa firm opposition to the practice of apartheid and racial discrimination, and to impress upon that country's government, the need to make significant changes in these discriminatory practices. Some countries and sport federations have imposed a total ban on all sporting contacts with South African athletes. Other countries have sought to restrict and discourage such contacts by other means. Canada has maintained, since 1974, a firm policy of giving neither financial nor moral support to Canadian sport bodies for the purpose of travelling to South Africa for competition, or for the purpose of hosting events in Canada, in which South African Teams or athletes are allowed to participate.

.../2

The Government does not consider itself to be in a position to place restrictions on the right of Canadian citizens to travel abroad. Nonetheless, the Government firmly disapproves of all sport contact with South Africa and, within the limits of the policy described above, has done all that it can to discourage contacts since that policy was adopted.

As part of the international effort to eliminate racially discriminatory practices from sport, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions, (in 1971, 1975, and 1976), calling on all member states to, among other actions, refuse any sponsorship, assistance or encouragement to sport contacts with South Africa.

The Canadian Government supports these resolutions and has declared its intention to implement their provisions. The Government considers that such measures are necessary to strengthen the international effort to bring about substantial change in South African sport policies and practices. While the Government recognizes that certain limited steps have been taken by South Africa in this direction, these modifications have been largely cosmetic and are not indicative of any real and substantial alterations in the discriminatory policies and practices in South African sport. Sport activities constitute a very important element in South African society, and it is clear that the society's self-esteem has been markedly affected by the growing isolation in international sport. It is equally clear that the modifications undertaken to date have come about partly as a result of this isolation.

It is with the above considerations in mind that I will comment on the future attitude of the Canadian Government towards continued sporting contacts with South Africa. You will recall that African, and other, states boycotted the Montreal Olympics as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction over New Zealand's sporting relations with South Africa. The possibility of this action was realized in 1974 as was the possibility of a similar boycott against the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. Some progress appears to have been made in recent months in reconciling the differing views of the countries concerned.

.../3

Mr. David Hoy

On May 11, 1977, I wrote to all Canadian Sport Federations urging them not to undertake actions which might cause adverse international attention being directed to either Canada or Canadian sport governing bodies. I also strongly urged them to do their utmost to discourage sport contacts with South Africa at all levels within their respective sports. The Government, for its part, has continued to enforce the policies expressed above. Furthermore, as a reflection of the seriousness with which the Government regards this matter, we will strongly discourage and, if necessary, take a very critical attitude in public towards any proposed sporting contact between Canadians and South Africans, whether federal funding is involved or not. This will include proposals by Canadian sport bodies to host world class events where South Africa is a member of the international federation and, as such, would be eligible to participate.

An additional important initiative was taken by Prime Minister Trudeau at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held at Gleneagles, Scotland, June 12, 1977. At that time, all Commonwealth countries agreed to support a declaration introduced by Canada reaffirming their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign. On the basis of this declaration, the Commonwealth countries anticipate a successful XIth Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and a continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport in general.

A representative of the Fitness and Amateur Sport Branch, Mr. Ted Peterson, will be in Edmonton in the near future. He will contact you through the Department of Physical Education of the University of Alberta to arrange a mutually convenient time to discuss this subject further. I trust that the foregoing will prove useful to you in your current research on the relationships between apartheid and international sport.

Yours very truly,

Iona Campagnolo.

NEWS
NEWS
RELEASE

Minister of State
Fitness and Amateur Sport

Ministre d'État
Santé et Sport amateur

1978 - 101
July 14, 1978

CANADA DEFINES POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICAN SPORTSPEOPLE

OTTAWA - The federal government has established specific criteria for the granting of Canadian visas to South African sportspeople, it was announced today by the Honourable Iona Campagnolo, Minister of State, Fitness and Amateur Sport.

Criteria were established following the December 1977 announcement by External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson which stated that non-immigrant visas would be required for all South Africans visiting Canada. This policy went into effect with implementation of the new Canada Immigration Act on April 10, 1978.

Criteria released today disallow visas for South African citizens who wish to come to Canada to participate in sports competitions or associated congresses as representatives of their country. They also apply to representatives of South African national sport federations, to representatives of a constituent body of South African national sport federations, and to South African executive members of an international sport governing body.

The restrictions are in accordance with the Agreement reached by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Gleneagles, Scotland in June, 1977. The Agreement stated that Commonwealth Governments would take every practicable step to discourage sporting links with South Africa, because of that country's official policy of apartheid.

Policies similar to Canada's have been adopted by other Commonwealth countries, including Australia.

The new criteria, announced today, are designed to clarify the government's previous policy on sporting contacts with South Africa.

Under this policy, the federal government refuses to provide funding or other assistance to Canadian teams travelling to South Africa, or to sporting events or congresses in Canada at which South Africans are expected to participate. The Canadian policy is based on discouragement of Canadian sporting contact with South Africa in third countries.

The Minister felt the policy placed an unfair burden on individual sport and recreation governing bodies in Canada. Today's announcement will meet requests of many Canadian sportspeople that the government take full responsibility for administration of the South Africa Sport Policy.

- 30 -

Ref.: N.-René Mercier
Tel.: (613) 995-8465

APPENDIX 2

SHRIDATH RAMPHAL

LETTER TO NATIONAL SPORT ORGANIZATIONS IN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

19 July 1977

Dear President

For some time now, more particularly since the Montreal Olympics, the question of sporting contacts with South Africa has come to be a major issue of public concern. At their Meeting last month in London, Commonwealth Heads of Government addressed themselves to this problem and, giving a welcome lead to the world, unanimously adopted a Commonwealth statement on apartheid in sport, a copy of which is enclosed. They were conscious, however, that the full realisation of their objectives "involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities". It is in that spirit that I bring this statement to the attention of your Organisation with the request that it be given all appropriate circulation.

More specifically, however, on behalf of Commonwealth Governments collectively, all of whom have subscribed to the statement, I should like to appeal for your wholehearted co-operation in its implementation both in the interest of Commonwealth harmony and the healthy development of international sport.

I am writing in similar terms to national sporting organisations in other Commonwealth countries.

Shridath S. Ramphal

Shridath S Ramphal

Miss Sue Neill
President
Canadian Women's Field Hockey
Association
c/o Faculty of Physical Education
University of Alberta
EDMONTON, Alberta

COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

The member countries of the Commonwealth embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

/2..

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Government of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.

London
15 June 1977

APPENDIX 3

UGANDA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1978 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

On May 8, 1978, Uganda officially withdrew from the 1978 Games. A great deal of controversy surrounds Uganda's withdrawal. It is believed that they withdrew because of anti-Ugandan comments made in the press and in the House of Commons. An account of the series of events which led to Uganda's withdrawal is presented below.

The question of Uganda's President Idi Amin attending the Commonwealth Games was first raised in Edmonton's City Council in April of 1977. At that time, aldermen voted to strike from their agenda a motion which called for them to "take any means possible to prevent Idi Amin or any member of His government from attending the Games" (Edmonton Journal, April 13, 1977). While the majority of council members voted in favour of striking the motion, three council members supported it. In stating their support for the motion, these members cited Admin's alleged genocidal atrocities against Ugandans. They believed the City of Edmonton should put on record its disapproval of Amin. Those who voted in favour of striking the motion felt that supporting it might be seen as a provocation to African nations, and hence put the Games in jeopardy (Edmonton Journal, April 13, 1977).

The Amin question reached the House of Commons in May 1977. Conservative M.P. Douglas Roche demanded that the Federal Government ban Idi Amin from attending the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Mr. Roche was critical of Canada's policy of "quiet diplomacy" and wanted the government to take "... some solid public stands on human rights issues" (Edmonton Journal, May 20, 1977).

External Affairs Minister Allen MacEachen responded to M.P. Roche's question by stating:

> I wonder whether you understand the implications of your suggestion that at this moment we should say that one member of the Commonwealth be denied admission? ... It might result in the collapse of the Games which is certainly not our intention.
>
> As you know with respect to the Edmonton Games the Federal Government is doing everything possible at the present time to make them a success and to get all countries to participate (Edmonton Journal, May 20, 1977).

During the summer of 1977, a report originating from Uganda quoted Idi Amin as saying that he would like to visit the Commonwealth Games. However, he wanted an invitation from the federal government and good security arrangements (Edmonton Journal, July 15, 1977).

Following the SCSA resolution at Rabat in November 1977 urging all African Commonwealth members to participate at Edmonton, Uganda accepted its invitation in February 1978. After being notified of Uganda's acceptance, Assistant Sports Coordinator Ken Porter said that the Ugandan team would have an impact on the type of security arrangements needed (Edmonton Journal, February 28, 1978).

The issue of Uganda was again raised in the House of Commons when Conservative M.P. Doug Roche asked External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson whether Idi Amin would be banned from the Games. Mr. Jamieson declined to comment to the question, noting that Amin has a talent for "maximizing the proposing of hypothetical questions as to whether he is going to visit someplace or whether he is not" (Edmonton Journal, March 3, 1978).

The Minister added that it would serve no useful purpose in speculating what the government would do if Amin decided to come to Canada. "If President Amin announces categorically that he is going to come we will deal with it at that time" (Edmonton Journal, March 3, 1978).

In April there were reports in the news media that Amin was planning to attend the 1978 Commonwealth Games as coach of Uganda's boxing team (Edmonton Sunday Sun, April 10, 1978). On April 21, in the House of Commons, Conservative M.P. John Diefenbaker wanted assurances from the government that Amin would be banned from entering Canada. He said; "We need no coaches for murder and terrorism" (Edmonton Journal, April 22, 1978).

In response to Diefenbaker's question Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport said that she believed Amin was bluffing in his threat to coach Uganda's boxing team. She pointed out that Amin had threatened to attend the 1974 Christchurch Commonwealth Games but never appeared. She added, "I think he is using the same ploy in connection with the Edmonton Games" (Edmonton Journal, April 22, 1978).

Early in May, Amin invited several Canadian newsmen to cover Uganda's Mayday celebrations. In a Kampala interview with the Edmonton Sun newspaper, Amin "warned" that if Canada did not want him to attend the Commonwealth Games there would be a possibility of other African nations boycotting the Commonwealth Games. Amin also alleged that he had already been invited to the Games by the Commonwealth Games Foundation (Edmonton Sun, May 3, 1978). In Ottawa, the government's response to Amin's statement was cool. They chose not to react to what they believed were statements designed to elicit a response from the government. However, Amin's comments did get a rise out of M.P. Roche who stated:

> My opinion is that Idi Amin should be banned from Canada ... This is grotesque; the very idea of our city [Edmonton] hosting Amin is outrageous (Edmonton Sun, May 4, 1978).

On May 3rd there were reports originating in Uganda stating that Idi Amin had invited Margaret Trudeau, estranged wife of Prime Minister Trudeau, to see Uganda for herself. However, these reports were never confirmed (Edmonton Journal, May 3, 1978).

A Ugandan radio broadcast monitored in London on May 7 was quoted as saying that Ugandan athletes would be withdrawn from the Commonwealth Games as soon as confirmation was received of reports that Zionist Israelis planned to compete in the Games. The radio reported that:

> President Amin will not have Ugandan men and women athletes compete alongside Israeli athletes in view of Israel's aggression against the Arab states and the occupation of Arab territories (Edmonton Journal, May 10, 1978).

On May 8 the Ugandan team was withdrawn from the 1978 Commonwealth Games by President Idi Amin. A note was delivered to Canada's External Affairs Department by Uganda's High Commissioner to Canda, David Akongo. The contents of the note were not made public under an agreement between Akongo and the External Affairs Department. However, Akongo revealed to the press some of the reasons for Uganda's withdrawal:

> ... Canada has used Uganda's intention to participate in the Games to mount a vicious and entirely unwarranted anti-Ugandan campaign (Edmonton Journal, May 19, 1978).

In June, there were indications that Uganda might yet send a team to the Games. An official of the Ugandan National Council of Sport told the Reuters news agency that the track and field team that was to compete in the All-Africa Games in Algiers might go on to Edmonton (Edmonton Journal, June 15, 1978). Hope for Uganda's participation in the Games rose on July 9th when Ugandan track star John Akii-Bua revealed in Algiers, on the eve of the Pan-African Games, that a decision about his country's appearance in the Commonwealth Games had not yet been made. Another Ugandan athlete said:

> We are hoping that it will still be possible for us to go to Canada. Despite the recent stories of a boycott, there could well be a Ugandan team in Edmonton (Edmonton Journal, July 10, 1978).

While all interested hoped Uganda would send a team to Edmonton following the Pan-Africa Games, they did not participate in the 1978 Commonwealth Games. Morse (1978) believes that Uganda withdrew because the Canadian Press and House of Commons statements were essentially anti-Uganda. In the official note of withdrawal given to the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Okongo pointed out that Amin had never said he intended to come to the Games and that the government of Uganda regarded all these statements in the press and the House of Commons as an unfriendly act. As a result Uganda withdrew its team.

It is doubtful if such speculation about Amin's attendance at the 1978 Commonwealth Games was ever necessary. President Amin probably would never have come to Edmonton because of the very realistic chance that his government would fall in a coup. As Iona Campagnolo pointed out in Parliament, Amin threatened to attend the 1974 Commonwealth Games in Christchurch and never attended. Similarly, Amin threatened to attend the 1977 Commonwealth Conference in London and never set foot in Britain. It is doubtful, therefore, that he would risk attending the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton.

APPENDIX 4

E.S. MPOFU

FIRST SECRETARY, EMBASSY OF BOTSWANA

LETTER TO AUTHOR

EMBASSY OF BOTSWANA
CHANCERY
VAN NESS CENTER
4301 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W. SUITE 404
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 244-4991
TELEGRAMS: BOTSEM, WASHINGTON, D. C.

OUR REFERENCE: BW/INF 9/2(48)
YOUR REFERENCE:

July 7, 1978

Mr. David Hoy,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Canada T6G -2H9

Dear Sir,

Botswana does not at the moment have sufficient means to develop sports facilities to train athletes. As you might know it is also quite expensive for a country such as Botswana to send athletes to participate at the Commonwealth or any other games.

Yours Sincerely,

E. S. Mpofu
First Secretary

ESM/sar.